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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDM-GC-MH

31 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. General

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation DAN QUYEN-HINES.

(2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation HINES, 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970, is set forth in Inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

(4) Locations, coordinates for villages, LZ's, and FSB's are listed at Inclosure 5.

(5) Mission: The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations to support GVN pacification programs; to locate, pursue and destroy VC/NVA elements attempting to disrupt pacification; to screen routes of infiltration along the CAMBODIAN Border; to secure the major LOC within its AO; to relocate its base of operations to Camp Radcliff; to turn over to ARVN Camp Enari and tactical responsibility to PLEIKU Province; and to redeploy one brigade to CONUS for inactivation.

(6) Concept of Operation. At the beginning of this period, the Division had one brigade in PLEIKU Province and two in BINH DINH. The 1st and 2d Brigades were conducting operations to preclude an incursion into the coastal lowlands during T&T by the 3d NVA Division. The 3d Brigade was in an economy of force role in western PLEIKU Province preparing to withdraw from combat in preparation for redeployment activities. At the end of the period, the threat of the 3d NVA Division had dissipated, the 3d Brigade had been inactivated at Fort Lewis, Washington, and PLEIKU Province and Camp Enari were under the control of the 22d ARVN Division.

(a) Liaison with GVN: The 4th Division maintained continuous liaison with Headquarters, II Corps. Brigades maintained liaison with

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districts and with ARVN units in whose AO they operated.

(b) Reaction Forces: One infantry battalion was stationed at Camp Radcliff, and was engaged in training, security and patrol activities. This battalion constituted the Division reserve and maintained one company on fifteen minute alert, prepared to reinforce Division elements, or if directed, relieve or reinforce GVN units.

(c) Highway Security: Highway 19E was secured at various times by the mechanized battalion, tank battalion, and armored cavalry squadron. The maximum force employed at any one time was two battalion sized units and the minimum was the armored cavalry squadron. All units on Highway Security operated under Division control. Other routes were secured when necessitated by Division units operating in the area.

(d) Screening the CAMBODIAN Border and Interdiction of Infiltration Routes: The Division Armored Cavalry Squadron conducted screening operations north and west of PLEI DJERENG; to just south of DUC CO interdicting the infiltration route through the PLEI TRAP Valley and the two infiltration routes north and south of DUC CO. This configuration continued until mid-February when the mechanized battalion relocated to Highway 19, and the cavalry squadron redispensed its screen to the vicinity of LZ OASIS. This disposition continued to provide a screen for the western approaches into Camp Enari. One infantry battalion constituted the defense of Camp Enari.

b. Intelligence

(1) General: Enemy activity in PLEIKU Province for February was light as enemy elements launched a brief offensive on 1 February and then concentrated on highway interdiction for the remainder of the month. The K-6 Bn/24th Regiment was identified in contact in the PLEI KRONG area. Southwest of PLEIKU, 4th Division elements found several rice caches. In BINH DINH Province activity was moderate, characterized by brief firefights, small arms sniper fire, and numerous incidents of ground to air fire. Several large food and arms caches were found in an area that had been targeted for a PW Camp and an NCO and Officer Training area northwest of BASE AREA 226.

During March, activity in PLEIKU Province remained light but was highlighted by an attack by fire on Camp Holloway and an attack on the PLEI ME CSF. In BINH DINH Province, activity remained moderate with a majority of the incidents being friendly initiated. Division units operating west and northwest of BASE AREA 226 continued to capture and evacuate rice caches, and an extensive hospital complex was found. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols from the K-75 Ranger Company accounted for more than one KIA per contact during the month.

Activity increased in April, in both BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces as the enemy began its "Spring Offensive" with numerous attacks against friendly installations, outposts, and fire bases. During April, Division

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month resulting in several downed aircraft.

(4) Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength as of 30 April 1970.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
3d NVA Division Headquarters	2400	Northern BINH DINH
2d VC Regiment	950	Northern BA 226
18th NVA Regiment	1310	BA 226
500th Transportation Battalion	350	Northwest of BA 226
24th NVA Regiment	900	Cbu Pa (Mtg)
95B Regiment	700	BA 202
H-15 Local Force Battalion	200	East of Camp Spari
X-45 Local Force Battalion	200	Southwest of Camp Spari
408th Sapper Battalion	300	ENE of PLAIKU
631st Composite Battalion	300	Southern CHU PRONG
Infra Structure	7150	
Guerilla Forces	1000	
TOTAL ENEMY FORCES	15760	

(5) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques

(a) Since 1 March 1970, contact with villagers in and around the 4th Infantry Division new TAOR has revealed an unwillingness to discuss either enemy activity or possible plans, particularly including plans for the enemy Summer Offensive. This attitude may be attributed to a degree of success in known enemy propoganda concerning American troop withdrawals and enemy reprisals against local villages known to support the GVN and American forces. American troops propagation of rumor concerning troop withdrawal continues to reinforce enemy propoganda efforts. Currently, the villagers are being told of the successes of the Liberation Movement in CAMBODIA.

(b) The enemy continues to employ harassing tactics in villages, including reinforced and fortified villages, and against US and ARVN/GVN installations.

(c) Exploitation of several detainees and some documents has given the 4th Division information that the enemy is now being forced to eat foodstuffs other than rice due to the allied pacification program, the

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defoliation program, and capturing and evacuating many tons of rice. Detainees have stated that they have not eaten for three or four days due to lack of rice.

(d) It appears that the enemy is now placing individuals along flight patterns to observe helicopters as they are arriving or departing Landing Zones or Fire Support Bases. This enables them to plot the direction of travel based on certain climatic conditions. The cadre then arrange for personnel to be placed near the flight pattern and interdict with ground to air fire. This type tactic resulted in two downed aircraft with eleven US killed and three wounded.

(6) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses

(a) Personnel:	KIA (BC)	306
	NVA CIA	13
	VC/VMC CIA	16
	TOTAL	335

(b) Weapons:	S/A	205
	C/S	20
	TOTAL	225

(c) Ammunition:	S/A rounds	139,078
	C/S rounds	1,320
	Grenades	80
	Mines	112

(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items:

Explosives	1,634
Documents	280,090
Rice	457,285 lbs
Salt	2,904 lbs

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Actions:

(a) Capabilities

1. The 2d VC Regiment of the 3d NVA Division has the capability

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to conduct multi-battalion size attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas in the PHU MY area of BINH DINH Province.

2 The 18th NVA Regiment of the 3d NVA Division has the capability to conduct multi-battalion size attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas supported by their organic 122mm rockets. They can also interdict Highway 19 from the MANG YANG Pass to BINH KHE.

3 The 95B Regiment is capable of conducting up to battalion size attacks against fire support bases, isolated camps, and populated areas in the VC Valley and harassing and interdicting Highway 19 from AK KHE to PLEIKU.

4 The 408th Sapper Battalion can conduct company size sapper attacks supported by mortar and possible rocket fire against allied installations and populated areas in PLEIKU Province.

5 The 631st Composite Battalion is capable of launching multi-company size attacks supported by 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets on allied installations, outposts, and populated areas west and north of PLEIKU City.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities

1 Enemy units are vulnerable to airstrikes and artillery fire when in bivouac or massing for an attack.

2 Enemy munitions and food caches are vulnerable to allied search and clear operations.

3 Enemy lines of communication are sufficiently extended to make them vulnerable to interdiction by allied operations.

4 Enemy movement is vulnerable to airborne personnel detection and sensor devices.

5 The enemy is vulnerable to psychological operations due to low morale, heavy personnel losses, and shortages of food and medical supplies.

(c) Probable Courses of Action

1 The Spring-Summer Offensive will continue with brief halts for resupply and reorganization of forces. Enemy forces are expected to maintain their current activity and will conduct attacks by fire on friendly installations and outposts. Again the attacks will be of the harassing type to destroy the current GVN pacification program.

2 In BINH DINH Province, the 2d Regiment will conduct operations against friendly fire bases and local villages and hamlets in the PHU MY

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area and the area north of BA 226, in an effort to gain control of the prosperous eastern and the northern BINH DINH region.

3 The 18th Regiment will conduct operations in the AN KHE/VINH THANH area targeted against allied installations and Highway 19.

4 Local forces, operating in support of the BINH DINH Provincial Committee, will continue harassment and psychological warfare against the villages and hamlets especially in the coastal districts of PHU MY and PHU CAT.

5 In PLEIKU Province, the 24th NVA Regiment is expected to remain inactive as it will continue to resupply its forces with fresh troops, food and weapons. It is expected to participate in at least one of the major battles of the Spring-Summer Offensive.

6 The 631st Composite Battalion will employ 122mm rockets in attacks by fire against allied installations around PLEIKU City.

7 The 408th Sapper Battalion will conduct sapper attacks against allied installations in the PLEIKU area and continue terrorist activities in the city itself.

8 The 95B Regiment will resume its normal mission of interdiction of Highway 19 when the US forces, now occupying part of their base area, leave VC Valley. The 95B Regiment is also expected to attack bridges, strong points, and to harass villages along Highway 19.

9 Local forces will continue interdiction of lines of communication and harassment of local villages attempting to disrupt the pacification program and strengthen VC control of the province.

(3) Military Intelligence Activities

(a) General: During the past quarter, the 4th Military Intelligence Company provided Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation, and Interrogation of Prisoners of War support to the Division. Emphasis was placed on the close coordination and frequent exchange of information between 4th MIC units and G2. A daily G2 situation briefing for all G2 related activities and the frequent exchange of ideas and information during these briefings greatly enhanced the production, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence material.

(b) Counterintelligence: The activities of the CI Section during the reporting period continued to include preplanned operations against small local force units and individuals with the majority of the CI effort being devoted to increasing the number of agent sources within the Tactical Area of Responsibility. An operation is continually conducted to screen all indigenous employees working at Camp Radcliff. The highly successful operations resulted in the identification and neutralization of several VCS during the quarter.

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(c) Interrogation Prisoners of War: Close cooperation was maintained between the IPW Section and G2, as well as the units in the field, during the last quarter. The advantages of tactful exploitation and close rapport with detainees were amply displayed in IPW's successful interrogation techniques. During February the IPW Section exploited two returnees that had been in a PW camp since 1965. The two returnees gave the location of the VC PW camp, the location of cultivated areas that the VC were using to grow rice and potatoes, and the location of an Officer and NCO Training School. All of the information was compiled and an operation went into this area and located the PW camp and training school, and several areas that were or had recently been used for production of foodstuffs.

(d) Dufflebag Operations: During the reporting period the emphasis on Dufflebag operations was shifted to security of Highway 19 and protection of the Camp Radcliff perimeter.

The highway defense aspect of Dufflebag operations during the period was accomplished through a two fold program. The purpose of the program was to attempt to reduce the number of mining incidents along Highway 19 and to deny the enemy routes of approach to the highway, thereby discouraging interdiction of vehicles on the highway.

In an effort to stop the mining incidents, several seismic and acoustic devices were emplaced in strategic locations to detect the enemy upon his arrival at the highway. The results of these emplacements were quite conclusive. A device near LZ SCHUELLER detected an individual near the road. M-79 fire was directed into the area and a sweep was conducted finding one mine emplaced, but not yet covered, and another mine not exploded.

To deny the enemy access to the highway, probable routes of approach were covered with seismic intrusion detectors. Once again the device was successful as five individuals were detected moving north toward a strong point on Highway 19 near LZ BLACKHAWK. Due to the proximity of friendly troops in the area artillery could not be employed, but the strong point was alerted, and were at 100 percent alert when the strong point began receiving B40 fire.

Camp Radcliff defense consisted of two phases. The initial phase of securing the heliport was accomplished by using a Balanced Pressure System line sensor, and installing the devices within the perimeter wire to detect individuals trying to infiltrate the perimeter wire. The second phase of perimeter defense was to saturate possible routes of access outside the perimeter. This mission was initiated with the emplacement of thirty seismic devices to the north and east of the perimeter. Although the program is in its infant stages, the first night after emplacement approximately five individuals were detected.

(e) G2 Air Reconnaissance: During the reporting period, efforts to compile photographic coverage of the new Division AO were met with

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limited success due to inclement weather in the AO during the months of February and March.

During April, weather improved and imagery was produced and received for interpretation and analysis of enemy activity in BASE AREA 226. Also during the reporting period Snoopy/Scorpion operational techniques were changed to provide closer direct support to maneuver elements. Missions were conducted within close proximity of maneuver elements and serve as scouting and screening elements in front and along the flanks of ground troops. Limited success of this operation has been experienced due to frequent lack of aircraft assets.

During February and March a study was made to determine the correlation between Red Haze mission readouts and areas of slash and burn field clearing and subsequent cultivation. Results of the study indicate that changes in enemy field clearing and farming activity may be detected by employment of OV-1B aircraft in the Red Haze (IR) configuration.

(9) Weather Forecasting

(a) Support provided:

1. Hourly weather observations	2160
2. Special weather observations	360
3. Routine scheduled forecasts plus amendments	290
4. Planning forecast issued to select staff agencies twice daily	180
5. Aircraft accident reports (summary of weather existing at the time)	11
6. Monthly climatology reports for II Corps	3
7. Out of station briefings conducted at request of staff agencies	30
8. Telephone requests for weather information	2340
9. Area climatology summaries and special area or long range forecasts	12

(b) The most significant operational problem occurred during March when a planned Division operation (RICHLEBERGER BLACK) was cancelled due to poor weather in the objective area. A long range forecast had predicted marginal if not poor flying weather during the period, and on the tentative target date of 22 March, proved accurate. The operation was aborted on the 23d of March again because of weather, but did take place on 24 March as a brigade sized effort.

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c. Operations and Training Activities

(1) Operations

(a). The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period. Two major operations employing unique techniques were undertaken during the period in an attempt to cope with the enemy's evasive tactics.

The normal enemy response to a major operation in the 4th Division AO is to fragment and exfiltrate the area. The enemy has been generally successful in escaping friendly forces. In an attempt to counter this tactic, the Division conducted two unique operations to test concepts for fixing and destroying enemy units. Neither operation produced a significant body count because they were primarily a test of techniques, and were not conducted in areas where the enemy was known to be concentrated. However, the operations were extremely valuable as training vehicles, and have added a new tactic to the 4th Division repertoire which can be profitably employed whenever an appropriate target is identified.

Both techniques employ a high concentration of troops in a relatively small area. In the first operation five infantry battalions were deployed in a ring around the target area. On D-Day and on successive days, the ring was closed. The second operation saw one brigade of three battalions deployed in a line to sweep through a base area, with ranger patrols ambushing routes of exit forward of the advancing units. Both techniques require detailed planning, tight control of fire and movement, and a high degree of discipline on the part of commanders and troops.

In the cordon operation three battalions moved overland and two were combat assaulted into positions on the outer ring. Plans called for the ring to be closed and all units tied in at flank coordinating points by the end of D-Day. Rifle companies were assigned frontages of 600 meters or less on D-Day, so that an average front line strength of 100 men would permit a density of one man every six meters. Daily phase lines were assigned and on days subsequent to D-Day, all units moved toward the center of the circle, maintaining a continuous line day and night. As the circle constricted, units were pinched out and occupied stay-behind ambush positions. On the final day of the cordon, one battalion swept the center of the circle and other units moved back to an outer position to permit room for employment of small arms weapons. All units then swept back to PZ's and were airlifted to new AO's.

The terrain selected for the exercise was very heavily forested and mountainous, with the D-Day circle encompassing two steep ridges that flanked a river. The river formed the boundary between the two brigades and served as an FCL as the cordon was closed. Vertical cliffs and rock formations added to the difficulty of movement, and

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successful execution of the concept in this terrain indicated that the technique has application almost everywhere.

The operation was in general a qualified success. The area chosen was subjected to the most thorough search ever conducted in a jungle area by US troops (results: 12 KIA, 2 detainees, 9 individual weapons CIA, 745 small arms rounds, 750 blasting caps, 5 tons rice CIA, and 12 structures and 2 fortifications destroyed). However, very few enemy were killed and unquestionably a number of individuals successfully exfiltrated the cordon. A number of unforeseen problems were encountered and though most were overcome during the course of the operation, they undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of the seal. With these problems corrected, the jungle cordon technique holds great promise and will be employed at the first opportunity, i.e., an identified enemy concentration.

Following are some of the most significant lessons learned:

1. Six hundred meters per company is too wide a frontage because of vertical distances in mountainous terrain. Three to five hundred is optimum.
2. The technique is expensive in resources and should be used only when a valid target has been located.
3. Phase lines are necessary as control measures but must not be used to measure forward progress. The use of one phase line per day causes units to regard the phase line as a goal and control suffers from emphasis on speed.
4. The high density of radios causes frequency interference and a special SOI was used to help reduce this problem, with widely separated frequencies for adjacent units.
5. Coordination at limiting points was poor initially due simply to a lack of experience, but great improvement was noted during the course of the operation.
6. Battalion CP's function best when they follow the line of troops, moving from one OP to another every second or third day. An LOH per battalion each day is essential.
7. More enemy were engaged and killed outside the cordon than inside, emphasizing the criticality of the stay behind ambushes.
8. Every third or fourth day should see a complete stop by the entire line for resupply and rest. This is the most exhausting type of operation imaginable for the individual soldier.
9. Detailed planning and briefing of all troops is essential. Troops approached this operation with great enthusiasm because the size of the effort was apparent to all.

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The second type operation, a linear sweep by one three battalion brigade, was undertaken as a substitute operation when a lengthy period of bad weather prevented a sweep by the entire Division. The brigade was forced to move into position on foot after a two day delay and made its sweep in a direction known to be less desirable than the one selected earlier. The sweep, which lasted eight days, reinforced many of the lessons learned during the cordon and the improvement in command and control was apparent. The liager company kept eight to ten teams deployed forward of the brigade and these ambushes accounted for almost all enemy kills (16). In future operations of this type, a much higher ratio of ambushes will be employed. Otherwise, no significant new lessons were learned in the sweep which had not been identified in the cordon operation.

(b) 1st Brigade: At the beginning of February the 1st Brigade had disposed its forces at three fire support bases located in and around the CROWS FOOT area. The 3-8th Infantry occupied Fire Support Base CHALLENGE, the 1-14th Infantry operated from Fire Support Base ABDY, and the 1-22d Infantry operated in the northeast part of BASE AREA 226, with the battalion command post located at Fire Support Base AUGUSTA. Operations consisted of daily search and clear sweeps in platoon size or smaller size force. Each battalion had one firebase company to secure the command post and the direct support artillery battery.

On 1 February the brigade received a warning order to prepare for a new operation. This operation was planned in reaction to a POW report of an NVA Prisoner of War compound in the vicinity of BR 5398.

As operation WAYNE STAB drew to a close the brigade moved their tactical operations center to LZ ENGLISH in preparation for Operation WAYNE STAB II.

Coordination was effected with the 22d ARVN Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade, both of which were operating along the eastern boundary of the brigade's new area of operation. Liaison with the 173d was established when the 1st Brigade tactical command post moved to LZ ENGLISH. Plans called for the 3-8th Infantry to remain at Fire Support Base CHALLENGE. The 1-14th Infantry was to establish a Fire Support Base at BR 577909 and deploy their rifle companies into selected areas of operation around the firebase. The 1-22d Infantry was to establish a firebase at BR 531971 and deploy similarly to the 1-14th Infantry. Each battalion required one rifle company for security of the direct support artillery battery and the battalion command post located at each fire support base. Rifle companies operated in platoon size forces conducting search and clear and Ivy patrol operations during the day. Ambush and short range reconnaissance patrols were conducted at night on trails and suspected avenues of enemy travel. Coordination was made with K Company, 75th Infantry Rangers who were to operate as a company size force initially in the center of the brigade area of operation to locate the suspected POW camp. As the operation progressed, the Rangers reverted back to their conventional role of providing long range recon patrols in selected areas. Air

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Force Forward Air Controllers attached to the brigade were airborne over the brigade AO during all daylight hours and they directed a total of thirty-six airstrikes on preplanned targets and targets of opportunity during the operation. The 7-17th Air Cavalry provided the primary means of surveillance over areas not occupied by ground forces. Their capability of immediate reaction to targets of opportunity and the ability to find such targets provided the brigade with a valuable tool for destroying enemy personnel and installations. They were also the best means for finding lucrative targets for airstrikes.

On 16 February the 1st Brigade initiated Operation WAYNE STAB II. All available aircraft were utilized in the airlift. A total of 57 UH-1H "Hicks", 12 gunships, 8 CH-47 "Hooks" and 4 "Cranes" provided the means to move 2 Infantry battalions (1-14th and 1-22d), the 3-8th Infantry () and K-75 Infantry Rangers. Air Force jets and Army gunships provided an effective preparation for the proposed fire support bases. Two Air Cavalry troops conducted visual reconnaissance and screening missions along the edges of the brigade area of operation. Before 1200 hours on D-Day, the Air Cavalry had accounted for five enemy kills while the K-75 Rangers, operating in company force, combat assaulted into the vicinity of the suspected POW camp at BS 5998. Shortly after the assault, they made contact with an unknown size force and captured one individual. The detainee reported the POW camp had already moved to the east. As the day closed, the 1st Brigade was disposed in the new AO as planned, and had killed seven enemy.

On the first complete day of search operations during WAYNE STAB II, 1st Brigade troops began uncovering a vast trail network and many hut and bunker complexes in the area. Panji stakes proved to be the major casualty producer and as a result, by nightfall of the 17th, eleven men had required evacuation due to panji wounds.

Ground operations continued and on 19 February, the second platoon of Company B, 1-22d Infantry engaged ten enemy after setting up a hasty ambush at BS 50101. A female was captured and heavy blood trails marked the enemy escape routes. Pursuit was initiated, but contact could not be reestablished. As the search for the POW camp continued, Company B, 1-14th Infantry found a large complex believed to be the compound, but once again the occupants had evaded. Fourteen tons of rice were found stored at the compound located at BS 589966.

On 27 February, the 2-15th Infantry conducted a combat assault into the vicinity of BS 483073, to establish a new fire support base (HOOPSB). The new disposition covered terrain farther north than had been covered to date. To complement the new posture, and react to intelligence brigade troops began to redeploy westward to begin search and clear operations in the new area of operations. The first week of March also saw a change in the brigade AO when the 3-8th Infantry chopped to 2d Brigade control on 4 March, again realigning

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the brigade effort.

By 9 March WAYNE STAB II had been completed and attention turned to the new operation scheduled to start 11 March. 1st Brigade forces went into a standdown posture in preparation for Operation EARHART WHITE.

The limited maneuver space planned for this operation prevented the use of many assets normally employed by the brigade. Artillery became the only effective method of fire support. Intensive preparations were used on planned objectives and suspected enemy locations before the initial insertion of ground troops. Gunships were used to "prep" the landing zones to be used. After the initial preparation, gunships were limited to supporting troops to the rear of the advancing cordon, but could not be effectively employed inside the circle. Artillery fire was limited due to the disposition of the troops on the ground. Air Force strike capabilities could not be employed in the confined space and the FAC's were given missions elsewhere during the operation. Air Cavalry troops were also excluded from operating in direct support of the brigade. Planning called for the 1st Brigade to establish the eastern sector of the cordon in conjunction with the 2d Brigade on the west.

On D-1, 10 March, the 1st Brigade Tactical Command Post was established at LZ SUSIE. To expedite the combat assault on D-Day, the 2-35th Infantry was airlifted to LZ HARD TIMES so that multiple pick-up zones would not have to be used. Liaison with 2d Brigade was established at LZ NIAGARA to coordinate daily advance and provide timely reporting to the 1st Brigade. Two infantry battalions were combat assaulted on D-Day into landing zones and deployed in a linear formation on the western slopes of the DAK SOM River system. Phase lines were established as control measures for each day's forward movement. As the cordon grew tighter, selected elements would be pinched out to conduct security and ambush operations to the rear of the advancing troops. The 1-22d Infantry combat assaulted from LZ LOUIS into LZ BLUE and began deployment on line while the 2-35th Infantry combat assaulted into pre-selected landing zones RED and BLUE. Both battalions attempted to close phase line red. However, rugged terrain and delayed starts prevented final linear deployment. Enemy snipers engaged the 2-35th Infantry TAG CP located at LZ RED at 1510 hours, but artillery could not be fired due to the proximity of friendly forces. Two US soldiers suffered wounds in the contacts, while enemy casualties were unknown.

On 12 March, the 1st Brigade troops had closed their portion of the cordon by 1100 hours. Control of the linear formation proved to be increasingly difficult to maintain. Marginal communications compounded difficulties and the Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) proved invaluable as a means of command and control for the ground commanders.

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EARTHART WHITE continued with relatively light enemy action or sightings during the week. As the 1-22d Infantry closed the maneuver portion of the sweep on 16 March, plans were made to extract the battalion and return OPCON of both the 1-22d Infantry and 2-35th Infantry to the 2d Brigade.

