August 05, 2014 at 7:54 PM

CONFIDENTIAL HQ XXIV CORPS, G-DA NANG RVN
12 APRIL 1970
PERINTREP 10-70
Period Covered: 050001H - 112400H April 1970
Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-17, ND 48-13, NE 48-4, ND 49-5.

1. (C) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION:
The intensity of enemy initiated activity decreased over the last reporting period even though enemy initiated incidents totaled 466, an increase of 22 from last week. The total number of incoming rounds decreased to 611 from 1622 for the week ending 11 April. There was a decrease in the number of enemy KIA's: 965 compared to 974 for the previous week. The number of PW's was 91, 38 more than the previous period. There were 91 incidents of mines and booby traps reported versus 88 for the last reporting period.

B. Thua Thien (P):
Activity within the province during the reporting period remained at a relatively high level. NVA forces in the western mountain region continued to make their presence felt by conducting attacks by mortar, RPG, and small arms fire. Action seemed to be concentrated around FSB Ripcord and FSB Veghel. In a recent incident 1/2 km east of FSB Ripcord (YD 343192), C/2/506 rceived mortar rounds, RPG rounds, and small arms fire from an estimated platoon-size force. Elements returned small arms fire and organic weapons fire. The results of the contact were 2 US KIA and 8 US WIA. It is believed that elements of the 6th regiment are the principle aggressors in this area. In another contact 1 km northeast of FSB Katy (YD 445158) on 7 April, the CP, D/1/506 Inf, received RPG rockets from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned organic weapons fire. Results were 1 US KIA, 26 WIA. This incident may have involved the K12 Sapper BN/6 Regiment.

In activity in eastern Thua Thien Province it was learned through PW interrogation that the Chi Thua I and Chi Thua II Sapper Battalions were responsible for attacks on FSB Arsenal and FSB Anzio respectively. On 6 April 70 at FSB Arsenal, C/1/502 Inf received an unknown number of RPG rockets. Shortly thereafter, 4 sappers attempted to penetrate the perimeter wire. Artillery, ARA, and flare ships were employed. Ten minutes later, 2/C/1 of the 502d Inf, in their ambush positions, observed 15 enemy 150 meters southeast of their position. ARA was employed. Results of the contact were 4 US WIA, 6 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW's, 12 RPG rockets, 78x1/4 lb satchel charges, 5 bangalore torpedoes and a 30 lb TNT block. Finally on 7 Apr 70 at FSB Anzio, (YD 933073), the regt CP, HHC, and Rcn Co/4/54 ARVN received approx 100 mixed RPG rockets and mortar rounds followed by a sapper attack from an estimated 80 enemy. Artillery, ARA, duster, and flare ships were employed. Results were 1 US WIA, 8 ARVN WIA, 39 NVA KIA, and 6 NVA PW.

2. (C) ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD:
A. Strength and Disposition: See Annex A.
B. Order of Battle:
From 5 Apr - 11 Apr 1970, there were 21 infantry regiments committed against XXIV Corps. These regiments are composed of 61 NVA Infantry battalions and 3 Main Force Infantry battalions. These forces are supported by the normal combat and combat service support units (signal, reconnaissance, medical, transportation, recoilless rifle, mortar, engineer, anti-aircraft and sapper). In addition, there are 8 separate Main Force and Local Force Infantry battalions, 19 Sapper battalions and 2 Reconnaissance battalions for a total of 93 maneuver battalions. These battalions are supported by 14 Rocket and Rocket Artillery battalions and 9 Field Artillery battalions. These units are identified as confirmed or probable, and are so located that no significant delay would be involved in their deployment against XXIV Corps.

C. Reinforcement:
There are 8 NVA regiments, one division and one sapper battalion reinforcing committed NVA forces which oppose XXIV Corps. These forces are considered uncommitted, but capable of closing with XXIV Corps in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. These units, except for the 3d NVA Infantry Division are currently unlocated in NVN but are identified units which have previously operated in the XXIV Corps AO.

H. Air Defense:
Anti-aircraft fire decreased from 190 incidents to 182 for the reporting period with 43 aircraft sustaining hits.

