

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)  
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road security have E-6 Launchers mounted and ready for use at all times.

1. Circuit Breakers for Airborne Personnel Detectors

Observation: Fuse wells in Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD's) are a source of trouble due to lack of replacement fuses.

Evaluation: N/A

Recommendation: That APD's issued to the division be modified by replacing the fuse wells with circuit breakers.

m. S-5's and Tactical Operations

Observation: Sector S-5's could be more advantageously employed to assist in the conduct of Tactical Operations within their sectors.

Evaluation: Operations conducted within the Division TAOR would cause less unnecessary property damage to friendly indigenous personnel if proper coordination were made with S-5 teams responsible for the areas concerned prior to the initiation of tactical operations. The familiarity of Sector S-5 personnel would allow for the determination of friendly agricultural projects, temporarily abandoned hamlets, and population habits and customs. The participation of S-5 personnel in the conduct of tactical operations would provide a verifying element to determine the status of otherwise suspicious and questionable cultivated or occupied areas.

Recommendation: That tactical units make coordination with appropriate Sector S-5 personnel prior to the initiation of tactical operations with the TAOR.

3. (C) Training

a. Determining Direction and Distance to Key Terrain Features

Observation: Because of the difficult terrain in the Central Highlands, the individual soldier requires intensive training in determining the direction and distances to key terrain features to his front while occupying a defensive position.

Evaluation: With proper training the individual soldier can render accurate and timely reports on the location of enemy fire. This training is easily accomplished while the unit is occupying a fire base. The training involves the use of target detection techniques and a compass. An individual

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so trained can provide information to bring rapid suppressive fires on the enemy.

Recommendation: That all units conduct training in firebases in the determination of accurate direction and distance to key terrain features.

4. (C) Intelligence

a. Use of AN/PPS-5 Radar for Convoy Security

Observation: It has been demonstrated that the AN/PPS-5 radar is an effective addition to convoy security.

Evaluation: On several occasions during the reporting period the AN/PPS-5 proved effective for increasing convoy protection. When situated on observation posts overlooking the LLOC, it can detect the enemy planting mines or his movement with a high degree of accuracy, enabling direct or indirect fire to be brought on the enemy without visual contact.

Recommendation: That AN/PPS-5 radar sets be used where feasible in a convoy protection role.

b. Patrolling

Observation: Immediately upon occupation of a new area a rifle company should conduct aggressive saturation patrols out to a distance of four kilometers.

Evaluation: Patrolling at company level is common practice; however, often these patrols are few in number and traverse distances of only 500 - 1000 meters. In at least one instance in the area of DAK PEK SF Camp, a unit occupied a defensive position and did not discover an enemy force located 3000 meters away until the US unit was attacked the second night. Indications subsequent to the attack revealed that the enemy force had occupied the same position the previous night; however, because of the 1500 meter limit of the US patrols the enemy location was not discovered.

Recommendation: That aggressive patrolling to a distance of 4,000 meters be done immediately upon occupation of a new area.

c. NVA Diversionary Tactics

Observation: Enemy forces utilize small elements to draw fires of a FSB as a diversion to bypass the FSB.

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Evaluation: Activities around LZ BRILLO PAD during the first part of July revealed that significant enemy elements infiltrated the valley system east of that location. During the same period sporadic attacks by fire during evening hours were launched on BRILLO PAD from CU PU Mountain 2 kilometers west of BRILLO PAD. Also, attacks by fire were received by LZ BUNKER HILL during this time. The intensity of the attacks indicated that a small force was involved. Concentration of artillery fires, a normal procedure, probably increased the enemy's ability to bypass both BRILLO PAD and BUNKER HILL.

Recommendation: That before massing artillery fires during a series of sporadic attacks, consideration should first be given to the possibility of an enemy attempt to create a diversion in order to bypass.

d. Searching POW's

Observation: On a recent mission, a POW was said to have been thoroughly searched by the capturing unit. On closer inspection two double edge razor blades were concealed in the PW's shirt pocket.

Evaluation: The razor blades lay flat against the individual's chest and should have been easily spotted. The insertion of the hand into the pocket while searching could have resulted in severe cuts.

Recommendation: That capturing units tear the pockets from the shirts of POW's and make a visual search for similar small weapons.

5. (C) Logistics

a. Plastic and Cloth Sandbags

Observation: Experience has proven that the cloth sandbag is more versatile than the plastic sandbag.

Evaluation: Vertical construction almost always demands the use of cloth bags since they are less prone to slip and fall. The plastic bag is satisfactory for horizontal construction. The plastic bag is more durable than the cloth bag, but is very susceptible to slipping. The plastic bag is acceptable for use in revetment walls, blast shields, and in open topped fighting positions for crew served weapons.