On 17 March, the 1-22d Infantry airlifted to LZ AMELIA and convoyed overland to Camp Radcliff chopping to 2d Brigade on arrival. The 1st Brigade TAC CP closed out operations at LZ SUSIE and airlifted to Camp Radcliff. The 2-35th Infantry chopped in place to the 2d Brigade at 0800 hours. As Operation EARTHART WHITE closed, new plans were being made to begin Operation RICHLEBERGER BLACK. This operation was originally planned to be similar to EARTHART WHITE. Two infantry brigades were to dispose in a linear formation to sweep south through BASE AREA 226. The 2-8th Infantry (Mech)(-) dismounted, was to conduct a screening and ambushing operation on the brigade's western flank, with the K-75 Rangers conducting extensive ambush operations around the eastern flank and forward of advancing troops. The brigade command post was established at FSB HARD TIMES. Division plans were changed for the planned operation when weather forced a delay of D-Day for two successive days. The 1st Brigade requested and was given the mission to conduct the sweep of BASE AREA 226 in lieu of the two brigade planned operation. Plans were made then to move overland and deploy on line rather than by airlift. Ten phase lines were established for reporting and control purposes. Limited K-75 Rangers support was available to the brigade during the operation. An effective LRRP screen could not be maintained on the flanks and front also. Air Force strike capability could not be effectively employed again due to the small area of operation. Troop density provided coordination between Air Force FAC's and ground troops. FAC's did direct numerous airstrikes prior to D-Day in an attempt to establish useable landing zones, but heavy jungle canopy and extremely steep terrain prevented any marked success. As a result, combat engineer rappelling teams were employed throughout the operation to establish landing zones and assist in cave destruction. Teams rappelled into selected locations at 1600 hours daily. Normally, there were three teams available. The engineers cut landing zones as needed, and were extracted early the following morning.

Phase I of the operation was the overland movement of the infantry battalions to their assigned areas of operation. The linear formation consisted of the 2-8th Infantry (Mech)(-) dismounted, on the left, 1-14th Infantry in the center, and the 3-8th Infantry on the right. Initially, 2-8th Infantry (Mech)(-) and 1-14th Infantry had CP's at LZ PROPHET while the 3-8th Infantry was at LZ HARD TIMES. The 1-14th Infantry maintained a TAC CP located at BR 661628. Liaison officers and battalion boundary contact teams were utilized to assist in reporting and control between battalions. Operations continued with relatively slow progress due to the rugged terrain and enemy activity at a low level.

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On 4 April the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) prepared to extract from the operation, and react to enemy activity in the west. By the end of the 5th, the battalion had airlifted to an LZ south of LZ HARD TIMES and convoyed overland where they chopped to Division control. Also on the same day, the largest cache of the operation was uncovered by D/3-8th Infantry when they uncovered two machine guns, fifteen SKS rifles, and a large amount of assorted ammunition.

By the end of the first week of April, it was decided to abandon the linear sweep formation in favor of more conventional methods of maneuver farther to the east. The linear portion of the operation then terminated on 7 April. Three days later the brigade had redispersed and had begun platoon and smaller search and clear operations.

Harassing and sniper fire continued throughout the operation, however enemy activity continued at a low level, with few significant contacts made. Only one more significant weapons cache was found on 18 April when twenty-one automatic weapons were found with one .51 caliber tripod by B/1-14th Infantry.

As operations drew to a close in BA 226, Operation WAYNE WIND was being planned in VC Valley targeted against the 95B Regiment. Plans called for one infantry battalion to begin search and clear operations in the new AO in conjunction with TF PURSUIT. The TF consisted of 3-506th Infantry (Abn), C/7-17th Air Cavalry, and C/75th Infantry Ranger. The 3-12th Infantry chopped to 1st Brigade control on 22 April and began operating in VC Valley while the brigade continued with the 3-8th Infantry and 1-14th Infantry conducting operations in BASE AREA 226.

As EICHELBERG&A BLACK terminated on 24 April, the 3-8th Infantry and 1-14th Infantry chopped to 2d Brigade, and TF PURSUIT came under brigade control.

✓ Operation WAYNE WIND was marked by several contacts with significant results for both sides. The third platoon, A/3-12th Infantry killed two enemy in the vicinity of BR 112358 after a sporadic contact throughout the morning. Two US casualties resulted when the second platoon, Company B, 3-506th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force. On 27 April, a helicopter with the command group of the 3-12th Infantry was shot down while flying over Company D, 3-12th Infantry. It crashed killing all aboard except one door gunner who later died of injuries. A total of nine men were killed including the 3-12th Infantry Battalion Commander, the S3 and key artillery personnel. Three enemy were killed and one captured during a ground contact after the incident.

Throughout the remainder of the reporting period enemy activity picked up considerably. Standoff mortar attacks occurred with frequent regularity on fire support bases while Ranger activities resulted in several enemy contacts. The majority of contacts resulted in enemy KIA's.

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(c) 2d Brigade: The 2d Brigade began the reporting period conducting Operation PUTNAM SHARK, with the mission of securing populated areas and critical installations. The 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry secured the populated areas in the VINH THANH and SONG BA Valleys, respectively; the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry screened and interdicted enemy movement toward Highway 19 north of LZ ACTION and TF 1st Battalion, 69th Armor secured Highway 19 from the MANC YANG Pass to the CRID boundary.

After the threat of a 1970 TET Offensive subsided, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry moved to an area of operations vicinity of LZ TOUGHIE, northeast of AK KHE. While operating in this AO, they uncovered the largest equipment and munitions cache of the reporting period in the DAK SOM, SUOI CON Valley areas. This cache contained approximately 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 158 B41 rounds, 6 122 mm rockets, one complete Chi Com 713 radio and several miscellaneous Class V items.

On 3 March the 2d Brigade assumed operational control of the 3-8th Infantry in preparation for Operation BARNHART WHITE, and on 5 March relinquished operational control of the 1-35th Infantry and TF 1-69th Armor to the 3d Brigade for subsequent inactivation.

Operation BARNHART WHITE, a division level operation employing the 1st and 2d Brigades targeted against elements of the 3d NVA Division vicinity of the DAK SOM River Valley, began on 11 March. The 1-8th Infantry, 3-8th Infantry and 1-12th Infantry, under the 2d Brigade control, in conjunction with elements of the 1st Brigade, conducted a large scale cordon operation of the objective area. The battalions enclosed the western portion of the cordon from north to south in the order listed. The 3-8th Infantry and 1-8th Infantry were tied in with the 1st Brigade on the north and south respectively. Four concentric phase lines, red, white, blue and gold, were established for control purposes. During the operation, a fifth phase line, purple, located between phase lines blue and gold was also established. All units advanced towards the center sweeping through the objective area to phase line gold, leaving stay behind ambushes in the vicinity of each of the phase lines. Upon reaching phase line gold, 2d Brigade elements moved back to phase line purple while a battalion from the 1st Brigade swept the center of the objective area. After this was completed, all elements patrolled back to their respective pickup zones for extraction.

A low level of enemy activity continued throughout the operation until its termination on 18 March. Perhaps the most significant find of the operation occurred when the 2-35th Infantry discovered a medical surgical center at BR 583829. A considerable quantity of medicines and equipment was found to include such items as orthopedic, abdominal, gynecological and cranial instruments.

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During the operation, the majority of contacts were friendly initiated, while enemy initiated contact was limited to sniper actions and ground to air fire. Numerous munitions and weapons caches were found which supported the belief that EICHELBERGER BLACK was indeed interdicting the enemy supply system and LOC's in the planned AO.

On 17 March, the 2d Brigade assumed operational control of the 1-22d Infantry and 2-35th Infantry from the 1st Brigade, and on 18 March, at the termination of Operation BARTHART WHITE, released the 3-8th Infantry to control of the 1st Brigade and the 1-8th Infantry to the 3d Brigade for inactivation.

A brief standdown for the elements in the field was conducted until Operation EICHELBERGER BLACK commenced on 24 March with the 1-22d Infantry, and 2-35th Infantry astride the DAK SOM, SUOI CON River Valleys. The operation was planned to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division, and interdict the enemy LOC passing through this area enroute to BASE AREA 226.

On 7 April the 1-12th Infantry was placed under Division control to provide a six hour ready reaction force and the 2d Brigade was placed on alert to move to PLEIKU in response to the rapidly changing enemy situation in the vicinity of DAK SEANG.

On 24 April the 2d Brigade assumed operational control of the 1-14th Infantry and 3-8th Infantry in BASE AREA 226 from the 1st Brigade. On 30 April the 2d Brigade extracted these two units from BASE AREA 226 to LZ HARD TIMES returning them to 1st Brigade control, thus terminating Operation EICHELBERGER BLACK.

At the end of the reporting period, the 2d Brigade continued to operate in the vicinity of the DAK SOM, DAK KROK PUNG Valleys to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division and interdict enemy LOC's through the area.

(d) 3d Brigades By the beginning of February, the 1-10th Cavalry had closed out FSB MEREDITH, and was continuing its security mission on QL19 with its CP relocated at LZ BLACKHAWK. At the same time that the 1-10th Cavalry was reducing its screening mission to the west, the

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The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) meanwhile continued to conduct numerous search and clear and cordon operations in an area generally south of THANH AN District during February and March. Operations during this period were characterized by numerous US/GVN operations, however, resulting in contacts with enemy forces were relatively light.

Early in March, in preparation for the eventual redeployment of the 3d Brigade, the 47th ARVN Regiment assumed control of LZ OASIS. As a result, the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) was displaced to LZ OUTRIDER. On 1 March, as a continuing reduction of the brigade's overall tactical responsibility, the 1-10th Cavalry reverted to Division control. Then on 14 March the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) returned to Camp Enari for stand down. After a brief security mission on Highway 19, the battalion reverted to Division control on 17 March, thus terminating the brigade's highway security mission.

During the first week of March, the 3d Brigade began receiving the first of its inactivating battalions. The 1-35th Infantry and the 1-69th Armor were released from the 2d Brigade, and came under the OPCOM of the 3d Brigade on 5 March. The 1-35th Infantry began an immediate standdown at Camp Enari, as did the 1-69th Armor at Camp Radcliff. By 30 March, both battalions had completed the turn in of property and a concurrent drawdown of personnel.

By 18 March the 1-8th Infantry had reverted to brigade control as the final redeploying battalion, and moved to Camp Enari to begin its standdown. By 3 April, all actions necessary to prepare the battalion for redeployment had been completed.

On 10 April the final tactical responsibility ended for the 3d Brigade when the 3-12th Infantry and TF ENARI reverted to Division control.

The colors of the brigade with the 1-8th Infantry, 1-35th Infantry, and 1-69th Armor and a 75 man honor guard departed by a SAN flight to Fort Lewis, Washington, on 10 April 1970 for inactivation.

(e) Division Controlled Operations: The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) continued its mission operating in a variety of roles. Dismounted operations were conducted on several occasions, as well as combat assaults to supplement normal mounted operations. During February, the battalion operated in an area southeast of LZ OASIS, conducting search and clear operations. Toward the end of February the battalion relocated and assumed a new AO astride Highway 19. With its new CP located at Pump Station #9, it was able to provide fire support for elements working south of the highway in an effort to prevent its interdiction.

As the battalion worked south of LZ OASIS, several combined RP/PF

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operations were carried out successfully. A measure of success could be seen in the thirty tons of rice CIA during this phase of operations.

From 22 March to 5 April, the battalion began dismounted operations in BA 226 under the OPCON of the 1st Brigade while all rifle companies were dismounted during this period, a mounted force remained at the Brigade TAC CP at LZ HARD TIMES.

As the operation in BA 226 came to a conclusion, the battalion re-verted to Division control. A new AO was secured from 6 April to 30 April astride Highway 14 from ELEIKU to KONTUM. Operations continued to stress reconnaissance in force, strong points and ambushes.

The 1-10th Cavalry terminated participation in Operation GREEN DEUCE under the 3d Brigade on 1 March and began Operation PARK SILVER under Division control.

Through the strategic location of observation posts on key terrain, platoon sweeps, aerial observation and ambushes, the enemy was unable to successfully interdict Highway 19.

(f) Division Artillery

1. The 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, supported by the 6-29th Artillery, began the reporting period in the CROWS FOOT area located northeast of AN KHE with the mission of disrupting enemy activities during the TET holidays. On 1 February the 6-29th Artillery controlled A/6-29 at LZ CHALLENGE, A/2-9th at LZ ARBY, and C/4-42d at LZ AUGUSTA. One platoon (2 tubes) of C/1-92 was located at LZ ABBY with the mission of CSR 6-29th Arty. On 3 February the 1-14th LNO reported 30 VC/NVA at BR 777819. A/2-9, A/7-15 and C/1-92() were adjusted onto the grid and the enemy fled north. On 14 February the 1st Brigade and the 1-22d Infantry, with direct support artillery, GA'd into new fire bases to begin Operation WAYNE STAB II. On 16 February the K-75 Hangers captured a POW at BR 533984. Interrogation of the POW indicated a possible POW compound in the area. Visual reconnaissance revealed numerous cultivated fields and crops. A supporting operation known as the "Lettuce Patch Program" was initiated with the objective of destroying this source of supplies for the enemy. On 22 February C/3-4th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity BR 595347. A/6-29 and C/1-92() fired 77 HE in support, and the enemy broke contact. A sweep of the contact area led to the discovery of six 60mm mortar rounds, one AK-47 and numerous spider holes and booby traps. Beginning 10 March, the 1st Brigade participated in Operation EARTHART WHITE, a divisional level cordon and search conducted vicinity of BR 5679. The operation lasted seven days and was characterized by small enemy contacts. During the period 17 March to 24 March the 1st Brigade regrouped and on 24 March began Operation MICHELEBERGER BLACK in BASE AREA 226. On 31 March LRRP B-45 sighted bunkers vicinity BR 695605 and adjusted D/5-16 on the target. An ADA by the 7-17th Air Cavalry after the mission revealed two enemy KBA. On 1 April LZ HARD TIMES received approximately twenty rounds of 82mm mortar. A/6-29, C/6-29.

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E/5-16 and D/5-16 fired counter mortar fire, and the mortars were silenced. On 16 April A/1-14th Infantry sighted ten to fifteen NVA/VC vicinity BR 747675 and adjusted A/6-29 on target resulting in eight enemy KIA. On 19 April the 1st Brigade began planning for an operation in the DAK PAYOU (VC) Valley area. The 1st Brigade assumed OPCON of TF PURSUIT on 24 April for the operation. On 24 April the operation in BASE AREA 226 was turned over to the 2d Brigade, and on 25 April TF PURSUIT CA'd into LZ MARTIE (BR226237). The 3-12th Infantry at LZ MARTY became OPCON to the 1st Brigade on 20 April and prepared to join the operation in VC Valley. The on-going operation was characterized by small enemy contacts and standoff attacks directed against LZ MARTY on 26 and 27 April and LZ MARTIE on 28 and 29 April.

2. The 2d Brigade supported by the 4-42d Arty (DS) began the reporting period with Operation PUTNAM POWER in progress targeted against the 18th NVA Regiment. The activity between 1 February and 8 February consisted of small enemy contacts in the vicinity of LZ HARD TIMES and along QL19. On 15 February LZ WARRIOR was attacked by an estimated sapper squad. Moderate equipment damage was sustained by B/4-42. Two enemy sappers were killed as they were attempting to exfiltrate from the battery area. On 17 February the area of interest of the 2d Brigade shifted from Camp Radcliff and QL19 to an area approximately twenty kilometers northeast of Camp Radcliff. On 21 February, C/2-9 and the 1-35th Infantry CA'd into LZ SHERKY. Search and destroy operations conducted in this area, characterized by small enemy contacts. On 4 March the 3-8th Infantry and A/6-29 CA'd into LZ SUSIE and the 2d Brigade prepared for Operation BARNHART WHITE. Also on 4 March the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42 CA'd into LZ NIAGARA, to participate in Operation BARNHART WHITE. On 5 March the 1-8th Infantry and A/2-9 CA'd into LZ CHALLENGE and all units were in position to begin the operation. The 2d Brigade and the 4-42d Arty established TAC CP's at LZ NIAGARA to facilitate control of forward elements. Operation BARNHART WHITE was again characterized by small enemy contacts as the enemy chose to evade friendly forces. On 19 March the 2d Brigade commenced Operation RICHLEBERGER BLACK operating in the area approximately forty kilometers northeast of Camp Radcliff. The operation was still continuing at the close of the reporting period with no significant contacts developed.

3. The 3d Brigade, supported by the 2-9th Arty (DS), began the reporting period in Operation GREEN DRUCE, directed at the continuance of offensive operations against enemy units, facilities and routes, support of the CVN pacification program, and reaction to threats against villages and isolated camps in the AO. The offensive operations were marked by light sporadic contact and a general unwillingness of the enemy to stand and fight. There were a significant number of caches, primarily ammunition and rice uncovered in the AO. Beginning the middle of February, the efforts of the 3d Brigade and 2-9th Arty turned to redeployment. On 15 March, the 2-9th Artillery terminated offensive operations to conduct the stand down in preparation for inactivation.

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(2) The following OPLANS and OPOBDS were published during the reporting periods:

(a) OPLAN 7-70, dated 6 Feb 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, CO 3d Brigade assumes Camp Xuan defense and its TAOR with 3-12th Infantry.

(b) OPLAN 8-70, dated 9 Feb 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, 2d Brigade operation targeted against the 3d NVA Division.

(c) OPLAN 9-70, dated 17 Feb 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan discussed operation of the Division rear at Camp Xuan.

(d) OPLAN 10-70, (BARHART WHITE), dated 6 Mar 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, became OPOBD 10-70 on 13 Mar 70. This plan concerned a 2d Brigade encirclement operation targeted against elements of the 3d NVA Division.

(e) OPLAN 13-70, dated 17 Mar 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, became OPOBD 13-70 (EICHSELBERGER BLACK) on 22 Mar 70. This plan concerned an attack against elements of the 3d NVA Division.

(f) OPLAN 14-70, dated 19 Apr 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, became OPOBD 14-70 on 25 Apr 70. This plan concerned the 1st Brigade operation against elements of the 95B Regiment in VC Valley.

(g) OPLAN 15-70, dated 19 Apr 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, became OPOBD 15-70 on 30 Apr 70. This plan concerned the 1st Brigade operation against the GIA LAI Provincial Headquarters.

(h) OPLAN 16-70, dated 29 Apr 70, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(i) OPOBD 40-70, dated 15 Mar 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, concerns Camp Radcliff and TAOR defense.

(j) OPOBD 41-70, dated 26 Mar 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, concerns civic action in the Camp Radcliff TAOR.

(3) ALT Support

Sorties

February	239
March	288
April	77
TOTAL	604

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(4) Training: The 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment trained a total of 1875 enlisted men, 93 officers, and 152 VIETNAMESE enlisted men during the period.

(a) The Non-Commissioned Officer Combat Leadership Course graduated 103 students.

(b) The replacement committee trained 1,875 enlisted men and 93 officers.

(c) The Pre-Recondo School graduated seven students.

(d) The 4th Division Sniper School trained 37 snipers. A class of 21 students began training on 25 April 1970.

(e) RF/PF and Kit Carson Scout programs continued: RF/PF program had 140 graduates while Kit Carson Scout Program had 12 graduates.

(f) RVNAF On-The-Job Training Program: The 4th Infantry Division, before relocation from Camp Shari in March, had trained 2,656 RVNAF Military/Civilian personnel through an extensive OJT program. After relocation of the Division to Camp Radcliff, the ARVN OJT program was again initiated with 15 ARVN mechanics undergoing practical training.

(5) Chemical

(a) The Division Chemical section continued to function in the dual capacity of a staff section and an operating section. The Division Chemical Section with the 43d Chemical Detachment OPCON, supported extensive aerial and ground employment of Rice Control Agents (RCA), aerial and ground employment of standard/non-standard defoliants for control of vegetation and crop destruction and operated and maintained the Division Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) equipment. Technical advice was rendered on the use of flame field munitions and inspections were conducted on unit CSR readiness, equipment and supply. The chemical ASP continued to operate in support of the Division.

(b) TRAILDUST missions decreased drastically from the previously reported period. Those flown were crop destruction missions. Helicopter spray operations increased significantly as standard defoliants became more readily available.

1 The NANG YANG Pass in PLEIKU Province was defoliated with standard agent ORANGE using the AGAVENCO helicopter spray rig. Nineteen sorties were flown over the NANG YANG Pass. Results were considered adequate.

2 Extensive enemy crop targets were killed in northern BINH DINH Province using the AGAVENCO helicopter spray rig. Results have been

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excellent with negative hits to any elements.

(c) Riot Control Agent (RCM) M continued to be used effectively in direct support of combat troops and played a vital role in the destruction and harassment of the enemy detected and located through intelligence sources. Both persistent and non-persistent CS was employed throughout the Division AO in support of ground troops, with H&I artillery fires to block enemy withdrawal routes from contact areas.

1 The use of micropulverized CS showed a slight increase over the previous period. The dry season in the Central Highlands increased the long term effectiveness of persistent CS. The Chemical Section employed 1,576 55 gallon drums of CS-2 against targets in the CMU PROAC Mountains, VC Valley and the HANG YANG Pass compared to the 1,383 drums employed during the last period. The drums are employed to contaminate infiltration routes, bunkers, tunnels, and assembly and living areas to reduce the amount of time the enemy can remain in the area and possibly canalize his movements. Drums employed by the section use only the new XM925 Pose, Burst and Drum System. Fifty-eight JMDPOS were used during the period for cave, bunker and tunnel denial.

2 Non-persistent CS was employed extensively from the air using the XM15 (A15802) CS canister cluster. These were used against suspected enemy locations in conjunction with artillery fire. A total of 335 XM15 munitions were employed during the period.

(d) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) operations are now centrally controlled from the Division base camp. The APD missions are still being supported by the 4th Aviation Battalion Scorpion Team. However, briefings and debriefings are conducted by the G2 and JIC APD Program. An increase in the effectiveness of the program from the above changes with greater exploitation being made from the intelligence gathered. A total of 165 missions were conducted during the period for a total of 102 hours.

(e) The training and evaluation of the new XM191 multi-hit portable flame weapon ended 30 April. A final evaluation report was forwarded to A3IV. Comments from the using units were incorporated in the report, and indicate units were slow to accept the weapon due to its size and weight. Comments from the field include:

1 The 1-14th Infantry used the XM191 successfully from defensive positions such as Forward Fire Bases and hill shoots.

2 The 1-10th Cavalry carried the weapon on the APC's during road clearing operations.

3 Factors found to hinder successful employment of the system as an offensive weapon were:

a Jungle growth tends to snag the weapon, slowing down the

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individual carrying the weapon.

b. The mountainous terrain places the weight in excess of 100 pounds on the individual carrying the weapon. The system would be more useful to a line company in the field if helicopter support was sufficient to deliver a night defensive packet to each unit prior to darkness, and then retrieve the packet at the beginning of the day to insure that the infantryman had a lighter load to carry.

(f) A Flame Bath test mission was conducted on 15 April using 55 gallon drums filled with diesel fuel. Nine drums were sling loaded under a CH-53 and dropped at a speed of 50 knots and approximately 200 feet above the ground. Accuracy was extremely good. Each net is capable of starting a fire approximately 40m x 40m, which is ignited by PAC aircraft using AP rockets. Two sorties of 2 nets and 16 drums of diesel fuel were flown in support of the 1st Brigade against a bunker and hootch complex. Experience has shown a difficulty in igniting the diesel fuel. Future missions will include NOGAS for easier ignition.

(6) Research and Development

(a) Mine Rollers: Although the M4 mine roller is no longer an M500B item, the Division is continuing to conduct tests and evaluations to determine its full capabilities. The roller has been modified to fit the combat engineer vehicle (CEV) in lieu of the design configuration for the M48 tank chassis. The CEV with roller, since 3 April, has located and destroyed four mines with no equipment damage. There are two operational rollers in the Division now with a third expected in the near future.

(b) AN/PRC-7 Mine Detectors: On 22 March, testing began on the AN/PRC-7 mine detector to determine its suitability in comparison with other detectors. Testing was conducted on both metallic and non-metallic mines, as well as debris common to RVN. Various soils were tested also to include sand, clay, laterite, rocks and water covered soils. Field tests were conducted in actual operational terrain. Initial testing has shown the AN/PRC-7 to be moderately effective. Final test results are being evaluated.

d. Logistics

(1) Emphasis continued on utilization of land lines of communications (LLOC) throughout the Division's area of operations for movement of all classes of supply. Relocation of the Division from Camp Shari to Camp Staloff was almost completely accomplished over LLOC. Favorable weather conditions throughout the period facilitated overland movement. Good flying conditions during the period contributed to greater use of air lines of communications (ALOC). With both lines of communication open throughout the period, movement of troops and supplies was accomplished in an efficient and timely manner.