K. Artillery, Rockets, Mortar:
The following is a compilation of incoming rounds reported in XXIV Corps AO during the week of 05-11 Apr.
TYPE EXPENDED
Unk cal mortar 91
60mm mortar 82
81mm mortar 1
82mm mortar 349
120mm mortar 47
Unk cal rocket 38
122mm rocket 42
140mm rocket 8

3. (C) OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS:
A. Enemy Identification: Nil.
B. Equipment Nil.
C. Personalities: Nil.
D. Enemy casualties: Enemy losses in XXIV Corps AO increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 965 KIA's and 91 PW's.

I. Weather:
1. Recap of Weather for Reporting Period:
Quang Tri Phu Bai Da Nang Chu Lai
High Temp 100 97 94 95
Low Temp 68 66 68 78
Pct Humid (Ave) 76 74 75 80
Rainfall .02" 0 0 .05"
Wind (Ave) NE/4 kts NE/6 kts E/8 kts var/6 kts
Miles Vis (Ave) 4.5 6 7.5 6

2. Weather Outlook for period 120001H-182400H Apr 70.
a. General: A frontal system is expected to effect the Corps AO beginning around 121000H Apr. Poor conditions will exist over the Corps AO for 36-48 hours with gradual improvement during the next 36 hour period.

J. Reconnaissance:
1. Ground Reconnaissance:
a. There were 78 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout the XXIV Corps AO during the period. The long range teams reported 55 sightings, totaling approximately 351 enemy. Recon team contacts, and air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings resulted in 61 enemy KIA and one enemy PW during the reporting period.
b. In the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Ranger teams reported observing approximately 28 enemy. A contact on 9 April resulted in nine enemy KIA.
c. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) Ranger teams operating in the Khe Sanh and upper Da Krong Valleys reported contacting 20-40 enemy at 081655H vic XD 994358. Results of the contact were four enemy KIA.
d. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company teams reported observing 39 enemy and killing seven enemy. Numerous campfires and a high level of activity were observed vic ZC 0550 throughout the period.
e. 1st Force Reconnaissance Battalion teams operating in the 1st Marine Division AO observed approximately 201 enemy during the period. Recon team contacts and air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings resulted in forty enemy KIA. One PW was captured during the period. While preparing for an extraction on 6 April, a team at ZC200620 contacted and estimated 30 enemy resulting in 16 enemy KIA. While conducting a search of a base camp vic AT 803637 on 7 April, the security element of a recon team contacted an unknown size enemy force resulting in 11 enemy KIA.

2. Aerial Reconnaissance:
a. Results of visual reconnaissance are published by respective divisions in the daily INTSUM.
b. Photo Interpretation, SLAR, IR, APD: Aerial photography of 3 April indicated a possible vehicle turn-off from Route 966 (YC 723042). Photography of 5 April showed a camouflaged vehicle turn-off from Route 616 (XD 869228) and a large cave near Route 926. Red Haze missions recorded readings in populated areas, in the river valley northwest of Hau Duc (AT 945029), in the river valley south of Nong Son (vic AT 800350), and around Hiep Duc (vic 9025). Side looking airborne radar recorded MTI in Base Area 611 and Base Area 607. An APD mission flown on 10 April southeast of Hau Duc (vic BS 1588) detected, then observed personnel. Helicopter gunships killed 2 enemy.

4. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:
A. General:
Enemy initiated activity continued at a high level during the reporting period. The majority of the incidents occurred at the early portion of the week as the enemy "high point" tapered off. Activity was not centered in any one province, but was spread across the entire XXIV Corps AO.
There were 32 reported politically oriented terrorist incidents. These incidents resulted in 17 people kidnapped, 9 civilians killed, 60 civilians wounded and 206 homes/buildings destroyed or damaged. While these figures are high, they represent a decrease from the previous reporting period. Quang Nam (P) and Quang Ngai (P) were the locations of the majority of these incidents, with rural hamlets and rural GVN Pacification Program centers being the targets for most of the late reported incidents.
A look at the past week's sabotage activity indicate that the interdiction of National Highway 1 was one of the enemy's objectives during their recent "high point". Six reported incidents occurred on Highway 1 and one incident involved the Hue-Da Nang Railroad Line.
There were three reported incidents of propaganda, all in Thua Thien (P). This figure is expected to rise in the coming weeks as it is felt that the VC/NVA will attempt to capitalize on the propaganda value of their increased activity. There were no reported incidents of espionage, during the reporting period. This was possibly due to the enemy's interest in more ostentatious forms of activity.
Miscellaneous significant reports include:
1. A directive, classified Top Secret, possibly issued by the Current Affairs Committee, Dien Ban (D), Quang Da Special Zone, Region 5, pertains to VC guerilla activities.
2. A directive, possibly issued by the Current Affairs Committee, Dien Ban (D), Quang Da Special Zone, Region 5, pertains to the Political Struggle and Military Proselyting phase of action.
3. A captured enemy document which pertains to enemy fifty columnists in Quang Dien (D), Thua Thien (P).
4. A reported incident of VCI recruiting attempt in Phong Dien (D), Quang Ngai (P).
B. Espionage: There were no reported incidents of enemy espionage activity during the week.
C. Sabotage:
National Highway 1 was the scene of six reported incidents this week and one incident occurred on the Hue-Da Nang railroad line. Also, three late reports from the previous reporting period involve interdiction of Highway 1.
1. Thua Thien (P): On 6 April, 1970, at 0930 hrs, an individual, while sweeping railroad tracks vic ZD 064017, detonated an unknown type mine, resulting in four RF KIA and 6 feet of rail damaged. (Thua Thien Sector INTSUM 96-70)

D. Political:
Terrorism remained at a high level during the reporting period, with 32 reported incidents accounting for 17 people kidnapped, 9 civilians killed, 60 civilians wounded and 206 homes/buildings destroyed or damaged. There were 56 late reports of terrorist incidents, boosting the totals for the previous reporting period to 74 reported incidents involving 50 people kidnapped, 67 civilians killed, 169 civilians wounded and 165 homes/buildings destroyed. These statistics, over a two week period of increased enemy activity, indicate the increasing emphasis the enemy places in the political objective of destroying the people's faith in the GVN as a viable form of security.
1. Quang Tri (P):
a) On 7 April 1970, at 0150 hrs, and USEF attacked a platoon of RF Co 560, RD Group #1 and PSDF who were in NDP at Lan Lang (H) (YD 183606), Cam Hieu (V), Cam Lo (D). Among the casualties from the contact were three civilians killed and four civilians wounded. Two houses were totally destroyed and four houses were partially damaged (Quang Tri/PSD 4-06-70)
b) On 7 April 1970, at 1200 hrs, a 40 pound explosive device with time fuse, emplaced behind the Cam Hieu (V) headquarters, vic YD 179509, Cam Lo (D), detonated. The village headquarters was 75% damaged by the explosion. (Quang Tri (P) Incident Report, 071000Z Apr 1970)
2. Thua Thien (P):
On 5 April 1970, at 1215 hrs, an unidentified female civilian, while walking on a trail, vic YD 570425, My Phu (V), Phong Dien (D), was injured when she stepped into a punji pit. (Thua Thien Sector INTSUM 95-70)