Recommendation: That only cloth bags be used for side-wall construction of bunkers and all vertical construction over four feet in height. Neither bag should be used as a weight bearing surface or for support.



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b. Vitamin Supplements

Observation: The incidence of rashes and infections is related to vitamin deficiency.

Evaluation: Vitamin tablets were issued to the forward elements of one battalion for one month. With no change in operations or requirements during this period, the incidence of infectious rashes, heat rashes, and minor infections was reduced considerably.

Recommendation: That multi-vitamin tablets be made available in sufficient quantity to allow regular use.

c. UH-1H Rotational Maintenance Humps

Observation: The 4th Aviation Battalion received all of its UH-1H aircraft during a short time span. This has caused the majority of the aircraft to enter scheduled maintenance at the same time.

Evaluation: Every 100 hours each army aircraft must undergo an extensive inspection termed the Periodic Inspection. A rotational maintenance problem occurs when it is time for a Periodic Inspection since most of the helicopters reach the 100 hour mark within the same general time frame. The length of time required to perform the Periodic Inspection varies according to the number of parts that need replacement and the availability of these parts.

Recommendation: That spacing in aircraft maintenance be accomplished similar to the DEROS on individuals. Aviation units arriving in an overseas theater should infuse aircraft with other aviation units to avoid the maintenance hump.

d. Resupply by Helicopter

Observation: Turbulance in mountainous terrain causes hazardous flying conditions, often making resupply of friendly units difficult, or impossible.

Evaluation: In extremely mountainous terrain where only DZ's are available and unsafe flying conditions due to turbulence preclude hovering a sling employed under a UH-1 Helicopter for a "quick drop" facilitates the operation.

Recommendation: That UH-1 aircraft sling load resupply items when terrain or weather prohibits normal resupply techniques.

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- 6. (U) Organization - None.
- 7. (C) Tactical Cover and Deception

Enemy Evasive Patterns

Observation: After daylight operations, US units are often required to leave their AO before nightfall to establish security of a populated area. Over a period of several days the enemy soon recognizes this pattern and can easily evade friendly forces when they return to their area of operations the following day.

Evaluation: In one instance, friendly forces realized the enemy's evasive pattern, and moved infantry forces into ambush positions along enemy withdrawal routes within the friendly AO. At first light an armored force entered the AO in accordance with their previously established pattern. Two of the ambushes intercepted enemy withdrawing hastily from the mechanized force.

Recommendation: That ambushes be used to capitalize on a pattern of enemy reaction to friendly operations.

- 8. (C) Other

A. Civil Affairs

(1) Control of Rice Sales

Observation: Intelligence sources have substantiated that VC/NVA elements have forced excessive rice purchases from local villagers as a means of resupply.

Evaluation: Indigenous families often require purchased rice to supplement their regular crop production. VC/NVA forces attempt to collect a variable portion of each family's rice supply regardless of US Civic Action assistance. To discontinue making purchased rice available would create extreme hardship among the villagers. The formation of consolidated, fortified villages also requires a commitment to provide assistance in economic functions while the newly introduced civic improvements are being accomplished. Documenting rice purchases made by the villages will preclude excessive amounts of rice purchased, insure an adequate supply for the villages, and require enemy forces to alienate themselves from the civilian population when attempts are made to tax this amount. An inventory of rice available within a village, and a record of rice consumed within a given period will provide some basis for the control of rice.

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Recommendation: That a proposed rice purchase be cleared through a control authority a minimum of 24 hours prior to the desired date of purchase. After determining the minimum rice needs of a village, a comprehensive file should be kept to provide a record of all unusually large purchases.

(2) CA Teams and Local Customs

Observation: It is a mistake to assume that a civil affairs project should not be attempted because it apparently violates customs and taboos.

Evaluation: Undesirable traditions can be changed if the alternatives are properly presented. In the consolidated village of PLEI KONG BRECH the MONTAGNARD practice of keeping their livestock under their homes was creating a serious sanitation problem. A CA team recommended to the village chief that all livestock be penned outside the village. The village chief decided to take the advice of the CA Team and build cattle pens outside the village.

Recommendation: That CA Teams demonstrate to the people that the change will be to the advantage of the village. Often the traditional taboos and customs of the MONTAGNARDS will be readily changed if an alternative is properly presented.

(3) MONTAGNARD Injuries on US Vehicles

Observation: Several vehicle accidents within a short period of time have involved MONTAGNARD passengers who fell from the rear of moving US Army vehicles.