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(2) Elements of the 45th General Support Group and the 593d General Support Group of the QUI NHON Support Command continued to provide logistical support to the Division in Operation HMMES. Additional transportation requirements for redeployment and relocation were supported by the 8th Transportation Group.

(3) During the period mid-February through mid-March, major elements of the Division relocated from Camp Enari to Camp Radcliff. This entailed relocating the major support units to Camp Radcliff. The residual units at Camp Enari were supported by an FSE until turnover of the camp to the ARVN. With the turnover of Camp Enari in mid-April, TASK FORCE ENARI was relocated to Camp Radcliff.

(4) On 1 February the 1st Brigade went to LZ ENGLISH and support was provided by an LSA operated by the QUI NHON Support Command, and Division forward support elements. The LSA, augmented by the 4th S&T personnel, provided Class I, III, IIIA, and V supplies. The FSE provided Class II and IV support and both graves registration and laundry service were provided by the LSA. The support activities terminated on 17 March when the 1st Brigade returned to Camp Radcliff.

(5) On 6 April the 2-8th Infantry, under Division control, deployed to the KONTUM area. Class II and IV for the 2-8th Infantry is provided by the Division Supply Office at Camp Radcliff. All other supplies and services are being provided by the 45th General Support Group at PLEDCU.

(6) Direct support maintenance and medical companies have habitually been employed in direct support of brigade task forces.

(7) Transportation Services: During the reporting period, there were 242 convoys with a total of 2,884 vehicles. In addition to this, there were 169 convoys consisting of 2,355 2½ and 5 ton trucks, 416 semi-trailers, and 27 low-boys involved in relocating the Division from Camp Enari to Camp Radcliff. The 4th Supply and Transport Battalion, augmented by the 8th Transportation Group, provided transportation for relocation of the Division.

(8) Materiel Readiness: During the reporting period the operational readiness had fluctuated somewhat, with an improvement noted in the OR of communications equipment (from 92% to 94%), combat vehicles (from 89% to 96%), and heavy engineer equipment (from 80% to 83%). The increased OR of the combat vehicles and heavy engineer equipment can be attributed, at least in part, to the implementation of the Filter Service Program. It is interesting to note that this program (slightly modified) has been adopted as USARV policy, and implemented as USARV Reg 750-32. The increased OR for communications equipment can be directly attributed to increased emphasis on maintenance management of these items at support level and reduced turn around time on items sent to CONUS under the R&R program.

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Several other categories of equipment have noted slight decreases in operational readiness; the OR of tactical vehicles decreased from 92% to 88% at the end of April and the OR of power generators decreased from 93% to 86%. This decrease can be attributed directly to the proportionate increase noted in the amount of equipment reported non-operational for supplies (NORS). The reason for this increase in NORS can be attributed to the relocation of the direct support supply activity (DSSA) which occurred during February. During the relocation of the DSSA from Camp Enari to Camp Madcliff, and for a short period thereafter, only priority (deadline) requisitions were processed for issue. This caused increased zero balance of PLL's and resulted in the increased NORS rate experienced during the second half of the reporting period. With the DSSA now fully operational, the OR of both tactical vehicles and generators has begun improving again.

The overall unit materiel readiness and maintenance consciousness, as reflected by the Division's COMM's and roadside spot inspections, improved appreciably during the period.

(9) Maintenance Support: Headquarters and A Company (Main Support), 704th Maintenance Battalion continued its role of providing direct support maintenance for base camp units, backup direct support for the battalion forward support companies, supply of Class IX (repair parts), and retrograde of materiel. The 704th Maintenance forward support companies continued to support the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades. B Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion redeployed with the 3d Brigade. Company E (Transportation Aircraft Maintenance) continued its aircraft direct support maintenance mission.

Emphasis was placed on repair by forward maintenance companies with supplementary contact teams provided by Headquarters and A Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion.

e. Civilian Affairs

(1) Civic Action

(a) TAOR: The relocation of the Division base camp during this period from Camp Enari to Camp Madcliff had some effect on the CA activities within the 4th Division. During the period 20 February to 15 March, the Civic Action teams participated in the VIETNAMIZATION of the Camp Enari TAOR Civic Action efforts. On 20 February over eighty officers and men of the 47th ARVN Regiment arrived in the TAOR to assume duties in seven of the villages. Simultaneously, teams from PLEIKU Province assets were designated to move into the remaining five villages. The resident US CA teams remained in the village for a period of time after the arrival of the VIETNAMESE teams to familiarize the new team with the village and current projects. After the initial joint occupation, the US teams moved out and commenced daily visits for a week and then gradually reduced the number of visits per week. Although certain problems were encountered with the transfer

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of the CA effort to the VIETNAMESE, the transition period proved quite helpful prior to the departure of the US teams from the TAOR.

Civic Action activities in the present TAOR, AN TUC District, BINH DINH Province, have consisted mainly of the effective relocation of all teams from the former TAOR, establishing and organizing an effective CA program for the new TAOR, becoming familiar with the newly assigned AO and to initiate CA activities with the minimum amount of lost time. All CA teams in the present TAOR are mobile and reside at the Division base camp.

(b) AN TUC District and the Division are working in close coordination to insure that the major CA effort is channeled to areas where it will do the most good. Considerable emphasis is being placed on getting officials at all levels within the district to utilize GVN channels to obtain funds and resources.

(c) One project presently under way is the establishment of a consolidated MONTAGNARD village. This is a joint GVN-US project. The MONTAGNARD hamlets located along Highway 19 on the western end of the TAOR are targets of the project. Finalization of the plan and securing the required materials is now in progress.

(2) Psychological Operations

(a) A PSYOP campaign was also conducted in support of the re-deployment of the 4th Infantry Division from PLEIKU to AN KHE. The purpose of the campaign was to illustrate the capability of GVN to assume responsibility for the security and conduct of operations in PLEIKU Province. Leaflets and posters were developed in coordination with II Company, 3rd PSYOP Battalion, Assistant Province Advisor, PSYOP, PLEIKU Province, and II Corps, G5 Advisor to promote the GVN image and the growing strength of the ARVN and its expanded operations. Other leaflets and posters were reprinted and disseminated urging the civilian population to support the RF/FF program. A special redeployment edition of the PSYOP newspaper BINH BINH was published and disseminated to Brigade 55's and to all PLEIKU PSYOP agencies.

(b) On 25 February, a test was conducted by the PSYOP section to determine the effectiveness of employing a 250 watt loudspeaker in an aerial role from a Light Observation Helicopter. At an altitude of 200-500 feet, the speaker was audible, but the overriding engine noise was too loud to understand the message clearly. The most effective altitude was from 1000 to 1200 feet above the target. At this altitude the speaker was clearly audible and the message could be understood with no interference from engine noise. The pilot was requested to fly at an altitude which he considered to be safe from small arms ground to air fire. At altitudes as high as 1600 feet the message was still audible and discernable although it was fainter. The people in the village over which the test was conducted stated that they were able to understand the words spoken through the speaker at all altitudes, but when the aircraft was lower than 500 feet they had trouble making

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out what was said. It was concluded that the 250 watt loudspeaker could be effectively employed from the LOR at altitudes ranging from 1000 to 1500 feet and also afford the personnel in the aircraft a much more favorable margin of safety than at lower altitudes.

(c) During March, an initial issue of 19 AN/PIQ-5A public address systems were received. These bullhorns were issued to the five major sector S5's. In following months, a total of 108 PA systems will be issued to the Division in monthly installments.

(d) During the last week of March, special leaflet and loudspeaker campaigns were planned and executed to support the 1st and 2d Brigade operations in BINH DINH Province. Division assets were used to supplement the preplanned program and to quickly respond to tactical needs. Approximately 1,500,000 leaflets were dropped in support of the operations. On 9 March, quark reaction leaflets and taped appeals were employed to exploit a HOI CHANH from the 3d NVA Division. The leaflet contained a handwritten appeal directed at the members of the rallier's unit urging them to rally. The taped appeal was made by the HOI CHANH and was the same general text as the leaflet.

(e) On 2 April, three enemy leaflets were discovered in the hamlet of AN DIEM BAO (BA 553522). They were directed against the civilian population and RF/PF units. Themes were that the US and GVN were losing and running away and that villagers and soldiers should revolt for the people's revolution, protection of rice fields--not to leave them. Leaflet and loudspeaker appeals were employed in the general vicinity of the village and surrounding area to counteract the enemy's message. Leaflets utilized promoted the GVN image and loudspeaker appeals were directed at the erroneous assumption made by the enemy concerning US pullout.

(f) Face-to-face PSYOPS within the Division TAOH was enhanced through the use of the individual talents of two Kit Carson Scouts assigned to the 2d Brigade PSYOP Team. When the team entered a village, one of the Scouts sang VIETNAMESE folk songs to his own guitar accompaniment in order to announce the arrival of the team and collect an audience. Once a sufficient crowd has gathered, the second Scout takes over and entertains the audience with various slight-of-the-hand tricks. When the act is completed, the audience is in a receptive mood and the Scouts then begin to talk about the GVN and disseminate the PSYOP message. The use of this technique has proved to be very effective in increasing the size of the target audience and making them more receptive to the information disseminated.

f. Personnel

(1) Strengths: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

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(a) Beginning of Period (1 Feb 70)

	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
Authorized-organic units	1,112	203	16,492	17,807
Authorized-attached units	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	1,112	203	16,492	17,807
Assigned-organic units	1,124	175	16,373	17,627
Assigned-attached units	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	1,124	175	16,373	17,627

(b) End of Reporting Period (30 Apr 70)

Authorized-organic units	877	184	12,967	14,028
Authorized-attached units	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	877	184	12,967	14,028
Assigned-organic units	910	184	12,865	13,959
Assigned-attached units	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	910	184	12,865	13,959

(2) Replacements: The Division received a total of 136 officers and 1,371 enlisted replacements.

(3) Casualties:

UNIT	HOSTILE			NON-HOSTILE		
	WOUNDED	KILLED	MISSING	INJURIES	DEATHS	MISSING
1st Bde	152	16	0	94	5	0
2d Bde	245	15	0	43	0	0
3d Bde	43	5	0	5	1	0
DIVARTY	24	4	0	16	2	0
DISCOM	10	1	0	15	0	0
1-10th Cav	39	1	0	6	0	0
1-69th Arm	5	0	0	11	0	0
Division Troops	28	1	0	22	2	0
K-75	33	1	0	4	0	0

(4) Morale and Personnel Services: Awards and Decorations during the period were presented as follows:

DECORATION AWARDED	FEB	MAR	APR
Silver Star	10	17	29
Distinguished Flying Cross	9	5	11
Soldiers Medal	0	3	10
Bronze Star (Valor)	101	157	134
Bronze Star (Service)	574	739	644
Air Medal (Valor)	30	15	17
Air Medal (Service)	814	886	582
Army Commendation (Valor)	56	131	193

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<u>DECORATION AWARDED</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Army Commendation (Service)	1740	2614	1834
Purple Heart	<u>57</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>131</u>
Total	3391	4687	3585

(5) Promotions: A total of 2,857 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-7</u>
February	266	311	90	15
March	205	433	55	6
April	<u>327</u>	<u>309</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	1,598	1,053	175	31

(6) Reenlistment: There were a total of 143 reenlistments during the period; First Term Reenlistments: 85, AUS Reenlistments: 56, BR/NG Reenlistments: 2.

(7) Health: This quarter has seen a new low in malaria for the Division. In March, there were only 20 cases for a rate of 14.1 cases per 1000 men. This was attributed to the ecological conditions that existed during this time, and to an increase in the effectiveness of gametocidal prophylaxis.

g. Engineer

The majority of the engineer effort during this period was directed toward relocation of the Division from Camp Snari to Camp Radcliff. In this connection, construction and rehabilitation of critical installations and facilities at Camp Radcliff was the priority effort.

In February, the 4th Engineer Battalion officially moved from Camp Snari, however, Company A remained in direct support to the 3d Brigade until 15 March. This direct support normally consisted of one squad. The majority of a company engineer effort was given in general support at Camp Snari which included the tear down and movement to Camp Radcliff of ten Pascoe buildings. On 27 March the company started to stand down and turn-in of all equipment in accordance with the Phase III draw down and by 15 April the company was at zero strength.

Company B remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade and provided direct support requirements using one platoon. The remaining two platoons were assigned projects at Camp Radcliff. The major projects completed by B Company were as follows: a POW Compound, bridge bypasses on M19, extension of ASP, bunkerline upgrade, and construction of portions of the protective wire around the Golf Course heliport.

Company C remained in direct support of the 2d Brigade throughout

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the reporting period, with one platoon providing this support. The remainder of the company was committed to the upgrade of Camp Madcliff. The major projects completed by the company included the 2d Brigade TOC, DIVARTY TOC, POL Tank Park wire, Golf Course protective wire, and two timber trestle bridges.

Company D remained in general support of the Division throughout the reporting period with the exception of one platoon which gave direct support to one battalion for clearance of a hilltop. Major projects included completion of the South River barrier, finance vault, rehabilitation of the Division Administration buildings and Headquarters, trailer park, construction of the special security detachment building, an addition to the Division TOC, 213 two-man fighting positions, construction of the Division Automatic Data Processing Center, and the erection of 10 Pascoe buildings. On 29 April the company minus one platoon began construction and upgrade of Highway 508.

Company E continued to provide general support for the Division. This support encompassed transportation of men and materiel, light construction, bunker destruction and AVL bridging. On 7 March the heavy equipment platoon of Headquarters and Headquarters Company was transferred to Company E, since that period the company had to provide heavy equipment support to the battalion projects as well as completing several projects on its own. One bridge platoon was reduced to zero strength on 15 April. Projects included construction of a road to a Division signal relay hill, clearing an area for a village, and construction of several motor pools.

h. Army Aviation Operations

Operational totals of the 4th Aviation Battalion were as follows:

Hours	15,180
Sorties	36,804
PAX	43,685
Tons	980

i. Inspector General

(1) 4th Division Annual General Inspections of four divisional units were conducted along with two courtesy inspections in preparation for the unit's Annual General Inspection. Due to the displacement of the Division from Camp Anari to Camp Madcliff, thirteen inspections were conducted of unit storage and safekeeping of individual personnel effects.

(2) Sixty-eight complaints were received during the reporting period; the two major areas of complaints were medical with twenty, and unit administration with twenty-two complaints received. Two hundred five requests for assistance were also received during the reporting period.

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j. Signal

(1) Operational activities continue to focus on providing multi-channel communications in support of the Division and its elements.

(2) LZ SCHUELLER: On 1 February a NRC-112 was installed to provide multi-channel communications between LZ SCHUELLER and Camp Radcliff. This system is still in operation, however, an AN/GRC-163 is now being used.

(3) LZ ENGLISH: On 18 February the 2d FASCP extended a VHF system to LZ PONY in support of 1st Brigade contingency operations.

(4) Camp Radcliff: The largest operation undertaken during the period was the relocation of the Division Headquarters. In order to accomplish this as smoothly as possible, the Famous Communications Center was placed into operation at Camp Radcliff on 2 March. This was followed with installation of an AN/GRC-142, AN/NTC-10, and an AN/GRC-163 on 7 March.

(5) Camp Enari: While the Division's move to Camp Radcliff continued, the 3d Brigade moved in for standdown and phase out. On 4 March, the communications center of the 3d FASCP set up in support of the 3d Brigade. One AN/MRC-69, located at Signal Hill, provided telephone communications with Camp Radcliff for TASK FORCE ENARI from 6 March to 15 April.

(6) LZ HARD TIMES: On 21 March the 1st FASCP deployed a terminal to LZ HARD TIMES in support of the 1st Brigade TAG CP.

(7) LZ RIPPLE: On 12 April, one AN/MRC-69 was installed at LZ RIPPLE to provide telephone communications to Camp Radcliff.

(8) LZ JIFFY: On 12 April, one AN/GRC-142 was installed at LZ JIFFY by C Company, 124th Signal Battalion. On 14 April the 2d FASCP installed one AN/MRC-69 for telephone communications.

(9) Camp Radcliff: On 14 April the perimeter communication project was completed providing telephonic communications to all bunkers and towers.

(10) LZ AQUARIUS: On 27 April one AN/MRC-69 was installed providing multi-channel communications to Camp Radcliff.

k. Information Activities

(1) News Media Correspondents

(a) During the period, a total of nine news correspondents visited the Division. They covered a variety of subjects, ranging from pure hometown and human interest material, to the Division's active combat

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and pacification operations. Included in the visiting news media personnel were representatives from the United Press International, Cincinnati Post and Times Star, and the Overseas Weekly. Military correspondents from Stars and Stripes, MACV, USARV, IFTV, and a DA Pictorial Team also visited the area. There were two free lance writers in the area during the period.

(b) In addition, the Radio/TV Section broadcast 910 minutes on AFVN (AM-FM) PLEIKU as news broadcasts. An additional 20 minutes of news were aired over the AM facilities of AFVN, QUI NHON. An additional 1872 minutes were utilized for a disk jockey show and Chaplain's messages over AFVN, PLEIKU. Television was used during this period with 300 minutes of broadcasts used for Division news and special events. A total of 94 hard news radio releases were received, prepared and cleared by the section during the period. On 1 March, with the relocation of the Division to AN KHE, 4th Division news was terminated as part of the daily broadcast schedule of AFVN, PLEIKU. Because of the lack of proper reception in the AN KHE area, studies were initiated to determine the feasibility of establishing an AFVN outlet at Camp Radcliff. These studies continued into the new reporting period.

(2) Home Town News Release Program

(a) The Division continues to rank high in the number of home town news release submissions. During the period, a total of 3627 DA Forms 1526 were logged and forwarded. This is a drop from the previous quarters and reflects the redeployment of the 3d Brigade, and reduction in the number of incoming personnel as well as an approximate 35% decrease in the number of awards and promotions. A letter was sent to all commanders during the latter part of the quarter to urge a rejuvenation in the program, which also lost continuity and impetus with the relocation to Camp Radcliff.

(b) The photo release program also suffered during the period reported due to the same reasons the 1526 program fell behind. During the quarter, 122 pictures were forwarded for release.

(c) The radio release program, not necessarily susceptible to the proportion of incoming personnel or awards and promotions, kept pace with the best throughout the world. A total of 386 hometown interviews and audio tapes were processed by the Home Town News Center for use by local radio stations in CONUS. Special emphasis was given this program for the Easter and Mother's Day period.

(d) Improvements continue to be noted in the distribution of command information publications. All newspapers are now continuing to be distributed at the battalion level.

(e) There were five fact sheets prepared and distributed during the period: Compassionate Reassignments, Sounding Board, Next of Kin Notification System Changed, Pay Increase and the National 4th Division Association.

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(3) There were 13 issues of the Division's weekly newspaper, The Ivy Leaf published. Increased emphasis was given to Command Information topics. Special issues were produced on the departure of the 3d Brigade, and the turnover of Camp Chari and the relocation to Camp Radcliff.

(4) The third issue of the Division quarterly publication, Esprit, was prepared and distributed during the quarter. The fourth issue was prepared for printing and distribution during the next quarter. In February, the second issue of Esprit was given USARV's second place award for all like productions in RVN. The publication, in magazine format, couples feature material, concerning Division activities, with Command Information subjects.

(5) During the period, the responsibility for photo coverage was turned over from the IO's organic photo facility to the 4th Division Signal Photo Lab. The Information Office retained all its own records, contact sheets and negatives. The personnel shortage forced the IO to abandon its photo capabilities to provide sufficient coverage in other areas of the operation. All IO photo lab equipment was transferred to the Signal Photo Lab to assist with the additional workload.

(6) The Public Information Section released a total of 2865 hard news stories and 384 photos during the quarter. Both these total are high for the year. Although feedback is sparse, indications are the direct release programs has resulted in a great deal of favorable publicity for the Division in the various media throughout the United States.

(7) Coverage continues at a high level in the three major command publications in VIETNAM, Stars and Stripes, USARV Reporter, and the MACV Observer. The following coverage was released during the period:

<u>Reporter</u>	36 stories	17 photos.
<u>Observer</u>	19 stories	9 photos
<u>Stars and Stripes</u>	26 stories	3 photos

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED, COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence

(1) Snail

(a) Observations: During the reporting period, it was observed that an exceedingly high number of devices were needed to secure bridges, due to the numerous avenues of approach to these sites.

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(b) Evaluation: To overcome this problem, Shald devices were used with a multi-external geophone system. This system was developed by the 4th Division Duffiebag Program and proven effective through numerous experiments. The system is in use only in the 4th Division AO and not a component part of the Duffiebag Program in VIETNAM.

The Shald is a device with both seismic and acoustic capabilities. The external geophone is emplaced to direct seismic vibrations in the ground. When vibrations are detected through the geophone they are transmitted to the Shald itself and the acoustic capability is then activated. The activation recorded by the seismic portion of the device can be confirmed by actual audio transmissions in the same area. Each geophone has a detection radius of 30 meters. In order to protect one bridge effectively, three additional geophones were spliced into the one device. The results are that with four geophones 120 meters may be covered, as compared to 30 meters with only one geophone. This allows for protection of a bridge with fewer devices.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that this system, employing more than one geophone to the Shald, be continued to enhance greater area coverage with fewer devices.

c. Operations

(1) Brigade Linear Sweeps

(a) Observation: During brigade linear sweeps, daily objectives tend to be unrealistic.

(b) Evaluation: Predetermined phase lines were used as daily objectives, and did not take into account terrain and changes in the enemy situation.

(c) Recommendation: In large sweep operations, daily advances should be regulated by terrain and enemy situation and not artificial phase lines.

(2) Unit Frontages

(a) Observation: Assigning unit frontages based on map studies only, is not practical.

(b) Evaluation: When considering frontages over difficult terrain, a 400 meter map distance may be 600 meters or more ground distance in steep terrain.

(c) Recommendation: About 4/5 of a 110 man company normally will move in the linear formation, so a frontage of 575 meters (7 meters per man) or less be assigned to a sweeping company.

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(3) Battalion Linear Sweeps

(a) Observations: Dispersion on line in difficult terrain reduces lateral movement, and significantly lessens the reaction capability of the sweeping unit commander.

(b) Evaluation: Reserve or reaction elements must be organized and centrally located to react rapidly in the event of enemy contact.

(c) Recommendation: The use of the linear sweep technique should be used by battalions or larger units only when it is part of an encirclement; when it is not part of an encirclement, but has a high density screen on the flanks and forward of the sweep; or when a high probability of finding a cache exists.

(4) Identification of Maneuver Units

(a) Observation: During linear sweep operations, ground identification of maneuver elements is difficult.

(b) Evaluation: The use of colored smoke in a pre-arranged sequence is a positive method of identifying major ground elements (i.e., with battalion size maneuver elements, each company uses only one color smoke. Coordination is made with the adjacent battalions to insure that their colored smoke is different in sequence also).

(c) Recommendation: The use of colored smoke during large scale linear sweep operations is a valuable aid to identify major ground elements.

(5) Storage of Materials

(a) Observation: Since no single location was available at Camp Radcliff for the storage of all Division Class II&IV stocks, it was necessary to establish two separate areas for storage. These areas were approximately two miles apart. This necessitated the development of new channels for the flow of documentation.

(b) Evaluation: At Camp Bnari a single issue facility was operated for Class II&IV items. Material releases were sent to the storage office; a warehouseman was assigned the task of picking the stock; the release and stock were then sent to the issue facility to await customer pickup. Such a system is not practical at Camp Radcliff, due to the reduction in manpower and a lack of the equipment necessary for the movement of items over the distance between the two yards. A substantial time loss between the time the release was cut and the time the item would be available for pickup could be resultant from the utilization of the single facility issue method.

(c) Recommendation: In order to overcome the disadvantages caused by the distance factors, a system has been instituted by which availability time is shortened. Several warehouses in each of the two storage yards are used as issue facilities. Storage areas are designated

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by technical service, i.e., Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal, Engineer. Each area has a bulk warehouse with backup stockage as well as a shelf storage issue warehouse. Material releases are sent from Stock Control directly to the issue warehouse concerned. The warehouseman then annotates the exact storage location on the back of the release and files it by customer. When the customer receives his notice of release, he goes to the appropriate issue warehouse and the item is issued from the shelf. The receipt document is then directly sent back to Stock Control for filing. This system has permitted a reduction in the amount of handling required to make an item available for issue. There is, of course, the added advantage of reduced wear and tear on materials due to reduced handling.

d. Organization: None

e. Training

(1) Good Marksmanship

(a) Observation: Good marksmanship is essential to effective combat operations. We have experienced numerous instances where poor marksmanship resulted in ineffective engagement of the enemy.