3. Quang Nam (P):
a) On 8 April 1970, at 1400, hrs one VC entered Yen Ne (H) A(AT 990680), Hoa Vang (D), and placed a timed explosive of unknown size and type in the house of the RD Cadre Team. Results of the explosion were one civilian wounded and three houses destroyed. (Quang Nam INTSUM 97-70)
b) (Late Report) On 29 March 1970, at 0130 hrs, an USEF burned the village committee building and National Police sub-station in Lai Nghi (H) (CNA), Vinh Xuan (V), Dien Ban (D). The two buildings were completely destroyed (Quang Nam/PSD 04-07-70)
c) (Late Report) On 31 March 1970, at 1245 hrs, a hand grenade was thrown into Than Quit (H) (CNA), Tinh Truong (V), Dien Ban (D). The grenade wounded the administration commissioner of the village committee and six other civilians. (Quang Nam/PSD 04-05-70)
d) (Late Report) On 1 April 1970, at 2400 hrs, and USEF burned the Huong An market (CNA) and 20 homes in Huong Xuan (H) (CNA), Phu Huong (V), Que Son (D). There were also four civilians killed and 13 civilians wounded. (Quang Nam/PSD 04-07-70)
4. Quang Tin (P):
a) On 5 April 1970, at 1330 hrs, an explosive charge, which had been planted on an ARVN truck parked on a Tam Ky City street (CNA), exploded. The explosion resulted in six ARVN soldiers and three civilians killed, 30 civilians wounded, two houses totally destroyed and two houses partially damaged. (Quang Tin/PSD 04-31-70)
b) On 5 April 1970, at 2200 hrs, one VC platoon entered Ngoc Tho (H) (CNA), Ky Nghia (V),Tam Ky (D) and kidnapped a sub-hamlet chief. (Quang Tin/PSD 04-34-70) (5) Quang Ngai (P):
a) On 6 April 1970, at 0200 hrs, ten B-40 rounds impacted in My Trong (H) (BS 832330), Duc Pho (D). One Civilian was killed, three civilians were wounded and three houses were destroyed. (Quang Ngai Daily INTSUM Number 82)
b) (Late Report) On 30 March 1970, at 0100 hrs, an USEF entered Phuoc Thuan (H) (BS 573916), Binh Thanh (V), Binh Son (D). The enemy abducted two residents, burned one watchtower and destroyed 100 meters of perimeter fence.
On the morning of 30 March 1970, while residents of the hamlet were repairing the fence, an unknown type mine was detonated causing one civilian killed and five civilians wounded. (Quang Ngai/PSD 94-03)
d) (Late Report) On 2 April 1970, at 0900 hrs, an USEF entered Binh Van (H), (BS 620938), Binh Son (D) and assassinated the hamlet chief. (Quang Ngai/PSD 96-08).
E. Propaganda:
There were three propaganda incidents reported during the week, all in Thua Thien (P). There were nine late reports on incidents during the previous reporting period. However, no new theme or approach was noted in the propaganda.
1. Thua Thien (P):
a) On the night of 5 April 1970, an unknown number of propaganda leaflets were dropped in My Chanh (H) (YD 962255), Phu Dien (V), Phu Vang (D). The leaflets instructed the people to fight the Americans. (Thua Thien/PSD 04-17-70)
b) (Late Report) On the night of 2-3 April 1970, an unknown number of propaganda leaflets were distributed at Dong Thinh (H), Phu Thu (D), (YD 837217) and Dong Anh (H) (YD 859226), Phu Ha (V), Phu Thu (D). The leaflets, written in English and Vietnamese, called for a stop to the war. (Thu Thien/PSD 1019)

F. Miscellaneous:
1. Directive number 28 CT/TV, dated 6 March 1970, signed by Hong Thang for C.68 pertains to the Political Struggle and Military Proselyting phase of action which was to be conducted in the rural areas. In order to bring the villagers back to their native villages, the Political Struggle Section and Military Proselyting Section should be consolidated and formed in a reserve force divided into spearhead cells which will be employed in the struggle when needed. (CDEC DOC LOG 05-1330-70, Bulletin No: 31,524)
2. A document captured on 2 March 1970, reveals the following: the enemy has organized internal traitors among the ranks of the Quang Dien PSDF and PF. In addition, the enemy has also organized clandestine guerrillas (nfi), and publicly sent in ex-Communist Party members for operations (nfi). (Thua Thien Sector INTSUM 95-70)
3. On 5 April 1970, at 1630 H, six VC suspects entered Phu Ninh (H) (YD 605293), Phong An (V), Phnog Dien (D), Thua Thien (P), for the purposes of liaison and to recruit VCI. (Thua Thien/PSD 04-17/70).
4. On 5 April 1970, at 0100 Hrs, and USEF collected 20 kilos of rice and took 7,200 $VN from residents of My An (H) (BS 695637), Tu Nghia (D), Quang Ngai (P). (Quang Ngai/PSD 98-18)