Evaluation: MONTAGNARD passengers in US military vehicles require greater supervision than US personnel. The unfamiliarity with basic safety practices and the great excitement experienced by MONTAGNARDS riding in a moving vehicle necessitates a safety lecture and positive supervision during the conduct of any vehicle movement.

Recommendation: That all units involved in the transportation of indigenous civilians require a safety lecture prior to boarding the vehicle, and the presence of a responsible US individual in the same passenger compartment as the indigenous personnel. The supervisor should insure that all indigenous personnel sit, and remain seated, during the duration of the ride.

B. Engineer

(1) Over-reliance on Airmobile Engineer Equipment



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Observation: Units have tendency to over-rely on airmobile engineer equipment.

Evaluation: Airmobile engineer equipment is a "nice to have" item. However, this equipment is subject to numerous maintenance problems when located at a fire base for more than one week. The 3414 Tractor, D-5A, D-6B, and Case 450 dozers have all experienced maintenance difficulties away from good maintenance facilities.

Recommendation: That airmobile engineer equipment be committed for a limited period of one to two weeks to firebases, and then returned to brigade base areas for thorough maintenance.

(2) Shortage of Airmobile Rigging Equipment.

Observation: Difficulty has been experienced in securing airmobile rigging equipment for rapid response to operations.

Evaluation: It has been difficult at time to secure sufficient slings and clevises to move a piece of heavy equipment. Rigging equipment rapidly becomes lost or unserviceable over a period of several sorties.

Recommendation: That direct support engineer companies have available to them a basic issue of twenty (20) feet, 20,000 pound slings, 30 clevises, and five donut rolls.

(3) AVLB and Rough Terrain

Observation: The Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) is not suited for rough terrain.

Evaluation: The AVLB has proven too top heavy for operations in exceptionally rough terrain. Insufficient maintenance support add to the complications of a long distance mission. Air lifted dry gap spans (M4T6) can often be emplaced more quickly and with greater assurance, when a long distance mission is involved.

Recommendation: That AVLB's be used on a very limited basis and primarily on short distance missions on roads or good trails.

(4) Removal of M4T6 Float Bridge

Observation: Too much time is wasted removing the M4T6 float bridge.

Evaluation: Much of the time in removing a float bridge is taken up by washing the mud off the bridge, removing the end ramps, and unpinning the bridge. Since this takes only a squad of men, these details can be accomplished one day prior to the actual removal of the bridge while the rest of the unit is convoying to the site.

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Recommendation: That one squal equipped with a 250 cfm compressor for cleaning of the bridge be dispatched one day prior to the removal of the bridge.

(C) Signal

Use of Secure Mode

Observation: Use of the secure mode on the command net blocks traffic on that frequency between radios not on secure mode.

Evaluation: A "secure-only" radio frequency has been established apart from the Command A frequency. The operation of this net requires one additional radio at each monitoring station. This method prevents the back log of clear, routine traffic from completely monopolizing the net following extended secure messages.

Recommendation: That units experiencing message back log on their Command A frequency consider the establishment of a secure-only net.

*Charles P. Stone*

CHARLES P. STONE  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

6 Inclosures  
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. (C) Task Organization as of 30 April 1968 was:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3-8 Inf  
3-12 Inf  
1-8 Inf  
C/2-1 Cav  
6-29 Arty  
A/5-16 Arty  
B/6-14 Arty  
A/6-14 Arty  
Co A(-), 4th Engr Bn  
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)  
1-10 Cav (-)  
4-42 Arty  
A/6-14 Arty  
B/3-6 Arty  
C/3-6 Arty  
B/5-16 Arty  
Co B(-), 4th Engr Bn  
TACP

DISCOM

DIVARTY

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-14 Inf  
1-35 Inf  
2-35 Inf  
1-12 Inf  
1-22 Inf  
B/1-10 Cav (-)  
A/2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)  
2-9 Arty  
B/1-92 Arty  
C/1-92 Arty  
C/6-14 Arty  
C/5-16 Arty  
D/5-16 Arty  
C/5-22 Arty  
C/4-42 Arty  
Co C(-), 4th Engr Bn  
TACP

Div Troops

2-1 Cav (-)  
7-17 Air Cav (-) GS  
A/5-22 Arty  
4th Engr Bn

2. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 63-37-67

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

ADD: 1-22 Inf (-)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: B-1-10 Cav

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: 1-22 Inf (-)  
ADD: B/1-10 Cav

3. (C) Task Organization as changed by OPORD 11-68

TASK FORCE MATHEWS

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3-8 Inf  
3-12 Inf

3d Bde, 101st Abn Div

1-506 Inf (Abn)  
2-506 Inf (Abn)