(b) Evaluation: Good marksmanship can be enhanced by constant practice and regular checking of weapons zero.

(c) Recommendations: That all fire bases establish range facilities suitable for confirming the zero of all weapons and for practicing "quick kill" techniques, and that troops securing the base be required to use these facilities on a regular basis.

f. Logistics

(1) Bladders

(a) Observation: On occasion, the tactical situation requires a rapid response in the placement of 10,000 gallon fuel bladders at a forward or temporary location in support of an operation. Often sufficient time is not available to permit the construction of protective fire revetments around the bladders. As a result, refueling aircraft, particularly Chinooks and cranes, causes stones and other objects to be thrown by their rotor wash into the bags. This causes numerous small punctures which, in turn, can render the bladder unserviceable either temporarily or permanently.

(b) Evaluation: The problem is unique only in that it normally occurs at a point and place in time which makes immediate repair of the bladder inconvenient if not difficult.

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(c) Recommendation: In order to preserve the bladders from damage, one unit experimented with airfield matting. The matting was placed against the bladder on the side facing the refueling points. It protected the bladder from flying objects, and the weight of the matting caused no apparent difficulty in operation.

(2) XM203

(a) Observation: M-79 grenadiers operating in heavy jungle foliage were not able to effectively employ their weapons during most contacts.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the lack of mass clearance, the M-79 proved to be ineffective in many parts of the AO, and the grenadier was unable to effectively participate in contacts. Those personnel carrying the experimental XM203 over-and-under M-16/K-79 were able to engage the enemy with the appropriate weapon more readily.

(c) Recommendation: That units operating in heavy jungle or rain forest be issued the XM203 in lieu of M-79's.

(3) Multi-Fuel Engines

(a) Observation: High failure of diesel and multi-fuel engines.

(b) Evaluation: The failure rate has been excessively high for diesel and multi-fuel engines, due to contaminated fuel and extremely dusty operating conditions. The scheduled services for filter changes listed in the applicable Technical Manuals were found to be inadequate.

(c) Recommendation: Units operating under similar conditions should have a Filter Change Program, which requires that all filters be changed or serviced, if applicable, on the 1st of each month. In addition, all fuel and air filters should be changed again, or serviced, if applicable, on the 15th of each month.

(4) AT-624A/AR Antenna Element

(a) Observation: The antenna, short whip, AT-892/PRC-25, has a relatively short life under combat field conditions.

(b) Evaluation: Antenna life under field conditions is difficult to predict. One method that can be used as a field expedient in lieu of the normal AT-892/PRC-25 is the USAF antenna element AT-624A/AR. While this antenna is not as flexible as the whip type, but with its flexible base, it is durable, and no significant impairment to the normal operating radius has been noted.

(c) Recommendation: That the USAF antenna element AT-624A/AR be used for AT 892/PRC-25 when the basic issue item is not available.

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(5) Explosives

(a) Observation: Recent shortages of Bangalore torpedoes has resulted in the issue of demolition snakes as a substitute item. Although these large linear charges are not as efficient in undergrowth removal as bangalores, they do serve as convenient excavating charges.

(b) Evaluation: Two sections of demo snakes laid two feet apart, and with 12-18 inches of tamping, will blast a fighting position four feet deep. Use of C-4 requires a series of holes to create the same effect and leads to waste of explosives due to overcharging.

(c) Recommendation: Demolition snakes should be used in hasty construction of fire support bases where construction time is of critical importance.

a. Communications: None

b. Material: None

i. Other: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

PARKER T. ANDERSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

6 Incls

1. Organizational Structure
2. Key Personnel
3. List of Abbreviations
4. Locations of Villages, FOB's
5. Map of 4th Div AO
6. Disposition of Forces for BARBARIC SHELS

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (72) (U)

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1-CO, 173d Abn Bde	
2-CO, DIVARTY	
2-CO, DISCOM	
2-CO, 1-10th Cav	
1-CO, 2-8th Inf	
1-CO, 3-8th Inf	
1-CO, 1-12th Inf	
1-CO, 3-12th Inf	
1-CO, 1-14th Inf	
1-CO, 1-22d Inf	
1-CO, 2-35th Inf	
1-CO, 5-16th Arty	
1-CO, 6-29th Arty	
1-CO, 4-42d Arty	
2-CO, 4th Engr Bn	
2-CO, 124th Sig Bn	
1-CO, 4th S&T Bn	
1-CO, 4th Med Bn	
1-CO, 704th Maint Bn	
2-CO, 4th Avn Bn	
1-CO, 7-17th Cav	
1-CS, 4th Inf Div	

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. (C) Task Organization as of 31 January 1970:

1st Bde., 4th Inf Div.

3-8 Inf (-)
1-14 Inf (A/3-8 OPCON 1-14)
1-22 Inf
A/6-29 Arty DS 3-8 Inf
A/2-9 Arty DS 1-14 Inf
C/4-42 Arty DS 1-22
C/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29 Arty
A/7-13 Arty (52d)
C/1-92 Arty (-) (52d)
B/4 Engr
D/704 Maint
E/4 Med
Flat/B/124 Sig
Flat/4 MP

2d Bde., 4th Inf Div.

1-8 Inf (-)
1-12 Inf (-)
1-35 Inf
1-69 Arm (-)
C/2-8 Inf (M)(OPCON 1-69)
D/1-12 Inf (OPCON 1-69)
C/6-29 Arty DS 1-8 Inf
B/4-42 Arty (-) DS 1-12 Inf
C/2-9 Arty DS 1-35 Inf
C/4 Engr
C/4 Med
Flat/B/124 Sig
Flat/4 MP
C/704 Maint

3d Bde., 4th Inf Div.

2-8 Inf (M) (-)
3-12 Inf
1-10 Cav
A/1-69 Arm (OPCON 2-8)
B/6-29 Arty DS 3-12 Inf
A/5-16 Arty GSR 2-9 Arty
B/5-16 Arty (-) GSR 2-9 Arty
D/5-16 Arty (-) GS
2-9 Arty (-)
A/6-14 Arty (52d)
A/4 Engr
B/704 Maint
A/4 Med
Flat/B/124 Sig
Flat/4 MP

Division Troops

2-35 Inf (IDG)
7-17 Cav (-)
B/2-9 Arty DS 2-35 Inf
A/4-42 Arty GS
C/7-15 Arty (52d)
4 Engr (-)
124 Sig (-)
K/75 Ranger
704 Maint (-)
4 Med (-)
4 S&T
4 MP (-)
4 MID
4 War Dog (Prov)
29 MID
43d Chem Det

Other

C/1-8 OPCON USASC
C/7-17 Cav DS 173d Abn

Inclosure 1

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12. (C) Task Organization change effective 1 Mar 70:
3-3 RELEASE C(-)/2-35 Inf 2-35 Inf RECEIVE C(-)/2-35
3d Bde RELEASE 1-10 Cav Div RECEIVE OPCON 1 10 Cav
13. (C) Task Organization change effective 2 Mar 70:
3-8 RELEASE 2/0/2-35 Inf 2-35 RECEIVE 2/0/2-35 Inf
14. (C) Task Organization change effective 3 Mar 70:
1-8 RELEASE D/1-8 Inf 1-12 RECEIVE D/1-8
1st Bde RELEASE 1-8 Inf 2d Bde RECEIVE OPCON 3-8
15. (C) Task Organization change effective 5 Mar 70:
2d Bde RELEASE 1-35 Inf 3d Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-35
2d Bde RELEASE 1-69 Arm 3d Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-69
1-69 Arm RELEASE B/2-8(M) 1-10 Cav RECEIVE B/2-8(M)
POK RELEASE A(-)/1-69 1-69 Arm RECEIVE A(-)/1-69
2-8 ILI(M) RELEASE 1/4/1-69 1-69 Arm RECEIVE 1/4/1-69
16. (C) Task Organization change effective 7 Mar 70:
1-12 RELEASE D/1-8 Inf 1-8 Inf RECEIVE D/1-8 Inf
2d Bde's A(-)/1-69 Arm at CIA BANG
17. (C) Task Organization change effective 10 Mar 70:
1-14 Inf RELEASE D/1-14 Inf 1-8 RECEIVE OPCON D/1-14()
1-12 RECEIVE OPCON 30/1-14
18. (C) Task Organization change effective 11 Mar 70:
1-10 Cav RELEASE B/2-8 (M) 1-14 RECEIVE B/2-8(M)
19. (C) Task Organization change effective 15 Mar 70:
1-10 Cav RELEASE C/1-10 2-8 RECEIVE OPCON C/1-10
20. (C) Task Organization change effective 17 Mar 70:
1st Bde RELEASE 1-22, 2-35 2d Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-22, 2-35
3d Bde RELEASE 2-8(-)(M) Div RECEIVE OPCON 2-8(-)(M)
2-8(-) RELEASE C/1-10, 1B/2-8(-) 1-10 Cav RECEIVE C/1-10, 1B/2-8(-)
1-14 RELEASE B/2-8(M) 2-8 RECEIVE B/2-8(M)

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32. (C) Task Organization change effective 10 Apr 70:
3d Bde RELEASE 3-12 Inf TASK FORCE ENANI RECEIVE 3-12
33. (C) Task Organization change effective 11 Apr 70:
3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, 1-8 Inf., 1-35 Inf., 1-69 Arty, 2-9 Arty
redeployed to CONUS as part of KEYSTONE BLUEJAY PHASE III
REDEPLOYMENT
34. (C) Task Organization change effective 12 Apr 70:
2-35 RELEASE B/1-12 1-12 RECEIVE B/1-12
35. (C) Task Organization change effective 13 Apr 70:
1-12 RELEASE A/1-12 1-10 Cav RECEIVE OPCON A/1-12
36. (C) Task Organization change effective 14 Apr 70:
1-12(-) RELEASE C/1-12 1-10 Cav RECEIVE C/1-12
37. (C) Task Organization change effective 15 Apr 70:
3-12 RELEASE OPCON TF ENANI TO DIVISION
B/7-17 Cav return from THAM BANG
38. (C) Task Organization change effective 18 Apr 70:
1-10 Cav RELEASE A/1-12 1-12 RECEIVE A/1-12
39. (C) Task Organization change effective 22 Apr 70:
Div RELEASE 3-12 Inf 1st Bde RECEIVE 3-12 Inf
40. (C) Task Organization change effective 23 Apr 70:
1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON TASK FORCE PURSUIT:
C/75 Regt., 3-506 Abn.
41. (C) Task Organization change effective 24 Apr 70:
7-17 Cav RELEASE C/7 17 Cav 3-506 Abn RECEIVE C/7 17
1st Bde RELEASE 1-14, 3-8 2d Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-14, 3-8
42. (C) Task Organization change effective 30 Apr 70:
2d Bde RELEASE 1-14, 3-8 1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-14, 3-8

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43. (C) Task Organization change effective 30 Apr 70:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Division</u>
3-12 Inf	1-22 Inf	1-10 Cav
C&K/75 Hanger	2-35 Inf	C/1-12 Inf
3-506 Abn		2-8 Inf (M)
C/7-17 Cav		7-17 Cav (-)
		1-12 Inf

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Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period:

Walker, Glenn D.	MG	Division Commander
Wheelock, John G. III	BG	ADC-A
MacFarlane, Jack	BG	ADC-B
Culin, John E.	COL	Chief of Staff
Juvenal, Michael P.	LTC	ACofS, G1
Strobridge, William F.	LTC	ACofS, G2
Prillaman, Richard L.	LTC	ACofS, G3
Kimble, Roy E.	LTC	ACofS, G4
Holland, David K.	LTC	ACofS, G5
Weaver, Johnathan M. Jr.	LTC	DPC
Serra, Robert R.	LTC	AG
Wallace, Raymond E.	LTC	IG
Stevenson, Bruce E.	LTC	SJA
Patterson, Peter H.	LTC	SURG
Parker, Travis W.	LTC	PM
Roberts, Charles W.	MAJ	CXL OFF
Gassie, Herbert H.	LTC	FIN OFF
Kelly, Orris E.	LTC	CHAP
Abel, Kenneth E.	MAJ	IO
Fress, George D.	MAJ	AMMO OFF
Christenberry, James P.	MAJ	TRANS OFF

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

Yow, Harold D.	COL	CO
Sigh, Cliff R.	LTC	DEP BDE CO

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Conger, William S. Jr.	COL	CO
Ferguson, William F.	LTC	DEP BDE CO
Mallory, Glynn C. Jr.	MAJ	SJ

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div (As of 10 April 1970)

Procter, Gilbert Jr.	COL	CO
Emery, Bruce W.	MAJ	DEP BDE CO
Brown, James H.	CPT	SJ

Division Artillery

Gudgel, Edward F. Jr.	COL	CO
Tassie, Lawrence R.	LTC	XO

Division Support Command

Adams, Dwight L.	LTC	CO
Bramlett, James T.	LTC	XO

Inclosure 2

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BATTALIONS

Cack, Richard S.	LTC	CO, 1-8th Infantry
Conell, Robert J.	LTC	CO, 2-8th Infantry
Fallon, Thomas F.	LTC	CO, 3-8th Infantry
Sterling, Morris P. Jr.	LTC	CO, 1-12th Infantry
McKay, Gerald D.	LTC	CO, 3-12th Infantry
Naler, Robert D.	LTC	CO, 1-14th Infantry
Rabin, Ronald J.	MAJ	CO, 1-22d Infantry
Scott, Donald L.	MAJ	CO, 1-35th Infantry
Harrison, William L. Jr.	LTC	CO, 2-35th Infantry
Ashworth, Servetus T. III	LTC	CO, 1-10th Cavalry
Marini, James L.	LTC	CO, 1-69th Armor
Lykke, Arthur F. Jr.	LTC	CO, 6-29th Arty
Tosberg, Ralph T.	LTC	CO, 4-42d Arty
Richards, Charles D.	LTC	CO, 2-9th Arty
Cook, Larry L.	LTC	CO, 5-16th Arty
Pacelli, Vincent A.	LTC	CO, 4th Aviation Bn
Brinkerhoff, John R.	LTC	CO, 4th Medical Bn
Sheldon, Lamar L.	LTC	CO, 4th Supply & Transport Bn
Smith, David G.	LTC	CO, 704th Maintenance Bn
Lehan, James F. Jr.	LTC	CO, 124th Signal Bn

Separate Companies and Detachments

Woods, James H.	CPT	CO, HHC, 4th Inf Div
Williamson, Jack	MAJ	CO, 4th Admin Company
Dulin, Stanley L.	CPT	CO, 4th MP Company
Smart, Richard F.	CPT	CO, 4th MI Company
Axelson, Gordon S.	MAJ	CO, 29th Mil Hist Det
Anderson, Donald R.	CPT	CO, 4th Pepl Det
Olmstead, Kim H.	CPT	CO, K Co, 75th Inf Rangers
Livingston, Arno K.	CPT	CO, 43d Chem Det

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List of abbreviations used in text (local, common usage, standard army).

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AFDS	Armed Forces Radio Service
AGI	Annual General Inspection
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
AO	Area of Operations
AFC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APD	Airborne Personnel Detector
ARP	Aero Rifle Platoon
ARVN	Army Republic of Vietnam
AVLB	Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge
AW	Automatic Weapon
BC	Body Count
CA	Civic Action, Combat Assault
CAS	Close Air Support
CAC	Command and Control (Aircraft)
CEV	Combat Engineer Vehicle
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CI	Counterintelligence
CIA	Captured in Action
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CNIT	Combined Mobile Instruction Team
CMNI	Command Management Maintenance Inspection
CMTT	Combined Mobile Training Team
CP	Command Post
CRID	Capital ROK Infantry Division
CS	Tear Gas
CSF	Camp Strike Force
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DS	Direct Support
DSSA	Direct Support Supply Activity
DTOC	Division Tactical Operations Center
EOP	Equipment Deadlined for Parts
ERP	Engineer Bagelling Platoon
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FO	Forward Observer
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FGA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSE	Forward Supply Element
FVMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GRREG	Graves Registration
GS	General Support
GIR	General Support Reinforcing
GUNSHIP	Armed UH-1 Helicopter
GVN	Government of Vietnam

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HAWKEYE TEAM
HE
HEP
H&I
HEADHUNTER
HOOK

Four Man Hunter-Killer Team
High Explosive
Hostile Enemy Position
Harassment and Interdiction
O-1E Aircraft Used for Visual Recon
CH-47 Chinook Helicopter

ICC
ISFORCEV, IFFV

Installation Coordination Center
I Field Force, Vietnam

KDA
KIA

Killed By Air
Killed In Action

L7
LOH
LP
LRP
LLOC
LZ

Local Force
Light Observation Helicopter
Listening Post
Long Range Patrol
Land Line of Communications
Landing Zone

MACV
MEDCAP
MF
MI
MIA
MSF
MSR
MTO

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Medical Civic Action Program
Main Force
Military Intelligence
Missing In Action
Mobile Strike Force
Main Supply Route
Modification Table of Organization
and Equipment

NCS
NORS
NVA
NVAG

Net Control Station
Non Operational for Supplies
North Vietnamese Army
North Vietnamese Army Captive

OB
OP
OPCON
OPLAN
OPORD

Order of Battle
Observation Post
Operational Control
Operation Plan
Operation Order

PF
POLWAR
POW, PW
PP
PSYOPS

Popular Force
Political Warfare
Prisoner of War
Preplanned
Psychological Operations

RATT
RCA
RD

Radio Teletype
Riot Control Agent
Revolutionary Development

Inclosure 3

-2-


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RF	Regional Force
RIF	Reconnaissance in Force
RL	Rocket Launcher
RRC	Radio Research Company
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
SA	Small Arms
SLICK	UH-1 Helicopter Used for Airlift
SWATCH	Sudden Apprehension of Suspect Person
SP	Self Propelled
SPOOKY	Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Flea-ship
SRP	Short Range Patrol
STZ	Special Tactical Zone
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TOS	Table of Organization & Equipment
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USSF	United States Special Forces
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VETCAP	Veterinary Civic Action Program
VMC	Viet Montagnard Cong
VMCC	Visual Reconnaissance
VR	Viet Montagnard Cong Captive
VT	Variable Time
VTR	Vehicle Tank Recovery
WIA	Wounded in Action
WP	White Phosphorous

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


INCLOSURE
4

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
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Incl 4

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4th Infantry Division Area of Operation



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Incl 4

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IA DRANG VALLEY	ZA3007 to ZA9007
LE TRUNG	NR9247
LZ ABBY	BR747813
LZ ACRION	BR260479
LZ ARNOLD TRAIL	BR726607
LZ AQUARIUS	BR457600
LZ AUGUSTA	BR301727
LZ BLACKHAWK	BR035535
LZ BRIGIT	ZA015164
LZ CHALLENGE	BR628322
LZ DENISE	BR520512
LZ DORIS	BR061342
LZ EMILIA	BR477595
LZ ENGLISH	BR377077
LZ HARD TIMES	BR613607
LZ KIPSHOOT	ZA187112
LZ KEEPER	BR123074
LZ JOHN HENRY	BR674708
LZ LAURA KAY	NR955306
LZ MARY	BR074730
LZ MARTIN	BR225238
LZ NIAGARA	BR421320
LZ OUTRIGGER	Z2204214
LZ PAULA	BR439408
LZ PLUTO	BR615943
LZ RAQUEL	BR506903
LZ RIFLE	ZA205726

Inclosure 5

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LOCATIONS OF VILLAGES, LZ'S, AND FSB'S

AN KHE	BR465467
AN LAO VALLEY	BR685430 N to BR6264
ARNOLD TRAIL	BR729607
BASE AREA 202	BR130307
BASE AREA 226	BR7263
BEN KET	YB873253
BINH KHE	AR639430
BRIDGE 36	AR882031
BUN HO	D-20733
BU PRANG	YU495553
CAMP RADCLIFF	BR465467
CHU PA MFS	YA9568
CHU PRONG MFS	AR765630
CROWS FOOT	BR2277
DAK ANUNH (CR)	AR7523
DAK PAYOU VALLEY	BR1330
DAK PEK	YB8896
DAK SIANG	YB8940
DIEN BINH	ZR090130
DI LAP	YB8756
FSB APRIL	ZR090130
FSB PORTROT	YB8756
FSB YEREDITH	YA916277
FSB OASIS	ZR114275
FSB ROMA	ZR079213
FSB SHERIDA	BR690553
Inlosure 5	

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LZ SCHUELLER	BR367458
LZ SHERRY	BR490690
LZ SNIPE	BR693613
(ST GEORGE	AR554164
LZ SUSTE	BR473908
LZ TERRACE	BR572753
LZ TOUGHIE	BR553630
LZ WARRIOR	BR322558
NANG YANG PASS	BR2251
NEPAL PLANTATION	A38623
OLD DAK TO	ZB0627
OREGON TRAIL	BR6164 NE to BR8471
PLEI DJEBENG	YA755457
PLEI HRONG	ZAL13673
PLEI TRAP VALLEY	YB3315 to YA6347
SONG BA RIVER	BR4745 SW to BR345235 S to PHU NHON
TRI BORDIER	ZB7325
VC VALLEY	BR1319
VIN THANH VALLEY	BR6251

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LE TAO BUIS	BR845945
LE UNLEPT	BR927757
LE UTE	BR355705
LE WARRIOR	BR322558
LE WELCH	BR494879
LE WILD CAT	YA595525
HANG YANG PASS	BR2251
PHU MY	BR9467
PLEI MRONG	ZA113673
PLEI TRAP VALLEY	YE8815 to YA6347
ROCKET BOX	ZA145535
SONG BA RIVER	BR4745 SW to BR345285 S to PHU NHON
VO VALLEY	BR1339
VINH THANH VALLEY	BR6251

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY (BINH TRAY #1)

1. (C) Summary of Personnel and Equipment Losses

US KIA	43
US MIA	118
NVA KIA	212
NVA CIA	7
Weapons and Equipment	
CS Weapons	20
SA Weapons	859
Rice CIA	591 tons
Structures Destroyed	2,197
Ammunition	10,797 Rounds SA
	717 Rounds Mortar
	141 Rounds Recoilless Rifle
	612 Grenades
	224 Rounds B-40

2. (C) Casualty Causes

a. Friendly Casualties

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
Ground Contact (Frd Initiated)	9	18
Ground Contact (Enemy Initiated)	20	65
Ground Contact at an LZ	1	9
Sapper Attack	2	6
Ground to Air Fire	6	8
Non-Battle Casualties	5	12
Total	43	118

b. Enemy Casualties


Air Cavalry	30
Tac Air/B-52	48
C/75 Ranger	16
Ground Contact	118
Artillery	UNCL
Total	212

Inclosure 6

DO GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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YELLOW

YELLOW

INCLOSURE 6

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DM 5200.10

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96252

AVDJR-GC-NH

20 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

S&S DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. General

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation EAM QUYN-KINH.

(2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation HINDS, 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970, is set forth in Inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

(4) Locations, coordinates of villages, LZ's, and FSB's are listed at Inclosure 5.

(5) Mission: The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations to support GVN pacification programs; to locate, pursue and destroy VC/NVA elements attempting to disrupt pacification; to screen routes of infiltration along the CAMBODIAN border; to locate and destroy enemy resources, installations and command facilities in CAMBODIA; and to secure the major LOC within its area of operation.

(6) Concept of Operation: At the beginning of the period, the division had one brigade operating to the north of Camp Radcliff targeted against the GIA LAI Provincial unit, and one brigade was operating to the south in the DAK PAYOU Valley against the 95B Regiment. CAMBODIAN border screening operations were conducted preliminary to division operations in CAMBODIAN Base area 702. In support of ARVN operations in CAMBODIA the division provided the support of two infantry battalions in the PLEI THAP Valley. Highway 19, the major LOC in the division area of operation, was secured with a minimum of one cavalry squadron, and one brigade began an IFV directed mission in eastern BINH DINH Province in support of the pacification effort.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

b. Intelligence

(1) General

(a) Enemy activity in BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces during May consisted of scattered sapper attacks, attacks by fire, and attacks against lines of communication. These offensive actions were taken to weaken and delay allied operations being conducted in enemy base areas located in CAMBODIA. Sapper attacks and attacks by fire were conducted against division support elements and Highway 19 was interdicted on both sides of PLEIKU in an effort to retard the movement of men and supplies. In Base Area 702, enemy resistance to 4th Infantry Division operations ranged from non-existent to moderate. According to documents captured in CAMBODIA, the enemy had warning as early as 17 March 1970 of the probability of friendly operations, and had moved much of his stockpile of supplies deeper into CAMBODIA. Contacts were fought with stay-behind elements and with enemy units guarding supplies that had not been withdrawn. Several large caches and medical facilities showed that even with prior warning the enemy had not been able to remove his troops and supplies to safety.