5. (C) ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES:
A. Courses of Action:
Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy forces within and contiguous to XXIV Corps AO, enemy capabilities and courses of action are:
1. Continue prosecute the war at present levels, maintaining pressure on ARVN/FWAF by conducting attacks by fire, limited ground attacks, and light to moderate sapper attacks.
2. Increase these levels of military activity, launching periodic offensives of limited scope and duration.
3. Launch multi-regimental to division size attacks across the DMZ and from western base areas toward the lowlands supported by all available artillery with the intent of inflictin attacks across the DMZ and from western base areas toward the lowlands supported by all available artillery with the intent of inflicting maximum casualties upon friendly forces and to take and hold population centers. The threat by geographical area follows:
a) Attack installations in Northern Quang Tri (P) with up to six infantry regiments supported by two sapper battalions and three artillery regiments.
b) Attack Quang Tri City from the south with up to five infantry battalions supported by two sapper battalions and one rocket/artillery battalion.
c) Attack the Hue/Phu Bai area with elements of five infantry regiments supported by two mortar/rocket battalions.
d) Attack installations in the DaNang TAOR (area surrounded by BT 1858, AT 9168, AT 8983, AT 9384, AT8443) with the equivalent of up to five infantry regiments supported by five sapper battalions and two rocket battalions.
e) Attack the Tam Ky/Chu Lai Combat Base with two infantry regiments supported by four sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.
f) Attack population centers in Quang Ngai (P) with the equivalent of two infantry regiments supported by two sapper battalions and one artillery battalion.
4. Revert to guerilla warfare with emphasis on the more traditional insurgent tactics of wide spread hit-and-run raids, sabotage, terrorism, attacks-by-fire, and intensified political-economic warfare.
5. Reinforce forces presently in XXIV Corps AO with two to three divisions from North Vietnam either across the DMZ or via the Laotian Panhandle, to effect either course of action (1), (2), or (3) above.
6. Defend positions just north of the DMZ with up to six infatnry regiments supported by two sapper battalions and three artillery regiments; defend elsewhere in XXIV Corps AO south of Route 9 with forces locally available.
7. Conduct terrorist, political, propaganda and proselying activities in conjunction with any of his courses of action.
B. Analysis and Discussion:
In the upcoming week there would be a little change in the pattern or intensity of enemy activity as experienced last week. He is expected to continue consolidating his positions and preparing his forces for phase II activities scheduled for late April or early May. Reconnaissance of selected targets will continue as will resupply of local forces. Offensive activity should be charactized primarily by attacks-by-fire and small ground probes. Activity in Northern Quang Tri migh be an exception, as elements of three regiments are congregated in the Mai Loc area. The 27th NVA Regiment will continue it's offensive operations against friendly forces and installations in the area. Elements of the 246th NVA Regiment have not yet been committed to battle but with disposition of forces immediately west of the Camp Carroll/Mai Loc area employment could be made at any time. Elements of hte 66th NVA Regiment continue to prove a threat from the south.
C. Probable Courses of Action:
During the coming week the enemy will continue his battle in the Central DMZ area while attempting to infiltrate additional forces into the Ba Long Valley, Mai Loc area. In MRTTH the enemy will continue to improve his positions, cache sites, and resupply routes in his newly created base areas to the west of the old base areas 101 and 114, and will continue to react quickly and violently to all Allied intrusions in those areas. In the southen three provinces of the Corps AO the enemy will continue his current level of activity. Offensive activity will remain primarily attacks-by-fire with some limited ground and sapper attacks. His major concern will be primarily continued preparation for upcoming Phase II of the offensive.
D. Vulnerabilities:
1. Massed enemy forces remain vulnerable to detection and subsequent destruction by tactical air, ARA, B-52 strikes, artillery bombardment, and combat assault.
2. Enemy forces infiltrating into the Corps AO remain vulnerable to interdiction, artillery and aerial bombardment, detection and isolation by reconnaissance elements, and defeat in detail by Allied combat operations.
3. Enemy morale is vulnerable to psychological exploitation by propaganda concentrating on NVA/VC defeats in combat; failure of the NVA to support the needs and aspirations of the people, contrasted with GVN ability to support these needs and aspirations; fear of death, battle hardships, disease, poor medical facilities, and lack of food supplies; and failure of VC sympathizers to establish a popular political power base in XXIV Corps AO.

GP-4
OLIVER B. PATTON
COL GS
ACofs, G2
ANNEXES:
A- DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH
B- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STATISTICS
C- DISTRIBUTION

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