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1-35 Inf  
Co A, 4th Engr Bn  
6-29 Arty  
C/4-42 Arty (DS)  
TACP

3-187 Inf (Abn)  
1-8 Inf  
1-22 Inf  
C/2-1 Cav (+)  
2-319 Arty (DS)

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-12 Inf  
1-14 Inf  
2-35 Inf  
B/2-8 Inf (Mech)  
C/1-10 Cav  
Co C, 4th Engr Bn  
2-9 Arty (DS)  
B/4-42 Arty (DS)  
TACP

DIVARTY

5-16 Arty

DISCOM

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)  
1-10 Cav (-)  
Co B, 4th Engr Bn  
4-42 Arty (-) (DS)  
B/3-6 Arty (DS)  
TACP

Div Troops

2-1 Cav (-)  
7-17 Air Cav (GS)  
A/5-22 Arty  
4th Engr Bn

4. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 65-37-67:

TASK FORCE MATHEWS

DELETE: 1-35 Inf

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

ADD: 1-35 Inf

5. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 65-37-67:

TASK FORCE MATHEWS

DELETE: 3d Bde, 101st (Abn) Div (-)  
2-506 Inf (Abn)  
3-187 Inf (Abn)

6. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 67-37-67

TASK FORCE MATHEWS dissolved effective 121500 June. The 1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division returns to division control effective 121500 June.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

ADD: 1-506 Inf (Abn) (eff 121500 Jun)

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf  
3-8 Inf

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-12 Inf  
1-14 Inf

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3-12 Inf  
1-22 Inf  
1-506 Inf (Abn)  
B/2-1 Cav  
B/6-14 Arty  
C/4-42 Arty  
A/1-92 Arty  
C/1-92 Arty  
A/2-319 Arty  
Co A, 4th Engr Bn (-)

1-35 Inf  
2-35 Inf  
B/2-8 Inf (Mech)  
A/1-10 Cav  
C/1-10 Cav  
2-9 Arty  
B/4-42 Arty  
B/1-92 Arty  
B/5-16 Arty  
B/7-15 Arty  
6-84 Arty  
C/6-14 Arty  
C/5-22 Arty  
Co C, 4th Engr Bn (-)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)  
1-10 Cav (-)  
A/6-14 Arty  
B/3-6 Arty  
C/3-6 Arty  
4-42 Arty (-)  
Co B, 4th Engr (-)

Division Troops

2-1 Cav (-)  
7-17 Air Cav (GS)  
A/5-22 Arty  
4th Engr Bn (-)

DIVARTY

DISCOM

7. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 68-37-67:

The 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (Abn) depart MACARTHUR and 4th Infantry Division control, effective 17 June.

8. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 69-37-67:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: C/1-10 Cav (-)  
ADD: A/1-10 Cav

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: 1-22 Inf

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: A/1-10 Cav  
ADD: 1-22 Inf  
C/1-10 Cav (-)

9. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 70-37-67:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: 2 Co's/2-35 Inf  
2-35 Inf (-)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

ADD: 2 Co's/2-35 Inf

Div Troops

ADD: 2-35 Inf (-)



10. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 72-37-67:

<u>Division Troops</u>	<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: 2-35 Inf (-)	ADD: 2-35 Inf (-)
<u>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
ADD: 1-35 Inf	DELETE: 1-35 Inf

11. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 73-37-67:

<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>Division Troops</u>
DELETE: 2-35 Inf	ADD: 2-35 Inf

12. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 74-37-67:

<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: 2-8 Inf	ADD: 2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf	1-12 Inf
1-10 Cav	1-10 Cav
ADD: 2-35 Inf	
A/7-17 Air Cav	<u>Division Troops</u>
	DELETE: 2-35 Inf
	A/7-17 Air Cav

13. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 75-37-67:

<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: 1-12 Inf	ADD: 1-12 Inf
1-10 Cav	1-10 Cav

14. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 76-37-67:

<u>Division Troops</u>	<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: D/7-17 Air Cav	ADD: D/7-17 Air Cav

15. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 77-37-67:

<u>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: 1-35 Inf	ADD: 1-35 Inf

16. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 78-37-67:

<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>Division Troops</u>
DELETE: 1-35 Inf	ADD: 1-35 Inf

17. (C) Task Organization as of 31 July with supporting artillery units:

<u>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
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3-8 Inf  
 3-12 Inf  
 1-8 Inf  
 B/2-1 Cav  
 6-29 Arty  
 A/1-92 Arty  
 C/5-16 Arty  
 D/5-16 Arty  
 B/6-14 Arty  
 Co A, 4th Engr Bn  
 TACP