(b) During June, enemy activity was light in both BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces. Division elements operated in Base Area 202 against the 95B Regiment and north of AN KHE against elements of the 3d NVA Division. Enemy forces avoided contact with division units and concentrated on resupply and the disruption of pacification. There were two large engagements during the month, one in each of the operational areas which resulted in over 50 enemy killed, three captured and one HOI CHANH. Enemy activity decreased in all forms after its highpoint of the previous month.

(c) In July, activity in BINH DINH Province remained light while increasing in PLEIKU Province to a moderate level. Enemy activity in both provinces indicated that large numbers of replacements were being infiltrated to various units in the division area of operation. North of AN KHE, three infiltration groups were identified, while C10G units in the PLEIKU area engaged a fourth. Division units were targeted against these groups, plus the 95B Regiment, the 2d Regiment, and elements of the 3d NVA Division. In BINH DINH Province the enemy generally continued to avoid contact, but in PLEIKU a moderate increase began the latter part of the month with attacks by fire against several major installations.

(2) PLEIKU

Activity in PLEIKU Province was moderate during May as 4th Infantry Division and allied units launched operations into enemy sanctuaries in CAMBODIA. Division elements experienced ground to air

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fire and met sporadic contact during the initial landings in CAMBODIA. During the remainder of the operation, enemy elements attempted to avoid US forces. Several large medical facilities were found, over 500 tons of rice was captured, and on 12 May, a weapons cache containing over 800 weapons was found. After 4th Division units withdrew from the CAMBODIAN phase of the operation, ARVN rangers made contact with a large enemy force in a regimental size base camp, resulting in over 40 NVA soldiers being killed and 2000 mortar and 500 B-40 rocket rounds being captured. On 24 May, the ARVN rangers engaged a large enemy force, resulting in 31 enemy KIA and one prisoner. To the south, in Base Area 701, ARVN units captured three 75mm pack howitzers, eleven 75mm RR and numerous small arms. A PW captured in this base area identified the 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment as being located there and told of a "K7" Battalion, 24th Regiment which had been formed in September 1969. Operations conducted by the 4th Division in the lower FLEI TRAP Valley after withdrawing from CAMBODIA resulted in 17 NVA killed in a number of engagements.

In the vicinity of PLEIKU City, the K631st Composite Battalion attacked the city with 122mm rockets, and 82mm mortars, and in addition interdicted Highway 19 west of the city with attacks by fire. On 4 May, LZ OASIS received 32 rounds of mixed 75mm RR and 82mm mortar fire. To the east of the city, LE TRUNG District Headquarters received 107mm rockets twice.

Action in PLSIKU Province remained light during June, as division elements operated in Base Area 202 against the 95B Regiment. The most significant incident occurred when D/1-14th Inf observed 70 enemy soldiers crossing an open field. Artillery, gunships, and tactical air were employed in support of the ground unit resulting in 28 enemy killed. To the east of the base area, a cache was found containing a 57mm RR, a 60mm mortar and ammunition for both weapons. Activity along Highway 19 decreased as allied troops withdrew from CAMBODIA. The largest incident occurred west of PLSIKU where the 2d Battalion (Mech), 8th Infantry was probed in a night location by an unknown size enemy force. Employing organic weapons, the alert 2-8th killed two NVA, and while sweeping the next morning found many blood trails leading away from the area.

Activity increased during July as enemy forces attacked RF/PF forces to the north and west of PLSIKU City, and the 95B Regiment and K631st Composite Battalion were identified southwest of PLEIKU. In the PLEI MRONG area, RF's engaged an unknown size enemy force. While sweeping after the contact, four VMC and four 122mm rockets were captured. The rockets were intended for the artillery company of the 408th Sapper Battalion. To the southwest of PLEIKU in the PLEI ME area, CIDG forces engaged small enemy forces throughout the month. PW's and captured documents identified these enemy troops as the 2201 Infiltration Group.

Other PW's and documents identified the K1 Battalion, 95B Regiment and the K631st Battalion. These units will conduct joint operations in that area in the future. On 16 July, Camp Enari received 23 rounds of mixed 122mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire from the south and southwest. At the same time a village to the south of Camp Enari received 75mm RR fire. The next night the CIDG camp at PLEI ME received 82mm mortar fire. Along Highway 19, both east and west of PLAIKU City, enemy activity was light and limited to mining incidents and harassing fire.

(3) BINH DINH

Enemy activity in BINH DINH Province was light during May as 4th Division units conducted operations in CAMBODIA. Enemy actions consisted of harassing actions against lines of communication and against the 4th Infantry Division base camp at Camp Radcliff. During this period Camp Radcliff received two attacks by fire and two sapper attacks. On 11 May, the camp received 18 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and on 16 May received eight additional rounds. The two sapper attacks were targeted against the 704th Maintenance Battalion and resulted in damage to vehicles and buildings. Upon return from CAMBODIA, elements of the 2d Brigade deployed north of AN KHE to operate against the C2/407th Sapper Battalion. The only enemy initiated incident during the operation was an attack by fire against LZ KIOVA consisting of ten rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

Activity decreased in BINH DINH during June as units from the 2d Brigade engaged an infiltration group and killed 29 enemy, captured three and one HOI CHANH. The PW's identified their unit as the 2d Training Regiment, and documents captured at the site of the contact identified the infiltration group as the D132 Group. Food caches found during the month totaled 45,948 pounds of rice. A clothing storage area also was found containing 500 pounds of clothes including several ROK and US uniforms. On 30 June, elements of the 1-14th Infantry discovered a large NVA base camp that was believed to have been a 3d NVA Division Headquarters due to the complexity and variety of the structures found. It was estimated to have been used within the previous two days by 300-400 people. Enemy activity against US fire support bases consisted of harassing and small arms fire and one 60mm mortar attack against LZ TERRACE. Along Highway 19, interdiction attempts were light except for a contact on 20 June in the ROK area of operation that resulted in several US vehicles being damaged or destroyed.

During July, enemy units in BINH DINH Province generally continued to avoid contact with the 4th Infantry Division, and placed their emphasis on the food procurement, resupply, and disruption of pacification. The largest action of the month occurred on 23-24 July when aviation elements spotted an unknown size enemy force. Artillery, gunships, tactical air, and maneuver elements of the 4th Infantry Division were

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employed which resulted in 43 enemy killed. The enemy carried documents that identified them as members of the 1126 Infiltration Group. On 6 July a PW was captured as he was leading replacements to the 50th LF Battalion. Documents captured at the same time as the PW identified his replacements as being from the D1122 Infiltration Group, the same group that was engaged by the 1-22d Infantry in June. Other documents captured during the month told of a 230 man group that would cross "a highway" on 10 July on their way to PHU YEN Province. Later in the month, two deserters from an infiltration group were captured and they identified their group as the 250th Infantry Battalion. This evidence indicates that the enemy may be making a major effort to build up his units prior to September, possibly for a new offensive.

(4) Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength as of 31 July 1970:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
3d NVA Division Headquarters	2400	Northern BINH DINH
12th Regiment	1310	Base Area 226
2d VC Regiment	950	Northern BA 226
500th Transportation Battalion	350	North of BA 226
95B Regiment	700	Base Area 202
K-45 LF Battalion	200	Southwest of Camp Shari
408th Sapper Battalion	300	Northeast of PLEIKU
H-15 LF Battalion	200	East of Camp Shari
243d Trans Battalion	300	Northwest of AN KHE
K631st Composite Battalion	300	West of PLEIKU
Infra Structure	4235	
Guerrilla Forces	1000	
Total Enemy Forces	12245+	

(5) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques

(a) A PW captured in PLEIKU Province has indicated that the K1 Battalion, 95B Regiment is to interdict Highway 19 west of PLEIKU. This is a new mission for the K1 Battalion, and in an area further north than this battalion normally operates. The same PW has stated that the K631st Composite Battalion will work with the K1 Battalion in some future operations in unknown locations.

(b) During operations in CAMBODIA, it was noted that most LZ's had huts on them and fences built around them. It was later proven that the enemy had built these huts to make US forces believe that these areas were inhabited. Actually only two LZ watchers would live in the huts and report any attempted insertions on their LZ.

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(6) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses

(a) Personnel:	KIA (BC)	380
	NVA CIA	13
	VC/VNC CIA	4
(b) Weapons:	SA	880
	CS	41
(c) Ammunition:	SA rounds	15,372
	CS rounds	1,430
	Granades	761
	Mines	158
(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items:		
	Rice	590.5 tons
	Documents	397,460 pages

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Capabilities

1 The 2d VC Regiment, 3d NVA Division, has the capability to conduct multi-battalion sized attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas in the PHU MI District.

2 The 12th Regiment, 3d NVA Division, has the capability to conduct multi-battalion attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas supported by 122mm rockets. They can also interdict Highway 19 from AN KHE to the coast.

3 The 953 Regiment is capable of conducting up to battalion sized attacks against Highway 19, fire support bases, and GVN villages.

4 The 408th Sapper Battalion is capable of conducting multi-company size sapper attacks supported by 107mm rockets, and attacks by fire against allied and GVN installations in the PLUKU area.

5 The 863rd Composite Battalion is capable of conducting multi-company attacks supported by mortars, recoilless rifle, and 122mm rockets, and attacks by fire against allied installations, villages, and lines of communication west of PLUKU City, and upon the city itself.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities

1 Enemy units are subject to airstrikes, and artillery fire while moving, in bivouac, or massing for an attack.

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2 Enemy munitions and food caches are vulnerable to allied search and clear operations.

3 Enemy movement can be detected by airborne and ground sensor devices.

4 Enemy bivouac sites can be located by airborne personnel detection and red haze detection devices.

5 Enemy lines of communication are overextended and subject to interdiction by allied forces.

6 Low morale, personnel losses, and shortages of food and medical supplies provide an excellent climate for psychological warfare operations.

(c) Probable Courses of Action

1 The enemy will probably continue to attempt to resupply, replace, and retrain his personnel in preparation for possible offensives in the fall.

2 The 2d Regiment will probably move to the VINH THANH Valley area to receive replacements and conduct retraining.

3 The 12th Regiment will probably continue to interdict Highway 19 east of AN KHE, disrupt pacification, and possibly attempt to procure food in the PHU CAT area.

4 Local forces in BINH DINH will probably continue to harass the pacification program and conduct psychological operations against allied units.

5 In PLEIKU Province, the K631st Composite Battalion will probably continue attacks by fire against friendly installations and harassment of villages and AF/PF forces.

6 The 408th Sapper Battalion will probably continue its attacks against PLEIKU City and LE TRUNG District Headquarters.

7 The 95B Regiment will probably continue to interdict Highway 19 between AN KHE and PLEIKU and possibly harass GVN villages in conjunction with local force units.

8 Local force units will probably continue harassment of lines of communication, providing intelligence for main force units, and disrupting pacification.

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(8) Military Intelligence Activities

(a) General: During the quarter, the 4th Military Intelligence Company provided Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation, Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Order of Battle support to the division. This included maximum effort in intelligence collection and production prior to the CAMBODIAN operation and general support during the course of those operations.

(b) Counterintelligence: The operations of the CI Section during the quarter included targeting individuals and small local force units, increasing the VIP Program, and developing agent sources within the Camp Radcliff area. Continual operations were carried on to screen all indigenous employees at all 4th Division base camps and to develop agent sources within those employees.

(c) Interrogation of Prisoners of War: Accurate and timely information was provided the division by the effective interrogation of prisoners of war and the accurate translation of captured documents by the IIP Section. The section was also able to provide detailed information through the skillful exploitation of prisoners and HOI CHANGES. This was particularly noticeable during the operation in CAMBODIA, where the information gained by those interrogations and translations resulted in many tactical targets being found and destroyed.

(d) Duffelbag Operations: During the last three months the Duffelbag program has continued to increase sensor coverage along Highway 19 and in the Camp Radcliff TAOR. During this period a complete sensor system was emplaced around the Golf Course Army Airfield and aviation personnel were trained in the employment of the sensors. Technical support was also given to the 1st Logistical Command to assist that organization with the employment of sensors.

(e) G2 Air Reconnaissance: The G2 Air Section has provided continual support for the division with VR, airborne personnel detection, red haze and photo missions. Close coordination with the Imagery Interpretation Section has given the field commander timely and accurate photographic coverage of an operational area. Photographic studies prepared of the major areas of enemy activity have provided increased intelligence on enemy operational areas, his tactical procedures and subsistence methods. A study of Red Haze readings has established that early morning missions provide the greatest accuracy.

(f) Order of Battle Section: An automatic data processing system developed by the Order of Battle Section has allowed the storage and instant recall of thousands of hard intelligence facts. Since it became operational during the latter part of May, the system has provided useful and timely information not only to the G2 section, but to the G3 and G5

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division staff sections and battalion S2 and S3 sections and LRRF teams. Current usage has averaged over one and a half times a day and has been steadily rising since its conception. In addition the section has provided timely and accurate analyses of enemy movement, trends, and capabilities.

(9) Weather Forecasting

(a) Support provided

1	Hourly weather observations	3000
2	Special weather observations	420
3	Routine scheduled forecasts and amendments	305
4	Planning forecast issued to select staff agencies twice daily	180
5	Aircraft accident reports (Summary of existing weather at the time)	10
6	Monthly climatology reports for II MR	3
7	Out of station briefings conducted at request of staff agencies	30
8	Telephone requests for weather information	3500
9	Area climatology summaries and special area of long range forecasts	10
10	Climatology briefings and safety briefings to aviation companies	6

(b) The most significant operational problem occurred during BINH TAY #1 when approaching monsoons placed a severe limitation time on operations being conducted in CAMBODIA.

c. Operations and Training Activities

(1) Operations

(a) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period.

As the period began, both brigades were disposed and involved in two major operations. The 1st Brigade was operating in the DAK PAYOU (VC) Valley area while the 2d Brigade was working to the north of

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AN KHE targeted against the GIA LAI Provincial unit. On 2 May both brigades received warning orders to cease operations and prepare to redispense their forces in preparation for a major operation in CAMBODIA.

The redispense of forces began with the 3-506th Airborne Battalion of the 1st Brigade, which was operating in the DAK KAYOU Valley area, airlifting from LZ MATTIE to Camp Radcliff. The 1-12 Inf (-), 1-22 Inf, and 2-35 Inf of the 2d Brigade also began their moves into Camp Radcliff. On 4 May, the 3-12th Inf, operating in the DAK KAYOU Valley area, with 1st Brigade elements reverted to division control, and returned to Camp Radcliff to begin base camp security operations. In addition, the 1st Brigade tactical command post airlifted to NEW PLAI DJERENG, while the remaining elements of its command post group and the 3-506 Airborne Battalion convoyed overland to Camp Holloway near PLEIKU. The 1-14th Inf moved overland and closed on LZ MEREDITH, and then prepared to continue to move overland the next day to NEW PLAI DJERENG, where it would begin its combat assault. The 3-8th Inf remained at Camp Radcliff and continued preparations for the operation.

The redispense of forces continued through 6 May with 2d Brigade elements occupying LZ MEREDITH, LZ JACKSON HOLE, and LZ OSIS. The 3-8th Inf of the 1st Brigade convoyed overland on 5 May from Camp Radcliff and closed LZ MEREDITH preparing to combat assault on 6 May.

All aircraft on 5 May, D-Day, were dedicated to the single lift of one battalion at a time. This involved the use of some sixty lift ships to first move the 3-506th Airborne Battalion to its objective area. The first aircraft into the LZ received heavy ground to air fire. Because no suitable alternate LZ was available, the mission had to be aborted due to time and distance factors.

In spite of airstrip congestion at NEW PLAI DJERENG, control factors, dust, and an inadequate number of refuel/rearm points, three major attempts were made on 5 May to insert the 3-506th. LZ's finally used were located at YA 413537 and YA 415545. By the end of D-Day (5 May), only one battalion with supporting elements was operational in CAMBODIA. Because there had been little time to pre-position all elements forward for multiple assaults, the short time span did not make any allowances for imperfections in the execution phase.

On 6 May the 1st Brigade continued to insert its forces into CAMBODIA. Enemy fire severely hampered the insertion of the 3-8th Inf, and airstrikes were unable to suppress the enemy fire. However, after the insertion of only sixty men in an alternate LZ, one helicopter was shot down. Another try was made, however, resulting in two damaged aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the day the 1-14th Inf fared somewhat better and was able to insert 75% of its troops, which completed the brigade activities of 6 May. The 1st Brigade completed the balance

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of its moves on 7 May with twelve aircraft. The 2d Brigade used the other 43 lift ships to move its three battalions (1-12, 1-22, and 2-35) into their fire bases. They experienced no significant enemy contacts during the remainder of the lift.

Ground and air operations conducted against the enemy in CAMBODIA were generally light to moderate actions. The contacts resulted in some 212 enemy KIA. (See Inclosure 6).

Several significant cache discoveries were also made during the course of this operation. Elements of the 3-506 Abn Battalion for instance, found a huge rice cache of approximately 500 tons and a weapons and ammunition cache containing over 800 individual weapons. (See Inclosure 6).

Even though the major tactical effort was completed on 16 May 70 with the extraction of the division elements from CAMBODIA, because of ARVN operations that were continuing in Base Area 702, both the 3-8th and 3-506th Infantry Battalions established fire bases in the FLEI TRAP Valley. This provided contingency fire support just east of the CAMBODIAN border for the ARVN battalions which continued to operate in the vicinity of the cache sites discovered earlier by the 3-506 Airborne Battalion.

(b) Division Controlled Operations

During May, the 2-8th (Mech) Inf conducted operations west of Highway 14, between FLEIKU and KONTUM. The battalion conducted operations north of AN KHE, east and west of Highway 508 in the first part of June and moved west to operate between FLEIKU and the CAMBODIAN border in the latter part of June. During July the battalion conducted operations south of AN KHE down Highway 28, east and west of the SONG BA River.

The first week in May the battalion continued to clear and secure Highway 14 from FLEIKU to KONTUM with its command post at LE RIPPLE. Two companies were employed to strong point the road and to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the area adjacent to the highway. During the hours of darkness the companies set ambushes and augmented the bridge defenses of the 1-6th XF Company by deploying mounted squads at bridge sites. A third company with two platoons dismounted conducted search and clear operations and saturation ambushing to the northwest of FLEIKU. No significant contact was made with the enemy during this period.

On 4 May the battalion assumed the mission of securing the road from Junction Highway 19 west and Highway 14 to NVA FLEI DJARENG. Each company mineswept the road and positioned strong points in that portion of the road assigned to it.

On 8 May the 2-1st Cavalry relieved the battalion of its road security mission and the battalion then set up a command post at NVA

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PLEI DJERENG and secured that logistical base. A third company conducted dismantled reconnaissance in force operations west of NEW PLEI DJERENG. D/7-17th Cav (attached) and A/2-1st Cav (OPCON) mineswept and secured other lines of communication surrounding NEW PLEI DJERENG. Convoy escorts were provided when required.

(c) Division Artillery

1 1st Brigade: The 1st Brigade, supported by the 6-29th Arty, conducted operations against elements of the 95B Regiment in Base area 202 (VC Valley). The operation was initiated in April 1970, and on 1 May, Task Force Pursuit of the 101st Airborne was on LZ MATTIE with three howitzers at LZ BIG WINDY. B/6-29th Arty, in direct support of the 3-12 Infantry was on LZ BORIS, A/6-29th Arty and C/6-29th Arty were at Camp Radcliff making final preparations for the airlift into the base area. The next day the brigade received a warning order to prepare for an assault into CAMBODIA on 5 May. The 3-506th Infantry of Task Force Pursuit became OPCON to the 1st Brigade, D/2-320 Arty OPCON 6-29th Arty on 3 May, and D/2-320 Arty and B/6-29th Arty airlifted to Camp Radcliff from their locations in VC Valley. On 4 May the 6-29th Arty tactical command post moved overland to NEW PLEI DJERENG to provide coordination for the planned operation.

D/2-320 Arty was airlifted with the 3-506 Abn from Camp Holloway to LZ CURAHEE in CAMBODIA. On 6 May, C/6-29th Arty airlifted from NEW PLEI DJERENG to LZ DRAGON. Meanwhile, the advance party from A/6-29th Arty combat assaulted to the vicinity of grid YA 488639, and began fighting to secure the area for a fire base for the 3-8th Infantry. The company commander of G/3-8th Infantry was killed in the action, and the battery commander of A/6-29th Arty took command of the company, organized a defense for its position, called in artillery and sent out patrols. A/6-29th Arty suffered two WIA and C/6-29th Arty supported the ensuing contact with close-in artillery fire until the next morning when the enemy fled the area. On the following day, A/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ MEREDITH to LZ PHILLIPS, where it joined its advance party.

Orders were received the second week in May to withdraw from CAMBODIA, but 4th Division Artillery would continue to provide artillery support for two ranger battalions (ARVN) that continued to operate in the base area, from two fire bases occupied to the east of the border in the PLEI TRAF Valley.

On 17 May D/2-320 Arty airlifted with the 3-506 Abn from LZ WILDCAT to NEW PLEI DJERENG where it changed to Task Force Pursuit control for an airlift by C-130 to BAN ME THUOT. C/6-29th Arty airlifted from NEW PLEI DJERENG to LZ WILDCAT to provide artillery fire support for Operation BINH TAN #2, and B/6-29th Arty convoyed from Camp Radcliff

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to NEW PLEI DJERENG to provide artillery support to the 1st Brigade tactical command post at NEW PLEI DJERENG. As ARVN operations closed in the base area on 25 May, A/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ SCOTT to NEW PLEI DJERENG, C/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ WILDCAT to NEW PLEI DJERENG, and A/1-92 Arty airlifted to NEW PLEI DJERENG where it returned to the 52d Arty Group control, terminating Operation BINH TAY #2.

After a brief standdown, the 1st Brigade received a new mission to search and clear suspected staging and headquarters areas of the 95B Regiment in the DAK PAYOU Valley area. The brigade concept of operation was to encircle the objective areas with battalion size forces and send a one company sweep through the objective area. Initially the 3-12th Infantry and 1-14th Infantry were working in the northern portion of Base Area 202 with the 3-8th Infantry in the southeast portion of Base Area 202. The artillery fire support plan called for one 105mm battery to be located at LZ BUCKEYE, one 105mm battery and a platoon of 155mm howitzers at LZ DORIS. The 6-29th Arty tactical command post relocated to LZ BLACKHAWK to facilitate command and control of the operation. By 1 June B/6-29th Arty had moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ BLACKHAWK and was airlifted to LZ BUCKEYE. On 2 June one platoon of A/1-92 Arty arrived by convoy at LZ BLACKHAWK and became GSR to the 6-29th Arty, and A/1-92 Arty then airlifted to LZ DORIS. A/5-16th Arty (-) at LZ ACTION became GSR to the 6-29th Arty while A/6-29th Arty moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ ACTION and airlifted to LZ NUTMEG. The first week of June was characterized by minor readjustments to OZCON artillery elements, and scattered enemy actions.

By 23 June the operation terminated and B/6-29th Arty returned to LZ BLACKHAWK where it spent the night before conveying to PLEIKU to provide support of Operation BINH TAY #4 and the GVN elections in eastern BINH DINH Province. On 26 June, C/6-29th Arty conveyed from LZ BLACKHAWK to LZ ULLIFT where it chopped to the control of the 173d Airborne Brigade to participate in Operation BINH TAY #4, in the PHU MY area. The GVN elections were held on 27 June and elements of the 1st Brigade were sent to populated areas to ensure minimum hostilities during the elections. The 3-8th Infantry went to the PHU MY District with C/6-29th Arty located at LZ ULLIFT and OZCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade.

The last week in June saw the 1st Brigade begin operations in the AN LAO Valley directed against elements of the 3d NVA Division. As the 2-35th Infantry chopped to control of the 1st Brigade with A/4-42 Arty on LZ WELCH OREGON to 6-29th Arty, one platoon of O/1-92 Arty (155mm towed) at LZ WELCH became GSR to the 6-29th Arty. A/6-29th Arty moved overland from Camp Wilson to Camp Radcliff and chopped to the control of 4-42d Arty. On 1 July the 6-29th Arty tactical command post moved overland to LZ ARMAGEDDON to facilitate better control of artillery fires.

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Operations continued to the northwest of Base Area 226 during July with minor readjustments of supporting artillery units.