Division Troops

2-1 Cav (-)  
 7-17 Air Cav (-)  
 A/5-22 Arty  
 4th Engr Bn

DISCOM

2-35 Inf  
 1-22 Inf  
 1-12 Inf  
 B/1-10  
 A/7-17 Air Cav  
 D/7-17 Air Cav  
 B/1-35 Inf  
 D/1-35 Inf  
 B/4-42 Arty  
 C/4-42 Arty  
 B/2-9 Arty  
 C/1-92 Arty  
 B/5-22 Arty  
 Co B, 4th Engr Bn  
 TACP

DIVARTY

1-14 Inf  
 2-8 Inf  
 1-10 Cav (-)  
 1-35 Inf (-)  
 A/2-9 Arty  
 A/3-6 Arty  
 B/3-6 Arty  
 B/1-92 Arty  
 A/5-16 Arty  
 A/6-14 Arty  
 C/6-14 Arty  
 C/2-9 Arty  
 Prov Btry  
 Co E, 4th Engr Bn  
 TACP

Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

Division Headquarters

Stone, Charles P.	MG	CG, 4th Inf Div
Brownfield, Albert R. Jr.	PG	ADC-4
Hodges, Warren D.	COL	Chief of Staff
Sulenski, Joseph S.	LTC	ACofS, G1
Smith, John A. Jr.	LTC	ACofS, G2
Kirwan, Robert L.	LTC	ACofS, G3
Brandt, Leo M.	LTC	ACofS, G4
Renick, Roderick D.	LTC	ACofS, G5
Daniels, John L.	LTC	DPC
Krug, Robert W.	LTC	AG
Zone, Robert W.	LTC	Div Durg
Seaman, Robert	LTC	IG
Russel, Donald M.	LTC	PMO
Childers, John C. Jr.	LTC	Fin Off
Cotton, James H.	LTC	Chap
Gillespie, John W.	LTC	Cml Off
Peck, Darrell L.	LTC	SJA
Kington, Donald M.	MAJ	IO

1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division

Fix, Joseph E.	COL	CO
Hickey, Pennel J.	LTC	XO
Hewitt, Robert A.	MAJ	S3

2d Bde, 4th Infantry Division

McChrystal, Herbert J.	COL	CO
Story, Robert P.	LTC	XO
Stanilli, Joseph	MAJ	S3

3d Bde, 4th Infantry Division

Forrester, Eugene P.	COL	CO
Buckner, Garrett D.	LTC	XO
Estep, Ronald C.	MAJ	S3

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Division Artillery

McAlister, Robert C.	COL	CO
Dewhirst, Sam T.	LTC	XO
Maurer, William W.	LTC	S3

Division Support Command

Abernathy, William C.	COL	CO
		XO
Whedbee, John S. Sr.	MAJ	S3

Battalions

Tombaugh, William W.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf
Edgerton, John P.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
Yarbrough, John D.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
Palastra, Joseph T.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
Hendrix, Jamie R.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
Monclova, Irving	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
McBride, Thomas E. Jr.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
Mundie, William L.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
Moore, William C.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
Noce, Robert W.	LTC	CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav
Moreau, Donald W.	LTC	CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav
Riggs, Theodore S.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
Akers, Albert B.	LTC	CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty
Fronczak, Edward L.	LTC	CO, 4th Bn, 29th Arty
Wiles, Richard I.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty
Hayward, Barton M.	LTC	CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty
Williams, Donald L.	LTC	CO, 4th Avn Bn
Helberg, Elvin R.	LTC	CO, 4th Engr Bn
Rolya, William I.	LTC	CO, 124th Sig Bn
Stracener, Carl E.	LTC	CO, 4th Med Bn
Porter, Vernon R.	LTC	CO, 4th S&T Bn
Ball, Duard D.	LTC	CO, 704th Maint Bn

Separate Companies and Detachments

Kelly, Peter A.	CPT	CO, HHC, 4th Inf Div
Long, George M.	CPT	CO, 4th Admin Co
Damon, Donald	CPT	CO, 4th MP Co
Magee, Michael C.	MAJ	CO, 4th MI Det
Holtry, Preston W.	CPT	CO, 29th Mil Hist Det

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CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

1. (C) Traildust Missions:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
2 May	YB7504-YA7588	6
3 May	YA7127-7722-8114	6
5 May	YB7504-YA7588	6
7 May	YA8901-YV8984	6
9 May	YA7284-YA6571	6
24 May	YB7504-YA7508	6
28 May	YA7144-7127	6
14 Jun	YA8802-YV8885	6
16 Jul	YB7804-YB8506-YB9506	2
18 Jul	YA9101-8605-8115	2

2. (C) Crop Destruction:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>TYPE CROPS</u>	<u>ACRES</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
29 Jun	ZB7871-8232	Corn	34.5	White	150
2 Jul	BR1125	Corn, Rice	53	Blue	240
3 Jul	BR1325-1326	Corn, Rice	59	Blue	250
3 Jul	BR1216	Rice, Beans	74	Blue	350
4 Jul	BR1213	Rice	22	Blue	75
9 Jul	BR1323	Rice, Beans	37	Blue	110
10 Jul	BR1523	Rice	23	Blue	110
11 Jul	BR1423-0924	Rice, Bananas	25	Blue	110
13 Jul	YA8977	Rice, Corn	21	Blue	110
14 Jul	YA8977	Beans, Rice Corn	21	Blue	110

3. (U) Perimeter Defoliation:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
28 May	Div	AR7833	Truck	Blue	165
31 May	Div	AR7833	Truck	Blue	550
1 Jun	Div	AR7833	Truck	Blue	495
11 Jun	Div	AR7835	Truck	Blue	605
12 Jun	Div	AR7834	Truck	Blue	660
13 Jun	Div	AR7834	Truck	Blue	550
14 Jun	Div	AR7834	Truck	Blue	495
19 Jun	Div	AR8036	Truck	Blue	550
29 Jun	Sp Forces	ZB0393	UH-1	White	225
4 Jul	Div	AR8033	UH-1	Blue	75
14 Jul	Div	AR8035	UH-1	Blue	150
18 Jul	Sp Forces	ZA2387	Truck	Blue	330

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
19 Jul	2/1 Cav	BR1453	Truck	Orange	270
31 Jul	Div	AR7833	CH-47	Blue	1500
		AR7834			
		AR7835			

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Box Full Of Grenades




FIGURE 1

20 CS GRENADES  
WITH PINS PULLED




FIGURE 2



FIGURE 3





FIGURE 4

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BAUER FLARE

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# **OPERATIONAL REPORT**

## **LESSONS LEARNED**

### **4<sup>TH</sup> Infantry Division**

31 OCT 1968

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 3 year intervals

Declassified after 12 years

EO 1.4 (b) (7) - (C) Applies

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

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SECTION 3 - DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION - ESCAPE AND EVASION

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ENCLOSURES

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| 1. | ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
| 2. | KEY PERSONNEL            |
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

JVDDH-CC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division  
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SECTION 1 (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

a. During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation MAC ARTHUR.

b. Organizational Structure. Task organization for Operation BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR for the period is contained at inclosure 1.

c. Key personnel. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

d. Mission.

(1) The general mission of the division at the end of the reporting period was to conduct surveillance and offensive operations and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM's Refugee Resettlement Program and the Revolutionary Development Program.

(2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

(b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces.

(c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.

(d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.

(e) Detect and eliminate VIET CONG infrastructures.

(f) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.

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AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division  
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RGS GSPOR-65 (R1)

(g) Support the Government of VIETNAM's EDAP HUNG Resettlement Program.

(h) Open, secure and maintain land lines of communication.

(i) Be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of Camp Strike Forces, Regional and Popular Forces, critical signal sites and sector/subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.

(j) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion size reserve on order.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General: At the beginning of the reporting period, the major enemy threat had shifted to DARLAC as a result of the 1st NVA Division having withdrawn from KONTUM Province in June and moved into DARLAC Province in July with the mission of taking BAN ME THUOT. By the middle of August, the enemy was conducting his final reconnaissance of the city, with the 66th Regt north of the city, the 320th Regt to the west, and the 95C Regt to the south. With the arrival of 4th Division units in the BAN ME THUOT area, however, the enemy was forced to switch his objective, and he redeployed the 320th and 95C Regts to DUC LAP. After unsuccessfully attempting to overrun DUC LAP Sub-sector Headquarters and SF Camp, the enemy withdrew into Base Area 740.

In the Tri-border area, the 101D Regiment in late August made an abortive ground attack on DAK SEANG SF Camp and a number of attacks by fire on DAK SEANG and PSD's in the area.

In early August the 24th Regt relocated from north of KONTUM City to the vicinity of the PLEIKU-KONTUM Province boundary, east of Hwy 14N. They attempted three ambushes in late August. ARVN elements inflicted heavy losses on the 24th Regt in August and September engagements east of Highway 14N between PLEIKU and KONTUM Cities.

The 18B and 95th Regts, which moved to Base Area 701 from the coast in July, did not return to the coast in September as anticipated, indicating that they may be assigned to the Highlands for a long offensive. The 95th Regt moved to the DUC LAP area in September, but was contacted only sporadically.