2. 2d Brigade: During the first week in May 1970, the 2d Brigade with the 4-42d Arty in support, initiated operations with three infantry battalions with their direct support artillery batteries north of AN KHE against the GIA LAI Provincial units, only to be extracted suddenly when notice was received of the pending operation in CAMBODIA. A/4-42 Arty with the 2-35th Infantry airlifted from LZ RAQUEL to Camp Radcliff on 4 May, and then moved overland by convoy to LZ MURKIN, southwest of Camp Enari on 6 May. B/4-42 Arty with the 1-12th Infantry moved overland by convoy from LZ AQUARIUS to Camp Radcliff on 4 May, and moved again by convoy to LZ OASIS on 5 May. C/4-42 Arty airlifted with the 1-22d Infantry from LZ NIAGARA to Camp Radcliff on 3 May, and on 5 May, C/4-42 Arty with the 1-22d Infantry moved by Air Force C-130 to FLEIKU Air Force Base and then moved overland on 6 May to LZ JACKSON HOLE. Operation BINH TUY I went into effect, and the 2d Brigade and 4-42 Arty established tactical command and operations centers at NEW FLEI DJERENG in conjunction with supporting elements. On 7 May the 2d Brigade was combat assaulted with three battalions of infantry and its respective direct support artillery batteries into multiple LZ's in Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA. A/4-42 Arty with the 2-35th Infantry combat assaulted from LZ MURKIN to LZ CONQUEST. B/4-42 Arty and the 1-12th Infantry combat assaulted into LZ INVASION while C/4-42 Arty with the 1-22d Infantry combat assaulted into LZ SPEARHEAD. The 2d Brigade was targeted against enemy elements, installations, and facilities of the B-3 Front and the 24th NVA Regiment. On 12 May the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42 Arty were relocated by air assault into LZ COMMANDER in the vicinity of YA 431635 with the 1-12th Infantry reverting to 1st Brigade control and B/4-42 Arty reverting to 6-29th Arty control. The 2d Brigade ceased operations in CAMBODIA on 14 May with the 1-22 Inf, 2-35th Inf, and their supporting artillery batteries being airlifted to NEW FLEI DJERENG. By the 16th, the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42 Arty, which had been OPCON to the 1st Brigade, airlifted to NEW FLEI DJERENG, reverting back to the 2d Brigade and the 4-42d Arty control respectively. All 2d Brigade supporting elements, maneuver battalions, and supporting artillery then moved overland to Camp Radcliff for a standdown and began preparations for future operations in BINH DINH Province.

Operation RUTNAM PARAGON was initiated on 18 May 1970 with the 2d Brigade inserting three infantry battalions to the north and west of Camp Radcliff to conduct offensive operations targeted against the C/2-407th Sapper Battalion and the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters in their known areas of operation. Emphasis was placed on small unit operations with ranger and reconno techniques used to the maximum. On 18 May the 1-22d Infantry (-) combat assaulted into multiple LZ's in its assigned area of operation with the command post and 4.2 mortars at LZ CHITRENA. However, C/4-42 Arty remained at Camp Radcliff

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providing responsive fires for IDGC and other elements of the 1-22d Infantry. On 21 May the 2-35th Infantry with A/4-42 Arty established a fire base at LZ WARRIOR and combat assaulted three companies into multiple LZ's in the area of operations. The 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty established a fire base at LZ KIOWA, and once again the 4-42d Arty had under its control its three organic firing batteries.

By 2 June the 2d Brigade had shifted its attention to elements of the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters further to the north of Camp Radcliff. In response to this, the 1-22d Infantry with C/4-42d Arty airlifted into LZ BAXTER. On 4 June, 1C/1-92 Arty (two tubes) of 155 airlifted from FSB BLACKHAWK to LZ BLACKHAWK to provide added support to the planned operations. In response to significant findings by the K-75 Rangers, the 1-12th Infantry combat assaulted into multiple LZ's to the west of LZ BAXTER. The command post of the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty airlifted from LZ KIOWA to LZ CHEXSONGS on 8 June.

The second week of June, the 2d Brigade received OPCON of the 2-8th Mech with the mission to provide road security along Highway 508 for engineering efforts on Hill 666. The battalion established its command post at LZ ARMAGEDDON with B/5-16th Arty in direct support. Consequently, B/5-16th Arty became OPCON 4-42d Arty effective 9 June. On 20 June, the 2-8th Mech was given the mission of road security from PLEIKU to DUC CO, as a result the brigade released OPCON of the 2-8th Mech and 4-42d Arty released OPCON B/5-16th Arty. The 2d Brigade continued to conduct offensive operations to the north of Camp Radcliff and to interdict the lines of communication between the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters and the 3d NVA Division. The lack of available air assets necessitated that all moves utilize overland routes as much as possible to conserve helicopter assets.

On 28 June the 2d Brigade released the 2-35th Infantry to 1st Brigade control and received OPCON 3-12th Infantry with its command post at LZ CHALLENGE. Consequently, the 4-42d Arty released A/4-42d Arty to 6-29th Arty OPCON and received OPCON B/6-29th Arty. C/1-92 Arty became GSR 6-29th Arty and 1A/1-92 Arty GSR 4-42d Arty.

The division now had two brigades targeted against the infiltration routes of the 3d NVA Division along the SUOI KON River and the GIA LAI Provincial unit along the SONG BA River, plus the C/2-407th Sapper Battalion to the northwest of Camp Radcliff. Command post/1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty were repositioned at LZ UTE on 1 July to provide the necessary control and artillery coverage for the new 2d Brigade area of operation along the SONG BA River. Two tubes of D/5-16th Arty moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ ARMAGEDDON on 1 July to provide mutual support for LZ UTE and additional fire support for 2d Brigade maneuver elements. Command and control elements at the 2d Brigade and 4-42d Arty displaced to LZ ARMAGEDDON.

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During the remainder of July, 2d Brigade elements continued to conduct offensive operations to interdict the 3d NVA Division, CIA LAI Provincial headquarters and C/2-407 Sapper Battalion.

3 The 1-10th Cavalry, under division control, had the mission of securing Highway 19 from the AN KHE Pass to the PLEIKU sector boundary. The 5-16th Arty, in addition to its general support mission, provided two liaison sections and one 155mm SP battery in direct support. In early May, C/5-16th Arty was in direct support to the 1-10th Cavalry, with three tubes at LZ SCHUELLER and three tubes at LZ BLACKHAWK. On 28 June, B/5-16th Arty moved three tubes to LZ ACTION and three tubes to LZ BLACKHAWK and assumed the direct support mission. The following day, C/5-16th Arty moved from LZ BLACKHAWK to LZ SCHUELLER to Camp Radcliff and resumed its general support mission. Operations of the 1-10th Cavalry throughout the reporting period consisted of posting security forces and reacting to enemy harassing attacks on Highway 19.

4 The 2-8th Mech performed a number of missions under division control during the reporting period. The 5-16th Arty provided a liaison section, three forward observation parties, and a 155mm SP battery in direct support. A/5-16th Arty (-) (four tubes) was in direct support at LZ RIFLE. On 4 May, the 2-8th Mech received the mission to secure the road network from PLEIKU to NW LAY DURENG and to secure the LSA complex at the latter location in support of the deployment of the division into CAMBODIA. In response, A/5-16th Arty (-) moved to LZ BURGESS to continue direct support. The remaining tubes joined the battery from Artillery Hill on 9 May. The 2-8th Mech was given a contingency mission to make a mechanized sweep into Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA, and A/5-16th Arty made the necessary preparations to accompany the battalion, but the mission was not executed.

On 17 May, the 2-8th Mech was sent to the PLEIKU Rocket Box. A/5-16th Arty (-) (two tubes) moved to LZ TRACER to provide artillery support. By 2 June, the 2-8th Mech assumed the mission of securing TL508 and the engineer work parties at LZ ARMAGEDDON. B/5-16th Arty moved six tubes to LZ ARMAGEDDON to provide artillery support. From 9-20 June 1970, the battalion was under the OPCON of the 2d Brigade and B/5-16th Arty was OPCON to the 4-42d Arty. On 21 June the 2-8th Mech returned to the highlands to provide security for Q19 from PLEIKU to DUC GO. B/5-16th Arty accompanied the battalion and established firing positions at LZ MEREDITH and LZ OASIS. The battalion returned to Camp Radcliff on 28 June and B/5-16th Arty moved to LZ BLACKHAWK and LZ ACTION to assume the mission of direct support to the 1-10th Cavalry. On 2 July the 2-8th Mech initiated operations south of Camp Radcliff targeted against the 95B Regiment and C/5-16th Arty moved to LZ SOPAK to provide direct support.

On 2 June the battalion moved into the area north of AK KHE along

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Highway 508, and assaulted into LZ R20 with the mission of conducting dismounted reconnaissance in force operations during daylight hours and saturation ambushes at night. The remainder of the battalion moved by tactical road march to FSB ARMAGEDDON. After reaching the fire base, Company C prepared itself for its assigned mission of securing engineer units moving to Hill 666 in the vicinity of BR 396689.

On 20 June the battalion moved west toward FLEIKU to secure Highway 19W from traffic control post 31 to the CAMBODIAN border.

On 29 June the battalion moved to Camp Radcliff and conducted stand-down activities until 2 July when it moved to its new area of operation south of AN KHE by tactical road march. The battalion worked its assigned area of operations by conducting reconnaissance in force operations during daylight hours, ambushing at night, and providing security for the water point located in the vicinity of LZ SOPAR.

(1) Armored Cavalry Operations

The 1-10th Cavalry was primarily responsible for convoy security of Highway 19. This was accomplished by establishing a series of observation points located on key terrain features. Selection of these OP's was based upon maximum observation of the highway fields of fire and likely enemy avenues of approach. Each OP was manned by a tracked vehicle with a series of platoon (minus) bases being established at critical bridges requiring 24 hour surveillance. During the hours of darkness all bridge sites were physically manned or ambushed to prevent enemy destruction. These night ambushes employed night observation devices in addition to the mechanical ambush apparatus. Enemy interdiction of the highway was reduced by conducting sweeps up to platoon size along the highway and into areas of suspected activity. The squadron air cavalry troop assisted in the highway security mission by conducting aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations. In addition the troop performed the normal fire support and interdiction role assigned to air cavalry.

(e) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 2, Inclosure 4, at the end of the reporting period.

(2) Summary of OILANS and OIORDS published:

(a) Background Information

1. Toward the end of April, the division began preparing to initiate operations against the GLA LAI Provincial units located northwest of AN KHE, and to continue operations against the 3d NV Division in Base Area 226 along the SONG CON River.

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2 OPLAN 15-70, 19 April 1970, prepared the division for operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units. D-Day for implementation was tentatively set for 24 April 1970.

3 Task Organization, prior to implementation of OPLAN 15-70:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-12 Inf	3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf
TF Pursuit	1-22 Inf	2-8 Inf (Mech)
3-506 Abn.	1-14 Inf	1-10 Cav
C/7-17 Cav.	2-35 Inf	
C/75 Rangers		

4 On 27 Apr 70, FRAGO 29-70 implemented 15-70 with D-Day effective 30 April 70. FRAGO 29-70 required the following changes:

a 2d Brigade close out FSB JOHN HENRY and ARNOLD TIMM and deploy 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf to LZ HARD TIMES, CHOP to 1st Brigade on arrival. 1st Brigade then deploy 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf to Camp Radcliff for 48 hour standdown. On 3 May, 1st Brigade CA 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf into an AO to conduct operations against GIA LAI Provincial units.

b No change in mission or organization was outlined for other divisional units.

5 On 1 May 1970, FRAGO 30-70 was issued to implement OPLAN 15-70, and to delineate specific missions and responsibilities of divisional units. Basically, the FRAGO accomplished the following:

a It caused a realignment and redistribution of division forces to accomplish the mission.

b It committed the 1st Brigade to operations with one infantry battalion against GIA LAI Provincial units 40 kilometers northwest of Camp Radcliff. This was a change from the two battalion force originally envisioned. However, K/75 Ranger was tasked to provide the bulk of its assets to the GIA LAI Provincial units' area. 1st Brigade received OPCON 1-10 Cav plus its area of operation and a security mission along Highway 19E. The 1st Brigade was now operating both north and south of Highway 19E against the 95B Regiment and GIA LAI Provincial units.

c The 2d Brigade continued operations northeast of AN XHs against the 3d NVA Division. The 1-12 Inf (-) was released from division control and given to the 2d Brigade.

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d Task Organization envisioned as of 4 May 1970:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
TF Pursuit	1-12 Inf (-)	2-8 Mech
3-8 Inf	1-22 Inf	C/1-12 Inf
3-12 Inf	2-35 Inf	K/75 Ranger
1-14 Inf		
1-10 Cav		

e 2-8 Mech continued to secure Highway 14N.

(b) On 3 May 70, 4th Inf Div received the IFFV FMAGO initiating operations in CAMBODIA, with D-Day set for 5 May. The division had received a warning order on the evening of 2 May and had begun planning that night so on 3 and 4 May all battalions were extracted from the field and began movement to staging areas. On 4 May OPORD 16-70 (BINH TRU #1) was published. Following are the salient features of that OPORD:

1. Task Organization

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	3-12 Inf
1-14 Inf	1-22 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-506 Abn	2-35 Inf	2-1 Cav
		1-10 Cav
		K/75 Ranger
		C/75 Ranger
		7-17 Cav

2. Mission: On 5 May 1970, the division conducted search and destroy operations in northern Base Area 702.

3. The concept called for the entire division, less one battalion (3-12 Inf), the cavalry squadron, (1-10), and K/75 Rangers to deploy into CAMBODIA, or be in direct support of operations in CAMBODIA. On 16 May, the task organization was as follows:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	3-12 Inf
1-14 Inf	1-22 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-506 Abn	2-35 Inf	2-1 Cav
C/75 Ranger		1-10 Cav
		K/75 Ranger

The division had released OEGON 7-17 Cav to IFFV. OPORD 17-70, published on 13 May, outlined all of the above.

(c) While the bulk of the division was deployed into CAMBODIA, the

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3-12 Inf and K/75 Rangers continued operating in the division permanent area of responsibility. FRAGO 31-70 deployed the 3-12 Inf (-) southwest of Camp Radcliff to conduct search and clear operations against the X17 VC Engineer Company, which was operating against the DONG CHE resettlement center. The operation commenced on 7 May with the 3-12 Inf (-) moving overland into the area of operation. The 1-10 Cav continued to secure Highway 19E. K/75 Rangers continued to deploy teams generally north and northwest of Camp Radcliff to gather information and intelligence on enemy locations and disposition.

1 On 17 May 70, IFFV FRAGO 33-70 was published. It deployed the 3-506 Abn and one troop (A) of the 2-1 Cav to BAN ME THUOT, releasing OICON of that unit to IFFV upon arrival. This was accomplished on 19 May. Additionally, the 3-12 Inf was deployed to NEW FLEI DJERENG to replace the 3-506 Abn with the 1st Brigade receiving OICON of that unit. This was accomplished on 18 May 1970.

2 On 18 May, the 2d Brigade commenced search and clear operations north of Camp Radcliff against the C2 Company, 407th NVA Sapper Battalion, after a four day standdown at Camp Radcliff. This mission was given to the brigade in OICOND 17-70. The brigade initiated the operation with the 1-22 Inf but was not able to immediately insert its remaining battalions because of a contingency mission given to the division by IFFV.

3 On or about 18 May the division received a contingency mission from IFFV, to be prepared to deploy two infantry battalions to eastern BINH DINH Province to relieve ARVN elements which might be committed to CAMBODIA. To this end, OELAN 18-70 was published on 21 May. Although the OELAN remained in effect for approximately seven to ten days, it was never implemented, as the requirement never arose.

(d) On 23 May 1970, OELAN 19-70 was published. Its purpose was to outline division operations after the termination of BINH TAY #1, scheduled for 25 May 1970. The following concept was envisioned:

1 2-1 Cav and C/75 Ranger revert to OICON of IFFV after termination of BINH TAY #1 and close out of NEW FLEI DJERENG.

2 2-8 Mech terminates operations vicinity HSIKU and return to Camp Radcliff.

3 1st Brigade extracts all elements from the FLEI TRAF Valley and NEW FLEI DJERENG; deploys to Camp Radcliff for a four day standdown and initiates operations in VC Valley against the 95B Regiment. (BA 202).

4 The 2d Brigade continues operations against the C2 Company,

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407th Sapper Battalion (NVA) and prepares for operations against GIA LAI Provincial units.

5 The 2-8 Mech, after standdown at Camp Radcliff, initiates operations to secure engineer work parties upgrading Highway 508 and constructing a forward operating base on Hill 666.

6 The 1-10 Cav continues present mission securing Highway 19A.

7 Task organization as outlined in OPLAN 19-70:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div. Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-12 Inf	1-22 Inf	1-10 Cav
1-14 Inf	2-35 Inf	K/75 Ranger

(e) On 24 May 1970, FRAGO 34-70 was published. Basically, it implemented OPLAN 19-70 as outlined below:

1 C/75 Ranger was released from OCON 1st Brigade to IFFV.

2 K/75 Ranger initiated its mission of gathering intelligence against GIA LAI Provincial units.

3 It gave the 2d Brigade a prepared mission to assume the 2-8 Mech mission of securing Highway 508 and Hill 666. This was based on the fact that the 2-8 Mech might remain in the vicinity of FLEIKU longer than originally envisioned.

(f) On 28 May, FRAGO 35-70 was published. It further clarified the execution of OPLAN 19-70 and gave the 1st Brigade a D-Day for operations against the 95B Regiment of 1 June. It deployed the 2-8 Mech from FLEIKU to Camp Radcliff and relieved the 2d Brigade of the prepared mission along Highway 508 and Hill 666. D-Day for the 2-8 Mech was set at 2 June 70. Also, effective 30 May 70, 2-1 Cav (-) was released from OCON 4th Division to IFFV. Essentially, with the initiating of operations in Base Area 202, by the 1st Brigade on 1 June, the division was almost in the same posture as it was prior to CAMBODIAN operations, except that the 2-8 Mech was now available for operations in the division area of operations.

(g) On 31 May, FRAGO 36-70 was published assigning C/7-17 Cav a direct support mission to the 1st Brigade and D/1-10 Cav a direct support mission to the 2d Brigade. C/7-17 Cav became OCON to the division on 1 June 1970.

(h) On 6 June, FRAGO 37-70 was published tasking the 2d Brigade to initiate operations along the FLEIKU/BINH DINH/KONTUM boundary with

the 1-12 Inf, against the GIA LAI Provincial units. It also changed the priority of K/75 support from the GIA LAI area of operation to the 1st Brigade in Base Area 202 effective 8 June 1970.

(i) On 8 June, FRAGO 38-70 was published giving the 2d Brigade OPCON of the 2-8 Mech, its area of operation, and mission. This was done to facilitate control in the area of operations between the 2d Brigade and the 2-8 Mech.

(j) FRAGO 39-70 was issued on 11 June deploying one platoon from the 2d Brigade to the 1-10 Cav to assist in securing MONTAGNARD villages approximately two kilometers east of LZ SCHUELLER. This action was accomplished on 12 June.

(k) On 13 June FRAGO 40-70 was published. Its purpose was to initiate operations against LOC's of the 3d NVA Division in northern BINH DINH Province. The mission was given to the 2d Brigade and in effect was a continuation of its current operations with orientation more towards the northern parts of the division area of operation. The 2d Brigade still retained the requirement for operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units, and for security of the engineer effort along Highway 508. To accomplish the mission, two infantry battalions would be deployed basically along the SONG CON River infiltration corridor, while one infantry battalion and the mechanized battalion continued operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units. The 1st Brigade continued operations in Base Area 202 with three infantry battalions.

(l) On 15 June 1970, FRAGO 41-70 was published so as to intensify operations along Highway 19E with patrols and ambushes, in an attempt to identify routes of movement across the highway, and destroy enemy elements operating along the Highway. The following missions were outlined in the FRAGO:

1 The 1st Brigade was reoriented to operate just south of Highway 19 between LZ SCHUELLER and LZ ACTION. Rcn/3-8 Inf was placed OPCON to the 1-10 Cav.

2 The 1-10 Cav would increase ambush and patrol activity by employing Rcn/3-8 Inf, sniper teams, and aero rifle platoons in this role.

3 K/75 Ranger release OPCON two sniper teams to 1-10 Cav and conduct reconnaissance and interdiction in an area just north of the 1-10 Cav area of operation, northwest of LZ SCHUELLER with a minimum of five teams.

4 The 2d Brigade continued its present mission north of Camp Radcliff.

(m) On 20 June FRAGO 42-70 was published, deploying the 2-8 Mech

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on road security mission between the intersection of Highway 19W and Highway 14, and the CAMBODIAN border. This was in support of ARVN operations across the border. (BINH TAY #4).

(n) On 23 June FRAGO 43-70 was published, redeploying forces to provide further support for BINH TAY #4 and for GVN elections. The following missions were outlined in the FRAGO:

1 The 1st Brigade terminates operations in VC Valley (Base Area 202); deploys one rifle company to LZ OASIS and releases OICON to 2-3 Mech; deploys one infantry battalion (-) to relieve ARVN of security mission in the ZLEIKU Rocket Box. This was all in support of BINH TAY #4. Additionally, deploy two infantry battalions vicinity PSU MY District on 27 June, release OICON to 1731 Abn Brigade. (Only one battalion, 3-8, was actually deployed). The purpose of this mission was to provide security for GVN elections on 28 June. Also one rifle company was given OICON to the 1-10 Cav. This also was in support of planned 1-10th Cav security operations for elections in AN TUC District.

2 The 2d Brigade continued missions against the 3d NVA Division and GIA LAI Provincial units.

3 The 2-8 Mech, reinforced with one rifle company, continued to secure Highway 19W from the intersection of Highway 14 to the CAMBODIAN border.

(o) On 26 June FRAGO 44-70 was published giving the 1-10th Cav the mission of conducting screening operations northeast and southwest of AN TUC to prevent enemy interference in GVN elections on 28 June.

(p) On 26 June OPLAN 20-70 was published. It was designed to reorient divisional operations after security operations for BINH TAY #4 and GVN elections were completed. Basically, it committed both brigades to operations north of Camp Radcliff against GIA LAI Provincial units, the 3d NVA Division and its rear elements. Also, it reassigned forces of the division within the two brigades. Following is a summary of the OPLAN:

1 Task Organization

1st Bde	2d Bde	Div Troops
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
1-14 Inf	3-12 Inf	1-10 Cav
2-35 Inf	1-22 Inf	4/75 Ranger

2 2d Brigade: Continues present mission against GIA LAI and LOC's of the 3d NVA Division. Release OICON of 2-35 Inf to 1st Brigade and receive OICON of 3-12 Inf upon its arrival from ZLEIKU. The 2d Brigade

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was also given the mission of coordinating security, quartering and operations of support activities at ANHAGLADDON since both forward brigade headquarters were to be stationed there. Basically, the combat mission of the 2d Brigade did not change.

3 The 1st Brigade, which had deployed all its combat elements to support BINH TAY #4 and GVN elections, except one infantry battalion, was committed to operate north of the 2d Brigade units, to locate and destroy the 2d NVA headquarters and rear service elements. It received OFCON 2-35 Inf from the 2d Brigade to accomplish its mission and would receive OFCON 3-8 Inf upon its closure to Camp Radcliff from PHU MY District. Following are the actions required by OPLAN 20-70:

- a. 1-10 Cav continue security operations along Highway 19N.
- b. 2-8 Mech release OFCON the one rifle company which had been attached for security of Highway 19N. (D/3-12 Inf).
- c. 3-12 Inf, under Division control, redeploy from LEIKU to Camp Radcliff and CHOK to the 2d Brigade on arrival.

(q) On 27 June FRAGO 45-70 was published executing OPLAN 20-70. D-Day was set for 28 June 70. There were no major changes from those envisioned in the OPLAN. 2-8 Mech was to move overland to Camp Radcliff on 28 June and receive a three day standdown prior to initiating operations in VC Valley.

(r) On 27 June 70, OPLAN 21-70 was published outlining the mission and concept of operation for 2-8 Mech deployment against the 95th Regiment and local force units south of AN KHE.

(s) On 1 July, FRAGO 46-70 was published implementing OPLAN 21-70. No changes from the OPLAN were listed.

(t) On 2 July, the 4th Infantry Division received a message from CG, IFFV, alerting it to deploy one brigade to eastern BINH DINH Province to attack a number of targets. One of the missions was to deploy one rifle company to vicinity of CAM RANH Bay to operate in the DONG SO, a mountain overlooking the installation. On 8 July, FRAGO 47-70 was published, assigning this mission to the 2d Brigade. The company (B/1-22) was deployed on 8 July, and returned on 11 July.

(u) On 11 July, FRAGO 48-70 was published, returning the flame platoon to its parent unit (2-8 Mech). The flame platoon had been augmenting security along Highway 50B OFCON to the 2d Brigade.

(v) To meet the mission assigned the 4th Infantry Division by the Commanding General, IFFV, OPLAN 22-70 was published on 13 July 70. It

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outlined the following mission and concept of operation:

1 Task Organization for the operation:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-12 Inf	1-14 Inf	1-10 Cav
2-35 Inf	1-22 Inf	K/75 Ranger

2 The 1st Brigade was to deploy its three infantry battalions into the western portion of northeast Base Area 226 in cooperation with the 40th ARVN Regiment, which would deploy two infantry battalions into the eastern portion of northeastern Base Area 226. This was to be a combined operation to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division operating in the area. It also took advantage of a CRID operation being conducted in southern Base Area 226.

3 The 2d Brigade would continue operating north of Camp Radcliff with the mission of interdicting the LOC's and infiltration corridors of the 3d NVA Division along the SONG CON River and SONG BA River. The 2d Brigade was assigned specific objective areas in which to operate which would complement the 1st Brigade and 40th ARVN Regiment operations.

4 No change in operational status was outlined for the 2-8 Mech nor the 1-10 Cav.

5 Tentative date for the operation was 17 July 1970.

(v) On 13 July, FRAGO 49-70 was published to accomplish repositioning of forces of the 1st and 2d Brigades. Basically, it implemented the task organization in OPLAN 22-70, and deployed 1st Brigade units to LZ TWO BITS for a three day standdown prior to the start of the operation.

(w) On 14 July 70, FRAGO 50-70 was published implementing OPLAN 22-70. There were no changes from the OPLAN except that one troop (-) from the 1-10 Cav was deployed to PHU CAT to conduct screening operations in conjunction with the CRID operation in southern Base Area 226. D-Day for OPLAN 22-70 was set for 17 July and the operation was initiated on that day. The troop (-) 1-10 Cav deployed on 20 July.

(x) On 23 July, FRAGO 51-70 was published directing the mission and concept for Phase II of 1st Brigade operations. It deployed two battalions of the 1st Brigade into the northern NUI NIEUS in cooperation with the 40th ARVN Regiment, which would be operating in the southern NUI NIEUS, and also with the 173d Abn Brigade and 41st ARVN Regiment, which would occupy blocking positions. This was a continuation of the operation in northeastern Base Area 226, and it commenced on 28 July. Additionally, one battalion of the 1st Brigade was deployed into the

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FISHHOOK area to conduct recon operations. It was assigned four specific objective areas to recon, generally along the I MR/IIIR boundary. The 2d Brigade also was given one objective in the same general area, just west of the FISHHOOK, in which to conduct reconnaissance operations. These operations continued through the end of July.

(y) On 30 July FRAGO 52-70 was published redeploying C Troop (-) 1-10 Cav back to Camp Radcliff and placing it OPCON to the 2-8th Mech for operations in the vicinity of Base Area 202.

(z) Operational names throughout the period:

1. PARK SILVER: 1-10 Cav; security of Highway 19B from PLEIKU defensive boundary to GRID border continuing throughout the period.
2. BAIRD SILVER: 2-8 Mech; security of Highway 14 from PLEIKU to KONTUM and security of FSB WEIGT DAVIS. Terminated on 4 May 70.
3. CHADLER BLUE: 2-8 Mech; search and clear operations in PLSIKU Rocket Box northeast and west of PLEIKU. Commenced on 15 May and terminated on 28 May 70.
4. ROBERTSON WHITE: 2-8 Mech; security of engineer work parties along Highway 50B and Hill 666. Commenced on 1 Jun 70 and terminated on 9 June 70.
5. WRIGHT BLUE: 2-8 Mech; security of Highway 19W from intersection of Highway 19W and Highway 14 to CAMBODIAN border. Commenced on 23 June 70 and terminated on 28 June 70.
6. BRANDISS BLUE: 2-8 Mech; search and clear operations against the 95B Regiment in VC Valley. Commenced on 2 July and is continuing.
7. FREDENDALL GOLD: 2-1 Cav; security of Highway 19W from PLSIKU to NEW PLEI DJERENG. Commenced on 18 May and terminated 30 May 70.
8. WAYNE WIND: 1st Brigade and TF Pursuit; operations against the 95B NVA Regiment in VC Valley (Base Area 202). Terminated 4 May.
9. WAYNE JUMP: 1st Brigade; northwest of NEW PLEI DJERENG in the PLEI TRAF Valley in support of ARVN operations in northern Base Area 702. Commenced on 16 May and terminated on 26 May 70.
10. WAYNE HURDLE: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations in VC Valley (Base Area 202). Commenced on 1 June and terminated 26 June 70.
11. WAYNE PAST: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations against elements of the 3d NVA Division to include headquarters and rear

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elements located 40 kilometers north of Camp Radcliff. Commenced on 26 June and terminated on 14 July 1970.

12 WAYNE SPAN: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations in north-eastern Base Area 226 in cooperation and coordination with the 40th ARVN Regiment and the 173d Abn Brigade and search and clear operations in northern NUI MIEUS in cooperation and coordination with the 40th ARVN Regiment, 41st ARVN Regiment, and the 173d Abn Brigade. Commenced on 17 July and is continuing.

13 PUTNAM PLATEAU: 2d Brigade; search and clear operations 40 kilometers north of Camp Radcliff against elements of the 3d NVA Division. Terminated on 4 May 70.

14 PUTNAM PARAGON: 2d Brigade; search and clear operations north of Camp Radcliff against the C2 Company of the 407th NVA Sapper Battalion, GIA LAI Provincial units, and LOC's of the 3d NVA Division. Commenced on 18 May and is continuing.

15 BINH TAY #1: All divisional units involved in operations in northern Base Area 702 or support operations from VIETNAM in Base Area 702. Operation initiated to destroy enemy forces, supplies, installations, and resources of the B-3 Front. Commenced on 5 May and terminated on 16 May 1970.

(3) Chemical Activities

(a) The 4th Division Chemical Section and the 43d Chemical Detachment supported extensive aerial and ground employment of Riot Control Agents, aerial and ground employment of diesel fuel for control of vegetation, and operated and maintained the division Airborne Personnel Detectors. Technical advice was rendered on the use of flame field expedients and inspections were conducted on CBR readiness, equipment and supplies. The chemical ammunition supply point continued to operate in support of the division.

(b) There were no defoliation or crop destruction operations during the period due to the nonavailability of defoliation agent, and no cleared areas for crop destruction. The only vegetation control program was conducted on Camp Radcliff using diesel fuel.

(c) Riot Control agent munitions were used extensively in support of combat troops and played a vital role in the destruction and demoralization of enemy targets and troops detected and located by special intelligence. Persistent and non-persistent riot control agents were employed throughout the division area of operation in support of ground troops, artillery fires, and to block enemy withdrawal routes from contact areas.

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1 The amount of micropulverized persistent CS employed during the period decreased over the last period. The chemical section employed 144 55 gallon drums of persistent CS against targets south of the AN KHE Pass by air drop from CH-47 helicopters. The drums were employed to contaminate infiltration routes and deny the enemy free use of the terrain. Some three hundred pounds of CS were used to seed suspected infiltration and exfiltration routes through the perimeter wire on Camp Radcliff and four hundred pounds of CS were used to contaminate areas on HON CONG Mountain.

2 Non-persistent CS was employed extensively from the air using the XM-15 (M15BR2) CS canister cluster. These canisters were used against suspected enemy locations in conjunction with artillery and air strikes. A total of 348 XM-15 munitions was employed during the period.

(a) Airborne Personnel Detector operations were flown a total of 152 hours during a total of 77 missions.

(4) Organization and Training

(a) Organization: A provisional unit, the Mobile Ground Surveillance Radar Section of the target acquisition platoon, division artillery, was organized to improve operational readiness and centralize control of division radar assets. DIVARTY is in the process of receiving augmentations of personnel and equipment for the unit, which should become operational in early August.

(b) Training: The 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment trained a total of 4,607 personnel during the period.

- 1 Replacement training: 3,902 EM and 303 Officers
- 2 Combat leadership course (NCO Academy): 149 students
- 3 Scouts: 99 students
- 4 RF/FF: 105 students
- 5 Sniper Program: 49 students.

d. Logistics

(1) Logistical Operations

(a) The beginning of the monsoon during this reporting period had very little effect on the movement of supplies. Thus, land lines of communication remained the primary mode for movement of all classes

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of supplies throughout the division area of operation. Favorable weather conditions throughout the period contributed to overland movement and created good flying conditions for air lines of communications. The movement of troops and supplies during the period was accomplished in an efficient and timely manner.

(b) Elements of the 45th General Support Group and the 593d General Support Group, both of the QUI NHON Support Command, continued to provide logistical support to the 4th Infantry Division in support of Operation HINES. Logistical support activities at LZ ENGLISH, Camp Radcliff, and NEW PLEI DJERENG support division operations during the reporting period.

(c) In late April 1970, the division received OPCON of the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry (Airborne) and C/75th Rangers. These units formed Task Force Pursuit and on 1 May 1970 initiated an operation in VC Valley. The 4th Infantry Division Support Command provided all support and service support for both units.

(d) On 4 May 1970, the 2-8th Infantry (Mech), under division control, moved from the KONTUM area to PLEIKU. While in PLEIKU, the unit received Classes II, IV, and V support from the division supply office at Camp Radcliff. All other classes of supply were provided by the 45th General Support Group at PLEIKU. The 45th General Support Group also provided all services to the battalion.

(e) On 4 May 1970, the 4th Infantry Division Support Command deployed to NEW PLEI DJERENG to establish a forward support base in support of division units while in CAMBODIA. During this operation, division units were provided maintenance support, medical support, transportation, and graves registration by DISCOM. Units deployed with the basic load of Classes I and V, and an initial stockage of Class IV at NEW PLEI DJERENG was provided by DISCOM. The 45th General Support Group provided Classes I, III, IIIA, and limited items of Class IV. The 45th General Support Group also augmented the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion in meeting the division transportation requirements. Class V was provided by the 184th Ordnance Battalion forward support unit. Laundry service was provided by a civilian contractor at Camp Schmidt, PLEIKU. The division received OPCON of the 2-1st Cavalry for this operation and provided it with the same logistical support as provided the division units.

(f) On 28 June 1970, DISCOM established a forward support element at Fire Support Base ARMAGEDDON in support of OULAN 20-70. The forward support element stocked limited items of Classes I, II, III, IV, and V. All other classes of supply were provided by permanently established facilities at Camp Radcliff. Bath, water, maintenance, and medical services were also provided at Fire Support Base ARMAGEDDON. Back-up services were provided from Camp Radcliff. A rearm/refuel point was

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also established at ANMAGEDDON in support of this operation.

(g) On 16 July 1970, a DISCOM forward support element was established at LZ UPLIFT. Emphasis was placed on throughput of supplies from QUI NMON to the forward support element at LZ UPLIFT. Class I, fast moving Class II, Class III, limited Class IV, and Class VI (sanitary packs) items were throughput to the forward support element at LZ UPLIFT. Class V was drawn from ASF 593-1 at LZ ENGLISH. All remaining classes of supplies were issued by the division supply office at Camp Radcliff to unit property book officers. The forward support element provided bath services to division units participating in this operation with two mobile shower units, and laundry service was provided by a civilian contract laundry at QUI NMON. Graves registration was provided by the 243d Field Service Support Company with augmentation of personnel from the Division Support Command forward support element. Maintenance support was provided by the Maintenance Contact Team, D Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion, operating at LZ UPLIFT. A light medical clearing company of the 4th Medical Battalion provided units with medical support. In addition, the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion augmented the refuel point at LZ UPLIFT with personnel and equipment.

(h) On 20 July 1970, C Troop (-), 1-10th Cavalry deployed to CMU CAT in support of ROK forces operating in Base Area 226. All support and services were provided this element by ROK forces. Back up maintenance support was provided by maintenance contact team operating at LZ UPLIFT.

(i) Forward support elements to include maintenance contact teams and medical clearing companies were employed throughout the period in direct support of brigade task forces.

(j) Supply Services

1 Division Supply Office

- Requisitions received: 13,000
- Requisitions passed: 1,737
- Requisitions filled: 7,258
- Total due out releases: 3,831

2 Class I issues:

- (a) Rations issued (three meals per ration)

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LOCATION	A RATIONS	C RATIONS	SUNDRY PACKS	PLRNP'S
Camp Radcliff	1,121,705	161,906	3,065	
L2 ARMAGEDDON	38,260	35,796	722	1,984
Totals	1,159,965	197,702	3,787	1,984

(b) Headcount and number of ration breaks as of 31 July 1970:

LOCATION	A RATION HEADCOUNT	TOTAL RATIONS HEADCOUNT	NUMBER OF UNIT BREAKS
Camp Radcliff	1,121,705	1,283,611	79
L2 ARMAGEDDON	38,260	76,040	30
Totals	1,159,965	1,359,651	109

3 Class III:

(a) Bulk POL issues in gallons

LOCATION	JP-4	AVGAS	NOCAS	DF-2
Camp Radcliff	1,576,000	0	736,000	988,000
BLACKHAWK	700,000	0	30,000	90,000
ARMAGEDDON	600,000	0	25,000	120,000
PLEI DJERENG	682,000	1,000	30,000	65,000
TWO BITS	15,000	0	0	0
Totals	3,573,000	1,000	821,000	1,263,000

(b) Packaged POL issues

LOCATION	OE-10	OE-30	OE-50	OE-90	GAA (lbs)
Camp Radcliff	9,260	39,970	10,300	6,875	16,385
PLEI DJERENG	60	1,100	500	0	350
Totals	9,320	41,070	10,800	6,875	16,735

4 Class IV issues:

LOCATION	ROLLS OF BARBED WIRE	COILS OF CONCERTINA	SANDBAGS	3'	6'
Camp Radcliff	683	8,171	1,413,000	15,247	30,715
PLEI DJERENG	252	3,714	372,000	6,327	6,377
L2 ARMAGEDDON	40	756	115,000	2,500	3,108
L2 UPLIFT	54	884	100,000	2,442	2,553
Totals	1,029	13,525	2,000,000	26,516	42,753

5 Baths: 48,600

6 Graves registration

a Human remains processed: 121

b Personal property shipments processed: 139

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7 The US Air Force expended the following quantities of Classes II and V in support of operations:

a.	<u>Class III</u>		<u>Quantity</u>
	Fighters		1,578,461.5 gal
	B-52		276,923.1 gal
b.	<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
	Bombs	3,509	950.0
	CBU	142	45.8
	Mapalm	1,554	417.9
	Rockets	23	4.6
c.	Delivered by fighters and AC-47 (Spooky):		
	<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
	20mm	153,200	38.3
	7.62mm	746,000	18.6
d.	<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
	B-52 Bombs	6	123.0

(k) Transportation services

1 The division controlled Highway 19W from PLEIKU to the CAMBODIAN border during the period 4-26 May 1970. During this period, there were 164 convoys consisting of 4,320 vehicles along Highway 19W.

2 With the establishment of FSB ARMAGNON, the division transportation officer commenced monitoring convoys on Highway 508. Through 31 July there were 92 convoys consisting of 1340 vehicles along the highway.

3 Company B, 4th Supply and Transport Battalion, hauled both supplies and personnel from Camp Radcliff to forward support areas throughout the period. When the need occurred, augmentation of transportation requirements was received from elements of the 8th Transportation Group.

4 Aircraft support

- a. Total cargo tonnage moved by dedicated air: 84
- b. Total passengers moved by dedicated air: 21,912*
- c. Total cargo tonnage moved by SMAR: 3
- d. Total cargo passengers moved by SMAR: 507*

*These figures represent the total number of passengers flown out of the AN KHE Army Airfield.

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- e. Total cargo tonnage moved by opportune air: 0
f. Total passengers moved by opportune air: 0

(1) Medical services: The 4th Medical Battalion, with Companies B and C supporting the 1st and 2d Brigades respectively, and Headquarters and A Company supporting base camp, provided the following patient actions during the period:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PATIENTS SEEN</u>	<u>PATIENTS ADMITTED</u>	<u>RETURNED TO DUTY</u>
HQ&A	8051	433	297
D Company	5120	142	77
C Company	<u>857</u>	<u>257</u>	<u>79</u>
Total	14028	832	453

(2) Material Readiness

(a) During the reporting period, the operational readiness of tactical vehicles, mortars, and generators has shown improvement. The operational readiness of tactical vehicles improved from 88% to 90%, mortars from 94% to 99%, and generators improved slightly from 82% to 83%. The operational readiness of combat vehicles was the same as at the beginning of the reporting period. Prior to 1 July 1970, combat vehicles were not deadlined for failure of the intercom system. This was changed on 1 July 1970 and several combat vehicles were deadlined for intercoms that were inoperable. The combat vehicles deadlined for intercoms have been repaired and the deadline has returned to the same low figure as at the beginning of the period. Communications equipment, artillery, radar, and heavy engineer equipment decreased in percentage of operational readiness during the reporting period. The operational readiness of artillery is, however, still at 97%. The increased deadline of communications equipment and radar is attributed to increased command emphasis in the utilization and maintenance of these items. The decrease in the operational readiness of heavy engineer equipment relates directly to the increase in the deadline of dump trucks during the last two weeks of the reporting period, caused primarily by the highway construction project on Route 508.

(b) During the month of July, the division requested and received a thorough inspection of the NCR 500 system at the 704th Maintenance Battalion direct support supply activity. As a result of this inspection, a 100% inventory is being conducted at the direct support supply activity. It is expected that results of the inventory and second NCR system will be an increased supply responsiveness. Also during the reporting period, several GMI's were conducted by this headquarters on the direct support operations of the 704th Maintenance Battalion. As a result of these inspections, direct support shop operations of all maintenance companies were thoroughly revised with a view toward

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increased operational efficiency.

(c) Maintenance support

1. Headquarters and A Company (main support company), 704th Maintenance Battalion continued its role of providing direct support maintenance for division base camp elements, back up direct support for the battalion forward support companies and contact teams, supply of Class IX (repair parts), and retrograde of material. D and C Companies provided direct maintenance support to the 1st and 2d Brigades, respectively. Company E (Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company) continued its aircraft direct support maintenance mission.

2. During the reporting period, emphasis was placed on employment of complete maintenance support companies in the forward areas. During operations in CAMBODIA, C Company operated at NEW ELEI DJERENG, and D Company operated at ELEIKU. At the close of this reporting period, D Company was operating at LZ UPLIFT. In other cases, maintenance contact teams were employed in the forward areas.

e. Civilian Affairs

(1) Civic Action

(a) The major civic action effort during this period was the completion of the MONTAGNARD Heights project. This project consisted of consolidating the ten MONTAGNARD hamlets located on the western end of the TAOR into a village complex. Work on the project began on 27 May 1970 with construction of perimeter barriers and bunkers. The perimeter was built around four hamlets located on the south side of Highway 19. Six hamlets located on the north of Highway 19 were relocated into the new perimeter. The construction of perimeter barriers and relocation were completed on 17 June 1970, and a resident civic action team was placed in the consolidated village. This team gave some stability and assisted in establishing a security system to defend the village. The resident team, working in coordination with MACV and GVN officials, established a security plan based on one PF platoon and a 22 man SON THON cadre element. A PF platoon was recruited from the MONTAGNARDS in the village and is presently in training. The resident team was removed from the village on 26 July 1970 because its mission had been accomplished. An effective workable security system has been established in the village and cooperation with local GVN authorities and the people has made this project one of the most successful in the present TAOR.

(b) Another project presently underway is the construction of a model sanitary hamlet. This project consists of taking one of the existing hamlets in AN TUC District and establishing a sanitation program. The sanitation program will consist of:

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1 Providing technical assistance for constructing walls, latrines, and land fills to adequately meet the needs of the people.

2 Training hamlet personnel in all aspects of personal hygiene and sanitation.

(2) Psychological Operations

(a) On 7 July 1970, twenty-five 105mm leaflet projectiles were test fired. Fifteen projectiles were packed with snug fitting rolls and ten were packed with loose fitting rolls. Twenty weight paper was used for all rolls. All projectiles burst at the proper height and leaflets were evenly disseminated throughout the target area. One hundred twenty-five projectiles are on hand for follow up missions to air strikes or landing zone preparations.

(b) The 1-22d Infantry received an NVA rallier on 22 June 1970, who had been infiltrating with an NVA unit which had been heavily engaged by elements of the 1-22d Infantry. The HOI CHANH was exploited through many PSYOP methods, and as a result, he made live aerial broadcasts and taped messages. He also wrote a message to his friends and allowed his picture to be taken for use on a leaflet.

(c) During the last week of July, special leaflets and tapes were developed in support of the 2-8th Infantry (Mech), which was operating in an area occupied by MONTAGNARD NVA/VC sympathizers and supporters. The messages contained an appeal for the MONTAGNARDS not to help the NVA/VC, and additionally informed them that if they did support the NVA/VC, then they would be considered our enemy.

f. Personnel

(1) Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized-organic units	880	184	12,965	14,029
Assigned-organic units	908	184	12,861	13,953
(b) End of Period				
Authorized-organic units	880	184	12,965	14,029
Assigned-organic units	769	167	12,435	13,371

(2) Replacements: The division received a total of 325 officer and 3946 enlisted replacements. During the same period, 484 officers and 4340 enlisted men rotated out of the division.

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(3) Casualties

UNIT	WOUNDED	HOSTILE		INJURED	NON-HOSTILE	
		DEAD	MISSING		DEAD	MISSING
1st Bde	159	24	0	73	2	0
2d Bde	119	22	0	43	3	0
DIVARTY	24	4	0	28	0	0
DISCOM	48	1	0	11	1	0
2-8th Mech	22	0	0	15	0	0
1-10th Cav	43	4	0	10	2	0
K-75 Ranger	25	0	0	6	1	0
Div Trps	14	1	0	28	3	0

(4) Morale and Personnel Services: Awards and decorations during the period were presented as follows:

DECORATION AWARDED	MAY	JUNE	JULY
Distinguished Service Medal	1	0	1
Silver Star	13	14	2
Legion of Merit	7	14	6
Distinguished Flying Cross	6	14	5
Soldiers Medal	5	11	8
Bronze Star (Valor)	39	80	25
Air Medal (Valor)	8	29	13
Bronze Star (Service/Achievement)	485	544	788
Army Commendation (Service/Achievement)	1002	1292	1577
Air Medal (Service)	1075	641	745
Purple Heart	243	119	66

(5) Promotions: A total of 4,103 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

(6) Reenlistments: 170 enlistments/reenlistments were received. The breakdown of enlistments/reenlistments were 63 first term RA, 28 AUS, 78 career RA, and one ER/NG.

(7) Health

(a) The division is presently adequately staffed with medical and paramedical officers. There are also adequate numbers of lower grade enlisted personnel but the diminishing numbers of senior medical specialists and senior noncommissioned officers pose an increasingly serious problem for the near future.

(b) The total hospital admission rate has declined from the peak reached in May, which was associated with the CAMBODIAN operation, and is now at the level experienced prior to that operation.

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Malaria continues to be responsible for the major portion of the patients requiring hospitalization. It reached a peak coincident with the CAMBODIAN operation and has continuously declined since, but still remains the prime cause of hospital admissions. Except for the month of June, the rates of 1970 have been lower than the corresponding period last year. Indeed, this May saw the lowest rate experienced by the division during its operations in VIETNAM. In this area are both vivax and falciparum strains. Vivax has been responsible for approximately 30% to 50% of the total cases of reported malaria.

Fever of unknown origin is also a continuing problem which contributes to a majority of outpatient visits. Fortunately, most of these are of short duration and require little or no hospitalization. Generally, the amount of fevers rise with the incidence of malaria and fall in parallel. This has not happened these past months, with the fever rate rising despite the fall in malaria. It is felt that most of these cases are due to arbovirus infections and are being collected to confirm this fact.

Other diseases such as respiratory and diarrheal diseases continue in low incidence and have not been a significant problem. Skin diseases, while not a major cause of incapacity, continue to be a troublesome problem and the outpatient rate has continued to rise during these summer months. It has not, however, caused any increased rate of hospitalization.

g. Engineer

Engineer activities during this period were characterized by a greater commitment to combat support activities. The major activity of this period occurred when the entire battalion was committed in May to support the CAMBODIAN operation.

Engineer activities in CAMBODIA began with one company in direct support of each brigade, while one company was placed in general support of the division with the mission of maintaining Route 14B and constructing the division logistics base. The bridge company moved to PLEIKU where it remained at Engineer Hill and supported the division with heavy equipment, tactical bridging, and minesweeping, while maintaining the capability to provide float bridging. On termination of this operation, the battalion was again committed to the direct support of the infantry brigades and construction of a two brigade FSB and FSA at LZ ARMAGEDDON. In addition, the engineers opened and upgraded the Land LOG to LZ ARMAGEDDON, completed the minimum essential operating facilities at Camp Radcliff, and furthered improvements on various defensive positions.

Company B provided direct support to the 1st Brigade. The normal level of support was one platoon plus reinforcing elements of up to one

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additional platoon whenever the brigade relocated its command post. Principal tasks assigned were landing zone and fire base cutting and clearing and cache destruction. Normally one Case 450 minidozer operated in support of Company B and the 1st Brigade.