September and October saw a general withdrawal and realignment of B-3 Front forces. The 101D Regt vacated the Tri-border area and moved south, probably to Base Area 701. The 24th Regt moved out of country and probably returned to its normal resupply area in Base Area 609. The 66th Regt moved from north of BAN ME THUOT to the area north of DUC LAP.

At the end of the reporting period, the main enemy force appeared to have concentrated in Base Area 701 opposite DUC CO. Units believed to be in the area were the 18B and probably 101D Regts. The 18B Regt was identified in a contact southwest of THINH AN at the end of October, indicating that an enemy offensive might be in the offing in western PLEIKU. A diversionary effort around BEN HET was also taking shape, with 40th Arty Regt units and possibly elements of the

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division  
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

24th Regt conducting attacks by fire on BEN HET and FSB's in the area. The 320th and 95C Regts were not observed since early September, and were probably still in Base Area 740. The 95th Regt was probably also there, while the 66th Regt was located somewhere between Base Area 740 and Base Area 701.

(1) KONTUM: In marked contrast to past patterns of enemy operations in the Highlands, KONTUM Province witnessed only limited enemy activity after early August, and at the end of the reporting period was opposed by the smallest number of NVA forces since prior to the Battle for DAK TO during November 1967.

Activity during the month of August was centered in the DAK SEANG area. After a feint at friendly firebases in the BEN HET area on the night of 14 Aug by means of heavy weapons attacks by the 40th NVA Arty Regt, the 101st NVA Regt launched a savage attack on the DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp on 18 Aug. A sweep of the area following the abortive assault netted 39 enemy bodies and 12 prisoners. This attack signaled the initiation of the Third General Offensive in KONTUM Province. The 1st Bde CP received a rocket attack on 22 Aug, and KONTUM City was hit by rockets and mortars on 23 Aug. It is significant that the attacks by fire were not followed by major ground contact as was the case during the TET and Second General Offensives. This would indicate that the VC and NVA forces simply were not strong enough to carry out full-scale coordinated attacks as they had previously. The attacks by fire continued on a daily basis in the DAK SEANG area during the remainder of August, but dissipated to sniping in the DAK TO area and mining activity and sporadic harassing attacks in the KONTUM City area.

For the first three weeks of September, friendly installations in the DAK SEANG area continued to experience almost daily attacks by fire, light contacts, and probes. In late September, however, enemy activity rapidly decreased, and Red Haze, APD sensings, and visual reconnaissance detected the withdrawal of the 101st Regt from the DAK SEANG area into LAOS. Activity generally increased south of DAK TO as a result of NVA efforts to reuse the old PLEI TRAP Road, specifically its northern and the eastern extensions. The KONTUM City area remained relatively active during September. Two rocket attacks, numerous light harassing attacks, and several attacks by fire on friendly locations north of the city were received.

The NVA units in KONTUM Province used the majority of the month of October to refit and reposition; consequently, there was an almost complete halt of enemy activity during this period. The DAK PEK area was the scene of increased activity as a result of the enemy's resupply efforts; however, despite this activity, no significant contacts were made in this area.

In late October there were indications of increased enemy activity in the BEN HET area that culminated in several intense attacks by fire on FSB #29 just south of the BEN HET Special Forces Camp and one 122MM rocket attack on BEN HET itself. This was the first rocket attack on the Special Forces Camp since 16 Feb, and indicates continued enemy interest in this area. The enemy involved were the 40th Arty Regt and possibly elements of the 24th Regt.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division  
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

On 27 and 28 Oct wheeled vehicle tracks were noted along the northern section of the PLEI TRAP Road, indicating the intention of the NVA to use this road once again. This is the first sign of vehicular use of the road since it was closed on 6 April.

(2) PLEIKU: In early August, the 24th NVA Regt moved from KONTUM Province and positioned itself along the PLEIKU-KONTUM boundary near Highway 14N. They were identified in a contact on 16 August when a two-company size ambush on Highway 14N resulted in 11 NVA killed. Documents captured in a sweep of the area identified the K-5 Bn, 24th Regt. Another two-company size ambush on 23 Aug, and subsequent platoon to company size contacts with CSF and ARVN units, produced PW's who identified all three Bns of the 24th Regt. The mission of the 24th Regt at that time was the interdiction of Highway 14N. Contacts continued throughout September. On 22 Sep a HOI CHANH from the K-5 Bn, 24th Regt stated that 390 men from the K-4 Bn and 150 men from the K-5 Bn were killed by recent airstrikes. He also stated that the K-6 Bn was operating west of Highway 14N, north of PLEI MONG. This was confirmed by contacts with US and CSF units north of PLEI MONG in late September and early Oct. It now appears that the 24th Regt has withdrawn into CAMBODIA for resupply purposes.