In addition to direct support of combat operations, Company B completed construction of ten large living/fighting bunkers at LZ ACTION, a semi-permanent fire support base on Highway 19, and began a similar project at LZ SCHUELLER. Other construction tasks included construction of defensive bunkers for a signal facility atop HOA CONG Mountain, construction of several softball diamonds/volleyball court complexes throughout the base camp, and completion of offices and banking facilities for the American Express at the Camp Radcliff Exchange.

Company C provided direct support to the 2d Brigade. As with Company B, the level of support normally provided the brigade was one platoon with reinforcing elements up to an additional platoon for moves of the brigade tactical command post. The principal tasks accomplished by Company C in direct support were landing zone and fire base construction, clearing fields of fire and the destruction of enemy caches. In addition to the Case 450, a D-5 automobile dozer was used to clear battalion fire support bases.

In addition to direct support of combat operations, Company C completed several construction projects at Camp Radcliff. These projects included the completion of the 2d Brigade tactical operations center, two revetments for medical evacuation helicopters, an observation tower, plus a guard tower at the 17th Field Hospital, upgrading and improving the defensive works at the 4th Division Heliport, renovation of two bridges, and a twelve point helicopter rearm point with centralized ammunition storage area.

Company D remained in general support of the division throughout the reporting period. Upon its return from the CAMBODIAN operations, the entire company minus one platoon moved to LZ ARMAGEDDON to upgrade Route 508 extending from LZ EMALIA to LZ ARMAGEDDON into a limited use, all weather tactical road. The dump truck platoon and several items of engineer equipment from Company B were placed in support of Company D for this mission. This major road building effort expanded the capability of the division to conduct major operations in the northern portion of the division area of operation, reduced the helicopter blade time, and enabled the government of SOUTH VIETNAM to open new areas for resettlement.

Company D also provided direct support for the combat operations of the 2-3th Mech which normally operated under division control. An engineer squad was normally provided and was reinforced with a combat engineer vehicle, a D-7 dozer, and an AVLB from Company B. The major mission assigned this element was to enhance the mobility of the mechanized

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infantry by constructing combat trails, bridges, and fords. In addition, the squad constructed defensive works and cleared fields of fire at the 2-8th Mech night defensive positions.

One platoon of Company D remained at Camp Radcliff tasked with several construction projects. During this period the platoon constructed a finance vault for the American Express Banking facility at the Camp Radcliff exchange, constructed a security fence around and made other defensive improvements to the division tactical operations center, built several foot bridges in the division headquarters area, and completed the total renovation of the division war room.

Company E continued to provide the division with engineer equipment, tactical bridging, and transportation support. The unique capabilities of this company allowed it simultaneously to provide equipment in support of specific line company projects, including substantial hauling and equipment support to Company D for the upgrade of Highway 508, while undertaking several earthmoving and dust control projects assigned to the company itself.

Company E was also tasked with minesweep missions throughout the division area of operations. These missions were accomplished utilizing a combat engineer vehicle and an M48A3 tank, each with the expendable mine roller attached.

Company E placed two 3/4' dry span M4T6 bridges during the opening of Highway 508.

Other specific projects completed by Company E during this period included excavation of a new sanitary fill for Camp Radcliff, clearing over two million square meters of vegetation for fields of fire on the Camp Radcliff perimeter, clearing and preparing an area for RF/PF housing, and placing penprime on the helicopter field at Camp Radcliff and the helipads at LZ ARMAGEDDON and LZ UPLIFT.

h. Army Aviation Operations

(1) The 4th Aviation Battalion supported both brigades and attached units. Elements other than the two brigades receiving support from the 4th Aviation Battalion included division chemical, engineer, artillery, G-5, and Project Left Bank. The 4th Aviation Battalion AH-1G gunships provided fire support elements to both brigades. The LOH's provided visual reconnaissance and command and control aircraft. Support was accomplished by combat assault preparations and gunship cover for LUCK insertions and extractions, resupply, medevacs, and ground forces in contact. Scorpion and Scorpion teams consistently provided invaluable intelligence which resulted in numerous bunker complexes and fortifications destroyed.

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(2) In addition, the battalion operated a forward airfield located at Camp Holloway to support the division conducting operations west of PLEIKU and in CAMBODIA. The extension of the division area of operation and the lack of aircraft parts hampered aircraft support for the division to a limited degree.

(3) The battalion also maintained responsibility and supervision of the Golf Course Army Airfield at Camp Radcliff. Extensive work is being done in all areas of the Golf Course, such as repairing tactical wire, cutting grass, removing debris and trash, installing and relocating fighting positions, and repairing gates. A perimeter lighting system was installed and it greatly enhances overall security.

(4) Pathfinder support was provided both brigades and attached units in fire support bases, resupply installations and continuous operation of the air traffic control zone. Visual reconnaissance missions for possible LZ's and fire support bases was also conducted. Pathfinder support is used occasionally for rigging of downed aircraft. In addition, they assist in training personnel in rigging, extraction of equipment, and providing RF/FF in Pathfinder support.

(5) During the months of May, June, and July 1970, the following aviation support was provided to the 4th Infantry Division:

(a) Organic Aviation Support

	May	June	July	Total
Hours	5,211	4,701	4,905	14,817
Sorties	14,631	11,996	13,275	39,902
Pax	7,142	10,417	12,088	29,647
Tons (Cargo)	83	205	363	651
Acft Down	4	3	5	12
Acft Dest	1	0	0	1

(b) Average daily organic and non-organic support to the division:

	UH-1H	AH-1G	UH-1B/C	CH-47	OH-6A	CH-54
A Co, 4th Avn Bn	18					
B Co, 4th Avn Bn		4	2		4	
D/1-10th Cav	4	4			4	
E/704th Maint	1					
52d CAB	17		6	5		1
1st Bde					2	
2d Bde					2	
DIVARTY					5	
Total	40	8	8	5	17	1

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1. Inspector General Activities

(1). Fourth Infantry Division Annual General Inspections of one divisional unit were conducted along with two courtesy inspections in preparation for the unit's Annual General Inspection, and thirteen inspections were conducted of the unit storage and safekeeping of individual personal effects.

(2) Two hundred forty complaints were received by the Inspector General's office during the reporting period. The two major areas of complaints were medical with fifty-five, and unit administration with fifty-three complaints. One hundred eight requests for assistance were also received during the reporting period.

j. Signal

(1) Operations

(a) Operational activities continue to focus on providing multi-channel communications and radio teletype in support of the division and its elements.

(b) The largest operation undertaken during this period was when the division deployed a tactical command post forward in support of its elements in CAMBODIA. On 10 May 1970, a multi-channel communication system was installed between Camp Radcliff and the division tactical command post located at NLEIKU. Three multi-channel communication systems were installed from the division tactical command post to elements forward. One system went to each brigade located at NAW NLEI DJEENG and the third was installed to support the 2-8th Mech Infantry Battalion at JACKSON HOLE.

(c) Prior to the CAMBODIAN operation, the 124th Signal Battalion had operated in a fixed base camp environment for nearly three years. As a consequence, the battalion was gradually tailored to meet its fixed base camp mission. Under these conditions, there was no requirement to provide communications to a tactical division headquarters or support command. The battalion equipment was used to support the brigades or was turned in. In turn the brigades became dependent on the signal battalion for communications support, which would normally be provided from their own resources. The brigades had neglected their own communications equipment, and had become dependent on the signal battalion resources. As a result, this equipment could not be returned to division control without seriously hampering the brigade communications. Hence, at the start of the CAMBODIAN operation, the 124th Signal Battalion was ill equipped, organized, or trained to handle division communications to two tactical division headquarters simultaneously. The situation which the signal battalion found itself in at the start

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of the CAMBODIAN operation points out the fact that organizations should if at all possible, remain in their TOE configuration so that if the need arises they are properly prepared to carry out their tactical communications mission.

(d) At LZ BLACKHAWK on 1 June 1970, the 1st Forward Area Signal Center Platoon deployed one AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 to LZ BLACKHAWK in support of the 1st Brigade tactical command post. The next day, one AN/GRC-163 and one AN/GRC-142 were installed for multi-channel communications and radio teletype support for the 2-8th Mech Infantry Battalion. On 20 June 1970, one AN/GRC-142 and one AN/MRC-69 were installed by the 2d FASCF in support of the 2d Brigade. At the same time in MEIKU, one AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 were installed to provide multi-channel communication and radio teletype support for the 2-8th Mech. In order to complete the multi-channel communication system, a relay was installed on Dragon Mountain.

(e) On 24 June 1970, one AN/MRC-69 was installed at Artillery Hill for telephone support for the 3-12th Infantry Battalion. One AN/GRC-142 was also installed for entrance into the division radio teletype special purpose net by the 3-12th Infantry Battalion. At LZ AHMAGEDDON on 5 July, the 1st FASCF installed one AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 for communications support to the 1st Brigade. Communications center and switchboard facilities were also provided to the 1st Brigade. One AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 were deployed to the vicinity BR 325274 to provide multi-channel and radio teletype communications between the 2-8th Mech and Camp Radcliff.

(f) The 1st Brigade deployed from LZ AHMAGEDDON to LZ UNLIFT on 18 July 1970. The 1st FASCF provided multi-channel communications between Camp Radcliff through a relay at PHU CAT, which was operated by C Company. The 1st FASCF also provided radio teletype, communications center and switchboard facilities for the brigade. On 26 July 1970, one AN/MRC-69 and one AN/GRC-142 were deployed in support of the 2-8th Mech to provide multi-channel communications and radio teletype with Camp Radcliff.

k. Information Activities

(1) News Media Correspondents

(a) During the period 1 May through 31 July, 1970, a total of 62 civilian news correspondents visited the division, covering a variety of subjects ranging from pure hometown and human interest material to the division active combat operations. The bulk of the correspondents was here during the period 5-16 May 1970, with primary interest in division operations in CAMBODIA. Included were representatives from ABC, CBS, NBC, AP and UPI, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the

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Washington Star, Reuters News Service, Time and Newsweek Magazines.

(b) Housing and transportation for visiting correspondents were provided by the MACV Press Camp at Camp Schmidt and a Forward 4th Division Press Camp at NEW PLAI DIERKING. All routine matters were handled by the IO Rear at Camp Radcliff, enabling the IO Forward to concentrate its efforts on proper and timely briefings.

(2) Radio/Television Activities

(a) Although there are no broadcast facilities at Camp Radcliff, the Information Office found it expedient to coordinate with AFVN affiliates in TLEIKU and QUI NRON. The command information messages (spots lasting 30 to 60 seconds) are given to these stations telephonically with the hard copy mailed simultaneously. This procedure is necessary for rapid dissemination of the information. Notable examples were the urgent warnings concerning the river flowing through Camp Radcliff, and the distinct possibility of swimmers contracting hepatitis from the contaminated waters.

(b) A relatively small number of broadcast hours concerning command and public information was noted, due to lack of facilities at Camp Radcliff. A total of 340 hard news items was released. These included combat and combat related activities.

(c) A total of 359 hometown news release tape recordings were initiated and processed during the reporting period. This was a decrease from the previous quarter, and was due in a large part to the utilization of radio/television personnel to assist in press camp operations during the CAMBODIAN operation. A new avenue of release was initiated, which enabled the information office to release tapes directly to the Audio-Visual Center in New York. This allowed for wider dissemination, and provided the information office with highly professional advice concerning this operation. Results of the new procedures are still being studied, however, a high degree of effectiveness has been noticed.

(d) Attempts are being made to obtain improved AFVN radio and television reception within the division area of operation. Studies concerning needed equipment and the facilities required, installation, availability and expediency of delivery have been made, however, there has been no specific date established for installation.

(3) Command Information Program

(a) Improvements in the distribution and dissemination of command information continue. Surveys indicate that division personnel are receiving all informational materials on a timely basis. Command information fact sheets prepared for troop dissemination during the

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period included: Contraband, DOD Race Relations Task Force, VIETNAMESE Red Cross Drive Fund, The Facts About VD, Army Promotions-A Look Into The Future, and Army Emergency Relief Campaign Drive.

(b) The summer issue of the division quarterly magazine, Esprit, was prepared, published and distributed. Distribution included medical facilities elsewhere in VIETNAM and in Japan. All incoming personnel processing through the 4th Replacement Company also received a copy. The most useful and effective tool available for the Information Officer to provide widest dissemination of command and public information continues to be The Ivy Leaf, the weekly division newspaper. Thirteen issues of The Ivy Leaf were distributed during the period. The material provided for the paper comes from all units and activities in the division and coverage is given to all action stories, human interest items, and general news concerning personnel and events occurring within the division. Additionally, articles from the Commanding General, the adjutant General, Surgeon, and the Chaplains and Staff Judge Advocate offer timely and professional advice and guidance for commanders and troops. The Ivy Leaf also published periodical information concerning the reenlistment program with materials provided by division career counsellors. Present circulation of The Ivy Leaf, to include active and former members, is approximately 4,000 copies per week.

(c) Frequently, the 4th Division receives coverage in other publications within VIETNAM and also the Army Times. During the period the coverage received in other publications was as follows:

Stars and Stripes	147 column inches	8 photos
Army Times	116 column inches	6 photos
MAGV Observer	188 column inches	10 photos
US:NV Reporter	206 column inches	10 photos

(4) Fourth Division Association and Scholarship Fund

The Information Office assumed the responsibility for Custodian, Fourth Division Association and Scholarship Fund, on 4 July 1970. New members registered in this period totalled 1,330, bringing the membership total to 4,850. During the same period, \$12,210 in voluntary contributions to the Scholarship Fund was made, raising the balance of the fund to \$323,403.

1. Highway Coordinator Activities

(1) During the reporting period, the Highway Coordinator's office continued to respond directly to the Assistant Division Commander-Maneuver in effecting coordination between the division, the US Army Support

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Command, QUI NHON, the ARVN II Military Region, the 93D Military Police Battalion, and other units concerned with security, traffic control, and engineer efforts along Highway 19 from the junction of Highway 1 near QUI KHON to AR 823470, vicinity the intersection of Highway 14 near LEIKU. Major operational problems that confronted the Highway Coordinator were:

- (a) Defolisting and land clearing
- (b) Upgrading and repairing the highway
- (c) Communications procedures
- (d) Fire fighting responsibilities
- (e) Disabled vehicle recovery
- (f) Safe driving
- (g) Security

(2) A total of 1732 convoys consisting of 48,144 vehicles was monitored and controlled by the three convoy control stations. A statistical summary of all Highway 19 activities follows:

Activity	May	June	July
Convoys	623	540	569
Vehicles in Convoys	17,825	14,778	15,541
Ambushes (Convoys)	16	4	0
Sniper	15	3	8
Attack on Bridges, FSB, etc.	12	1	7
Mines			
Found	36	14	5
Hit	15	8	2
Total	51	22	7
Demolition Damage			
Bridges	1	0	0
Culverts	0	3	0
Open Road	0	2	0
Total	1	5	0
Vehicle Loss (US)			
Damaged	16	16	2
Destroyed	3	1	1
Total	19	17	3
Personnel Losses			
KIA	3	3	1
MIA	28	17	6
Total	31	20	7

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Vehicle Loss (Accident)

Damaged	5	9	7
Destroyed	1	0	0
Total	6	9	7

Personnel Losses (Accident)

Killed	1	1	3
Injured	10	9	7
Total	11	10	10

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence

Spikesid Sensor Device

(a) Observation: During the reporting period, a major problem was encountered when employing the spikesid sensor device due to the failure of the acoustic element to activate.

(b) Evaluation: The air delivered seismic device is designed to detect seismic vibrations in the earth's surface and to transmit a signal to a receiver-transmitter unit. Activation of the seismic detection element in the sensor in turn should activate the acoustic sensing element, thereby making it possible to acoustically monitor any activity in the vicinity of the seismic vibration. In practice the device was found to send only the seismic signal to the monitoring site, the acoustic element having failed to activate on most occasions.

(c) Recommendation: That the spikesid device be technically evaluated to determine the cause for the failure of the acoustic sensing element to activate and transmit the acoustic signal to the monitoring site.

c. Operations

(i) Requirements of Additional Liaison and Forward Observer Sections

(a) Observation: Additional liaison and forward observer sections over and above those authorized by KFOE are often required.

(b) Evaluation:

1. Assets: Current US division organization provides three sets of liaison/FO teams per direct support artillery battalion. Thus, prior to the inactivation of the 3d Brigade, the division was authorized nine sets

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of liaison/FO teams and had eleven maneuver battalions. Subsequent to the inactivation of the 3d Brigade, the division has been authorized six sets of liaison/FO teams and has eight maneuver battalions. The general support battalion (5-16th Arty) is authorized two liaison teams and Headquarters, 4th Division Artillery is authorized one. Current doctrine envisions the use of these liaison sections with adjacent or reinforced non-divisional artillery units.

2 Semi-permanent requirements: The 6-29th Artillery provided a liaison section to the 1-69th Armor prior to its inactivation. The 5-16th Arty has provided a liaison section to the 1-10th Cavalry for some time and because of the size and configuration of the squadron area of operation, currently provides two sections. Since the inactivation of the 2-9th Artillery, the 5-16th Artillery has also provided a liaison section and three FO parties to the 2-8th Mech.

3 Temporary requirements: During the operation in COMBODIA, division artillery provided a liaison team to the 2-1st Cavalry, which was JCON to the division. Division artillery has frequently provided liaison teams to ROK and ARVN units during combined operations.

(c) Recommendation: That artillery units be prepared to constitute additional liaison teams and FO teams. Tactical doctrine and TO&I should provide for automatic augmentation or reduction of authorized liaison and FO teams based on the number of maneuver battalions assigned to the division.

(2) Fire Support Coordination for a Large Installation

(a) Observation: The large division command and control LSA complex at NEW LAI DJERENG required coordination of fire support.

(b) Evaluation: Fire support for the installation defense of the NEW LAI DJERENG complex was extensive. The fire support coordinator was responsible for integrating fires of 81mm mortars, 4.2 inch mortars, installation based 105mm howitzers, 155mm howitzers, and eight inch howitzers based outside the installation, quad 50 machine guns, and twin 40mm guns. Additionally, the employment of the AN/MQ-4 counter-mortar radar and a 23 inch XENON searchlight had to be planned and coordinated. The proper use of all these resources required an around the clock team of personnel experienced in fire control, fire clearance, and fire coordination procedures.

(c) Recommendation: That when an installation as large as New LAI DJERENG is established, it was determined that it is more efficient to task a battalion liaison team to perform the fire support coordination functions, and that the liaison team be the team from the maneuver battalion that provides security for the installation.

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(3) Engaging the Enemy Outside the Kill Zone

(a) Observation: A platoon size linear ambush was established along a north-south trail with the ambush positioned to the east of the trail. OP's were positioned north and south of the main element. An enemy element consisting of three individuals was spotted moving to the north approximately 100 meters to the west of and parallel to the trail. The element was engaged by six members of the platoon with negative results.

(b) Evaluation:

1 The effectiveness of the ambush was reduced as the enemy travelled parallel to the trail at some distance, thereby avoiding the killing zone. Engaging the enemy with less than one third the friendly element's fire power further reduced the effectiveness.

2 Normally the NVA are careless when they believe the area clear of friendlies and use well defined trails. However, in this situation, the enemy paralleled a trail, indicating they were aware of the friendly position, or because the division has been operating over large areas with small units, they are changing and operating off the trails.

(c) Recommendation: That mechanical ambushes be employed on the trail and a standard ambush be prepared on the flank of the trail at a point where route of travel is likely to be.

(4) Small-sized Ambushes

(a) Observation: Unit commanders found that by utilizing squad and half platoon sized ambushes, companies could effectively interdict a very large area and deny the enemy access to his usual trail networks.

(b) Evaluation: In mountainous and heavily vegetated terrain, it is very difficult to cover all likely avenues of movement of the enemy with company or platoon sized units. By further subdividing the platoon's into squad or half platoon sized elements, depending upon the communications and leadership capability available, one company can establish screens to interdict enemy movement over a wide area.

(c) Recommendation: That when the size of the enemy force warrants, or when the mission of the friendly unit is primarily screening or interdicting, numerous small sized ambush patrols be utilized.

(5) Stay-Behind Forces

(a) Observation: The use of stay behind forces can be used effectively against the enemy.

(b) Evaluation: It is a valuable tactical employment of unit

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resources to place stay behind forces along well used trails at night locations upon departure, near watering locations, and near good or often used landing zones. In many cases, the enemy knows the general location of US forces and will attempt to move into a vacated area to search for discarded equipment or munitions, or even try to get a favorable position to conduct future sniper attacks.

(c) Recommendation: That stay behind forces be employed on a regular basis.

(b) Enemy Booby Trapping of Watermelons

(a) Observation: While clearing an LZ for a helicopter pickup, four men spotted a watermelon laying in the open on top of a paddy dyke. All four men were within ten to fifteen meters of the watermelon when one of the group attempted to pick it up. Immediately after the watermelon was lifted, an M-26 hand grenade detonated directly beneath it, killing the individual that lifted it and wounded two others within range.

(b) Evaluation: These four men disregarded the obvious placement of the watermelon for the purpose of attracting attention. Since there were no vines near the watermelon, they should have realized it might have been left on the dyke for a reason. The watermelon should have been treated as a booby trap and moved only after the entire area around it had been checked out closely. To prevent possible injury from shrapnel, a length of rope or string could have been attached to the watermelon and after selecting a covered position 25-30 meters away, pulled from its position. Under no circumstances should the watermelon have been eaten, due to possible poisoning.

(c) Recommendation: During standdown maintenance periods and at least once each month, all personnel of a unit should receive instructions concerning enemy booby trap techniques, with emphasis on not disturbing any item on the battlefield which is not required by the tactical situation, and on proper techniques for checking out an item if it must be moved.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics

(1) Prepackaged Resupply

(a) Observation: Occasionally, when a unit is in contact, an immediate resupply of Class V is required.

(b) Evaluation: By having a prepackaged basic load of ammunition

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on a standby basis at the fire support base, the length of time required for emergency resupply of Class V can be greatly reduced. Packages should be handled either as an internal or sling load for a slick.

(c) Recommendation: That an emergency resupply of a company basic load of Class V be maintained in prepackaged, platoon-sized bundles ready for immediate delivery.

(2) Operation of Mini-Refuel Points

(a) Observation: During the CAMBODIAN operation, the 3-506th Infantry operated a "Mini" refueling point at its fire support base. This point consisted of three to four 500 gallon blivets and a small gasoline driven pump with filter/separator and one nozzle. This equipment gave the battalion the capability of refueling UH-1H and LOH helicopters supporting their battalion.

(b) Evaluation: This arrangement has the advantage of conserving blade time for supporting aircraft, permits the battalion commander to always have his command and control aircraft available, and is available in an emergency for other aircraft flying in the area. The mini-port can be used to top off aircraft that assemble for a short CA. This precludes aircraft from falling out for fuel during combat assaults.

(c) Recommendation: That consideration be given to operating "Mini" refuel points in forward fire support bases whenever the turn around time for refueling exceeds 20 minutes one way.

g. Communications: None

h. Material: None

i. Other: Civic Action

(a) Observation: Leaflets dropped from 1800 feet altitude travelled over eight thousand meters.

(b) Evaluation: In preparation for a leaflet drop, PSYO team members visited the landing zone of a battalion to coordinate with the S-3. It was determined that the leaflet drop should be made on an area approximately 8,000 meters from the landing zone. The pilot briefed the team on high wind conditions. Applying incorrect leaflet dissemination data, the pilot underflew the release zone by several thousand meters. Results: 1,000 to 3,000 leaflets missed the target area and landed on the landing zone.

(c) Recommendations:

1 That during high wind conditions aircraft fly lower to insure

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
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more accurate leaflet dissemination.

2 That when the drop area is within 15,000 meters of a landing zone, extra care be taken to insure the accuracy of wind drift calculations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



EVERETT R. HOUSE
CPT. AGC
Asst AG

6 Incls

- 1. Task Organization
- 2. Key Personnel
- 3. Abbreviations
- 4. Maps 1, 2, 3
- 5. Locations
- 6. Statistical Summary (BIMB TAY #1)

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2-CO, DISCOM	
2-CO, 1-10 Cav	
1-CO, 2-8th Inf (Mech)	
1-CO, 3-8th Inf	
1-CO, 1-12th Inf	
1-CO, 3-12th Inf	
1-CO, 1-14th Inf	
1-CO, 1-22d Inf	
1-CO, 2-35th Inf	
1-CO, 5-16th Arty	
1-CO, 6-29th Arty	
1-CO, 4-42d Arty	
2-CO, 4th Engr Bn	
2-CO, 124th Sig Bn	
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2-CO, 4th S&T Bn	
2-CO, 4th Med Bn	
2-CO, 704th Maint Bn	
2-CO, 7-17th Cav	

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