A newly formed Local Force Bn, designated the X-45, was identified by documents on 19 Aug. The X-45 Bn is located north of EDAP EMANG, between Highways 19W and 509, and has the mission of attacking the EDAP EMANG and THINH GIAO Resettlement Villages, as well as harassment of Highway 19W. Another Local Force Bn, the H-15, was identified for the first time since TET. On 7 Oct, a HOI CHANH rallied along Highway 7B, near the PLEIKU-PHU BON border. He stated that the H-15 LF Bn had been recruiting new personnel since TET and their current strength is 50. Their mission is the harassment of Highway 7B.

Enemy local force, sapper and artillery units harassed allied installations in the PLEIKU City area in late August. On 23 August, elements of the 31st Bn, 40th Arty Regt launched a total of 45 rounds of 122mm rocket fire from the west and north in conjunction with squad to platoon size sapper attacks against installations in the PLEIKU City area. On 12 Sep, Camp EMPI received approximately 25 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, all of which landed outside of the perimeter.

The infiltration and resupply route across southern PLEIKU Province remained active. Intermittent contacts have been made with transportation units providing supplies to the 95B Regt.

The 95B NVA Regt continued to operate on the eastern boundary of PLEIKU Province. The 5th Bn, 95B Regt continued its mission of harassment of vehicular traffic along Highway 19E. However, there was very little enemy activity along the highway, and recent indications are that the 95B Regt has moved east into BINH DINH Province and may in the future assume another mission.

In July, the 95th and 188 Regts moved from their areas of operation in PHU YEN and KHANH HOI Province into Base Area 701 in CAMBODIA. They remained in that location until approximately 1 Sep when the 95th Regt moved south to join the forces threatening DUC LAP. The 188 Regt as well as elements of the 101E Regt

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division  
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RC5 CSFOR-65 (R1)

The attacks became more sporadic, and ceased almost entirely by the latter part of October.

The total losses for the NVA/VC forces attacking in the DUC L&P area were well above 1,200.

Additionally, in the early part of August, captured documents revealed that the K-37 Engineer Bn AKA K-37 Sapper Bn and the K-25 Engineer Bn AKA K-25 Sapper Bn were working in the areas west and E-NE of BAN ME THUOT, respectively.

During the month of September contacts throughout DARLAC Province were usually limited to small local forces elements.

The decrease in enemy activity continued through the month of October. There has been no further identification or contact with the K-37, K-25, K-39 Bns, and the 66th, 320th, 95C, and 95th Regts during the month of October. The E-301 LF Bn was identified on 26 Oct by PWs as having two companies operating west of the MEWAL Plantation via AQ 8221. The C-2 Co, E-301 LF Bn has been identified by documents as located south of BAN ME THUOT. The 401 LF Bn was reported by PWs to be operating east of the MEWAL Plantation. Also, the PWs stated that the H-5 District Headquarters is located in the MEWAL Plantation. On 18 Oct a PW captured east of BAN ME THUOT from the 316th Trans Bn stated that his unit was subordinate to the 559th Trans Cp.

b. Estimated Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength on 31 Oct 68.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CURRENT EST STR</u>	<u>LAST KNOWN LOCATION</u>
B-3 Front Hq	500	CAMBODIA/KONTUM Border
1st NVA Inf Div (HQ & SPT)	1415	Base Area 740
66th NVA Inf Regt	1800	CAMBODIA/DARLAC Border
320th NVA Inf Regt	1400	Base Area 740
95C, NVA Inf Regt	1200	Base Area 740
168 NVA Inf Regt	1800	Base Area 701
95th NVA Inf Regt	1800	CAMBODIA/DARLAC Border
24th NVA Inf Regt	900	CAMBODIA/KONTUM Border
*40th NVA Arty Regt	1200	Tri-border Area
95B NVA Inf Regt	850	E. PLEIKU Province
304th VC LF Bn	150	North of KONTUM City
406th Sapper Bn	100	North of KONTUM City
X-45 VC LF Bn	200	W. PLEIKU Province
H-15 VC LF Bn	50	DAK AYUNH Valley
407th Sapper Bn	300	Unlocated
408th Sapper Bn	275	Northeast of PLEIKU City
301st VC LF Bn	250	BAN ME THUOT Area
401st VC LF Bn	300	BAN ME THUOT Area
K-39 NVA Inf Bn	300	Southwest of BAN ME THUOT
K-25 Sapper Bn	200	East of BAN ME THUOT
K-37 Sapper Bn	300	EAST OF BAN ME THUOT

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